Charmaine M. Wong

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal allowed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered three appeals arising from two convictions and an order for a new trial in impaired driving cases.

The central issue was whether, under the amended Criminal Code, the Crown must adduce direct evidence from an analyst or the analyst’s certificate to prove the alcohol standard used to calibrate an Approved Instrument, or whether the certificate or testimony of a qualified technician is sufficient.

The court followed the Yukon Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. MacDonald, holding that the qualified technician’s certificate is evidence of the facts alleged in it, including that the alcohol standard was certified by an analyst.

The appeals were dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Kathleen Thur from convictions for obstructing justice and uttering a forged document.

The court admitted fresh expert evidence regarding the authorship of a disputed letter, finding that the new reports could reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict.

While the court set aside the conviction, it ordered a new trial rather than an acquittal, holding that the interests of justice required a retrial in light of the new evidence.

The appellant, P.R., appealed his convictions for sexually assaulting two 15-year-old complainants.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not misapprehend the appellant’s evidence regarding his sexual preferences or rely on unsupported generalizations or stereotypes.

The trial judge’s findings were grounded in the evidence, and the reasons were read in context and as a whole.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, criminal harassment, and breach of recognizance, as well as his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the 20-month net delay was justified by the exceptional circumstance of case complexity, given the 10 complainants, multiple charges, and extensive pre-trial applications.

The Court also dismissed the conviction appeals based on alleged misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict.

The sentence appeal, challenging a four-month term for breach of recognizance and a 20-year SOIRA registration order, was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault and assault against his spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding evidence of his controlling behaviour and by failing to caution against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contextual evidence was relevant to the issue of consent and that a cross-count reasoning caution was unnecessary because the physical and sexual assaults were inextricably linked.

Thomas Adderley appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his 18-month custodial sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, failing to properly apply the law, and overlooking an absence of forensic evidence.

Regarding the sentence, the appellant contended that the trial judge erred in finding unprotected sexual intercourse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction and the appeal from sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or the treatment of the aggravating factor.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault, alleging a W.(D.) error and misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant's alleged motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no W.(D.) error as the trial judge's partial rejection of the complainant's choking evidence did not undermine her overall credibility for the sexual assault.

The court also rejected the speculative argument that the complainant had a motive to fabricate due to embarrassment over her Snapchat locator, finding it unsupported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud over $5,000, arguing three grounds: improper judicial notice of a psychological theory, reasonable apprehension of bias from the trial judge's comments, and insufficient reasons for judgment regarding credibility and mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reference to psychology was merely shorthand for finding the appellant's explanation implausible, his comments did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias, and his brief oral reasons were sufficient to explain the rejection of the appellant's evidence and the finding of fraudulent intent.

The appellant, T.L., appealed his conviction for three counts of sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge's reasons were inadequate for appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, as they clearly explained the acceptance of the complainant's credible evidence and the rejection of the appellant's denial, consistent with the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

The appellant, Cory Whiston, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the admissibility of text messages.

The issues raised were the prosecution's multiple attempts to admit the text messages and their alleged use as prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretion to allow subsequent motions for evidence, especially when the evidentiary landscape changed (citing *R. v. Langan*).

The Court also clarified that the appellant's own statements in the texts were admissible as party admissions, not subject to the rules governing prior consistent statements (citing *R. v. Schneider*).

The appellant appealed his convictions for various offences, including robbery and theft, and challenged the trial judge's finding that his Charter rights (ss. 10(a) and 10(b)) were not breached upon arrest.

He also argued procedural unfairness because the trial judge did not accept the Crown's concession regarding a Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of natural justice, no error in the trial judge's determination that physical evidence was not obtained in a Charter-infringing manner, and no error in the alternative s. 24(2) analysis for admitting the evidence.

The applicants, Darko and Daniel Stojanovski, sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of attempted murder and discharging a firearm, and sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court found the appeals were not frivolous but dismissed the applications, concluding that detention was necessary in the public interest due to the serious nature of the offences, the unacceptably weak release plan, and the weak grounds of appeal, which outweighed the applicants' arguments regarding COVID-19 risks in detention.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped statement to police.

He claimed he had equivocally invoked his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter during the interview.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual determination that the appellant had not expressed a desire to consult counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for arson causing damage to property and mischief endangering life arising from two incidents involving damage to a vehicle belonging to the mother of his former girlfriend.

The appellant was acquitted of a third mischief charge involving a slashed tire.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's admission and reliance on similar fact evidence and her identification of the appellant from security video footage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's identification of the appellant from video evidence or in her conclusion that the two offences were likely committed by the same person based on striking similarities.

The court also granted leave to appeal sentence to eliminate the victim fine surcharge.

J.B. was found guilty of assault bodily harm in a domestic context following a trial.

The Crown sought 9-12 months custody, while the defence requested time served (18 days equivalent) and probation.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation as primary sentencing factors for domestic assault, noting the aggravating factors of the victim's conditioning to abuse, the presence of a child during part of the incident, and the offender's lack of remorse and victim-blaming.

Mitigating factors included cooperation with police, stable employment, and a dated, unrelated criminal record.

The court imposed a sentence of 108 days in custody (90 further days intermittently after 18 days credit), 36 months probation, a DNA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, mandatory domestic violence counselling, and 100 hours of community service.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and breach of probation, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he was pressured by his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, noting the appellant's familiarity with the process and the time elapsed between his decision and the actual plea.

The court also declined to admit the appellant's affidavit as fresh evidence, finding it lacked credibility under the Palmer test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and robbery.

On appeal, he argued for the first time that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated when police elicited an unrecorded statement from him after he requested counsel but before he was given an opportunity to consult one.

The Court of Appeal allowed the issue to be raised, finding a sufficient evidentiary record and no prejudice to the Crown.

The Court held that subsequent recorded statements, taken after the appellant consulted counsel, were tainted by the initial breach due to their close temporal and contextual connection.

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2) as conscriptive evidence, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing a conditional sentence after finding the appropriate sentence was 36 months' incarceration.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, a conditional sentence is unavailable when a sentence of two years or more is imposed.

However, because the respondent had complied with his conditional sentence for six and a half months and made significant rehabilitative efforts, the Court varied the sentence to 36 months' incarceration but stayed the remaining three and a half months to avoid reincarceration.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering and committing sexual assault, arguing his guilty plea was not voluntary and informed due to the incompetence of his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's conduct throughout the multi-day trial, including his failure to object to the facts read-in and his own testimony, belied his claim that he did not intend to plead guilty to the offence as charged.