Laura Grant

The accused, charged with multiple offences including sexual assault and assault against an intimate partner, applied for release from custody after his trial had commenced but was adjourned due to a conflict of interest issue involving his defence counsel.

The accused argued that his continued detention was unjustified and sought a review under sections 520, 523, and 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that section 525 did not apply because the trial had commenced, and section 520 did not apply for the same reason.

However, the court assumed jurisdiction under section 523(2)(a) to consider vacating the previous detention order.

Applying the framework from St-Cloud, the court found no error of law in the initial detention order and concluded that there was no material change in circumstances.

The court held that the proposed release plan did not sufficiently mitigate the substantial likelihood that the accused would re-offend or interfere with the administration of justice, and dismissed the application for release.

The appellant, Vincent Bauer, appealed his conviction for three counts of sexual assault, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appeal focused on trial counsel's failure to effectively cross-examine the complainant, to put the appellant's denial of the allegations to the complainant, and to raise an unsupported automatism defence inconsistent with the appellant's instructions.

The court found that counsel's actions amounted to incompetence and resulted in a miscarriage of justice, rendering the verdict unreliable.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and one count of simple assault.

After crashing his vehicle into a gate at high speed, injuring two passengers, the offender panicked, moved a passenger with a broken back against his wishes, and attempted to hide from a passing motorist.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of his post-accident conduct against his youthful first-offender status, strong community support, and positive pre-sentence report.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years of probation and a two-year driving prohibition.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest, accepted the complainant's evidence without adequate explanation, and rejected the appellant's exculpatory evidence without considering whether it raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and a new trial was ordered due to the trial judge's failure to apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

A young person was charged with two counts of sexual assault, two counts of sexual interference, and one count of threatening.

The complainant was the accused's younger sister.

The allegations involved multiple incidents of sexual touching occurring between January 2014 and May 2015, and a threatening statement made in November 2017.

The court found the complainant's evidence detailed, consistent, and compelling.

The court rejected the defence evidence and accepted the Crown's submissions.

The accused was convicted on all five counts.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault and assault with a weapon against his ex-partner.

The central issue at trial was credibility, with the appellant claiming consensual sexual activity and the complainant denying consent.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's treatment of text messages between the parties, inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, and the assessment of the appellant's evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge engaged in illogical reasoning regarding the circumstances of the assault, impermissibly dismissed the appellant's evidence as 'self-serving' without proper basis, and failed to adequately address the complainant's potential motive to fabricate related to family law proceedings.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

Appeal from a conviction under section 2(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act for permitting a motor vehicle to be operated on a highway without insurance.

The appellant owned a vehicle that was driven by another individual on a test drive basis.

The Crown proved ownership through Ministry of Transportation records and established that no insurance was in place.

The appellant raised grounds of appeal regarding hearsay evidence, denial of a non-suit motion, and application of the strict liability test.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding the trial justice properly applied the law and made no material errors of fact.

The sentence was also upheld.

The accused, an 84-year-old man, was charged with sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code for allegedly touching the complainant, a 20-year-old woman, in a sexual manner without her consent on July 23, 2014.

The Crown alleged that during a visit to the complainant's home, the accused groped the complainant's breast and buttocks while hugging her in the garage.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming the interaction was an ordinary hug with a brief peck on the cheek.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence credible and compelling, while finding the accused's testimony contradictory, inconsistent, and demonstrating a lack of understanding of appropriate boundaries.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device.

He argued that the police officer provided faulty instructions on how to blow into the device and that he lacked the requisite mens rea to refuse.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably concluded the officer's instructions were clear and that the appellant intentionally failed to provide a suitable sample after six attempts, followed by an outright refusal on the seventh demand.

The accused was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm contrary to section 91(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that on August 23, 2012, the accused possessed a .22 calibre rifle without a valid firearms license.

The accused raised several defences including Charter delay, an exception under section 91(4), a claim based on Crown Patent status, officially induced error, and an argument that the rifle was not a firearm.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed a functioning firearm without authorization and convicted the accused.