John Robert Cowan

The appellant sought to strike his guilty plea to possession of a loaded restricted firearm, alleging material non-disclosure.

The Crown had requested an adjournment of a Charter motion, citing a police officer's medical unavailability.

Fresh evidence revealed the officer was facing criminal charges, which were not disclosed to the defence.

The appellant asserted he would not have pleaded guilty if aware of these charges.

The Crown conceded the fresh evidence's admissibility, the material non-disclosure, and that it likely influenced the plea.

The Court of Appeal accepted these concessions, allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, Everton Ambrose, appealed his conviction and sentence arising from a drive-by shooting.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge's reasons carefully reviewed the evidence and amply supported the conclusion that the appellant was either the shooter or a party to the offence.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or in the fitness and reasonableness of the sentence imposed.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, P.M., sought leave to appeal a three-year sentence for sexual assault, six months consecutive for assault, and four months concurrent for uttering a threat, imposed in absentia by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal raised the issue of conflicting sentencing ranges for sexual assault involving intimate partners versus non-intimate partners (R. v. Smith vs. R. v. Bradley).

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's sentence was fit and proportionate, even assuming an error in identifying the precise sentencing range, as appellate intervention is only warranted if the sentence is demonstrably unfit.

The Court declined to resolve the conflict in sentencing ranges for the purpose of this appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, B.J., applied for a bail review after being detained on tertiary grounds for serious drug trafficking and criminal organization charges.

The court found that the inclusion of electronic monitoring in the proposed release plan and the public health implications of the COVID-19 pandemic constituted material changes in circumstances, triggering jurisdiction for review.

The court was satisfied that the stringent release plan, including sureties, house arrest, and electronic monitoring, adequately addressed secondary ground concerns.

Considering the potential for lengthy pre-trial custody due to pandemic-related court delays and the accused's heightened health risk, the court concluded that continued detention was not justified on tertiary grounds.

B.J. was released on strict conditions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped statement to police.

He claimed he had equivocally invoked his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter during the interview.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual determination that the appellant had not expressed a desire to consult counsel.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest, accepted the complainant's evidence without adequate explanation, and rejected the appellant's exculpatory evidence without considering whether it raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and a new trial was ordered due to the trial judge's failure to apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

The defendant, charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking, applied to re-open a voir dire concerning the reasonable and probable grounds for her arrest and sought disclosure of a Confidential Informant's (CI) handler notes.

The application was based on recently disclosed CI notes and arguments regarding CI handling protocols and the CI's status as a material witness.

The court dismissed the application, finding no new significant evidence to cast doubt on the CI's reliability or to justify re-opening the voir dire or disclosing the CI's identity under the innocence at stake exception.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of invitation to sexual touching of a child and acquitted of sexual assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because there was no evidence the child did not comply with the invitations, which would have constituted sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no necessary logical inconsistency.

The court noted the jury may have misunderstood that the appellant's participation in the physical contact amounted to an assault, but this error would have enured to the appellant's benefit and did not undermine the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge should have given a specific caution regarding the complainant's evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury was capable of assessing the complainant's credibility using common sense and the general instructions provided.

The court also held that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could have reached the verdict.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the Crown improperly cross-examined and argued about the complainant's motive to fabricate, and that the guilty verdicts were inconsistent with an acquittal on an incest charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave a proper curative instruction regarding the Crown's conduct and that the verdicts were not inconsistent, as it was open to the jury to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing claims of self-defence or accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the objective medical evidence provided a sufficient basis for the trial judge to reject the appellant's testimony, and noting no other evidence supported her claims.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in her Vetrovec warning to the jury regarding a 'mixed witness' who gave evidence favourable to both the Crown and the defence.

The appellant contended that the trial judge should not have directed the jury to look for confirmatory evidence of the exculpatory portions of the witness's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made it clear the jury could accept the testimony without confirmatory evidence.

The Court noted that the instruction was fair to the appellant, as it did not repeat strong inculpatory evidence and provided a path to accept the exculpatory evidence without confirmation.

Furthermore, defence counsel did not object to the charge at trial.

The appellant and his co-accused were convicted of counselling murder and conspiracy to commit murder after planning to hire a hitman to kill the appellant's wife.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant to 6 years' imprisonment and the co-accused to 3.5 years.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing for parity with his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was the prime mover, motivated by greed, and that the intended victim being his wife justified a higher sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge relied on flawed identification evidence.

The complainant identified the appellant in the holding cells, a procedure the Court of Appeal found seriously flawed despite the appellant's request for it.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered as there was other evidence on the record that might sustain a conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against the thirteen-year-old daughter of his former partner.

The case turned entirely on credibility, with the trial judge rejecting the appellant's evidence based on three perceived inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence underlying all three bases for rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding a prior altercation and by permitting cross-examination on his prior criminal record under a Corbett ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no realistic danger of propensity reasoning regarding the prior altercation, which the defence had relied upon.

The Court also deferred to the trial judge's Corbett ruling, noting that clear limiting instructions were given to the jury regarding the prior convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and applying the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient for appellate review.

The trial judge properly rejected the appellant's evidence that he was invited to a stranger's apartment for consensual sex, and correctly applied the framework from R. v. W.D. without reversing the burden of proof.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his common law partner.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding a lay witness's testimony, gave an inadequate limiting instruction regarding a forensic pathologist's testimony, and that the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding there was a substantial body of circumstantial evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing the trial judge inadvertently gave four-for-one credit for pre-trial custody instead of the intended two-for-one.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the intended sentence would have been 25 months.

However, recognizing the added hardship of re-incarceration after the respondent's release, the Court varied the sentence to 21 months, leaving a remnant of 14 months to be served.