Breana Vandebeek

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene after engaging in a high-speed street race that resulted in a severe collision.

He appealed his convictions, arguing errors in the dismissal of his s. 11(b) Charter application, the admission of his police statement, and the jury instructions.

He also appealed his 15-month custodial sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the custodial sentence was deemed fit given the serious aggravating factors, including the appellant's efforts to conceal his involvement.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault arising from a shootout outside a nightclub that injured the initial shooter and five bystanders.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing a mistrial over the Crown's opening address, declining to direct acquittals on the assault charges, and refusing to leave self-defence with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's corrective instruction was sufficient, there was circumstantial evidence to support secondary party liability, and self-defence lacked an air of reality given the indiscriminate nature of the return fire.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a faint hope application seeking a jury review of a 25-year parole ineligibility period for first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge applied the correct pre-2011 reasonable prospect screening standard under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code, did not misapprehend the evidence, and was entitled to consider institutional misconduct, psychological risk assessments, limited acceptance of responsibility, and the likely loss of community support upon deportation.

The court rejected the submission that reliance on static factors foreclosed any future application, noting that the judge expressly left open a renewed application in two years.

The appeal was dismissed as the screening decision fell within the broad range of reasonableness.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, brought an application for judicial review to reduce his parole ineligibility period.

He brought a motion to permit witnesses employed by the Correctional Service of Canada and witnesses living outside Ontario to testify by video at the hearing.

The Crown consented.

The court granted the motion, finding it in the interests of justice under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code, as it would minimize time away from work, reduce costs, increase efficiency, and not prejudice the Crown.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He had originally elected to be tried in the Ontario Court of Justice, but due to scheduling delays that would have exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling, the Deputy Attorney General preferred a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code, moving the trial to the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that his election to be tried in the provincial court vested his right to that mode of trial and that the direct indictment was an abuse of process aimed at avoiding a s. 11(b) Charter stay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 577 provides broad authority to prefer a direct indictment even after an election is made.

The Court further held that there was no abuse of process, as the direct indictment actually facilitated an earlier trial date, consistent with the right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The appellant appealed his two-year sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He introduced fresh evidence detailing exceptionally harsh custodial conditions, including prolonged triple-bunking and extended lockdowns, which exacerbated his mental health vulnerabilities.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence fit but admitted the fresh evidence, concluding that the cumulative impact of the custodial conditions materially increased the punitive effect of the sentence.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was varied to time served followed by a conditional sentence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, chambered, prohibited handgun found in his one-bedroom condominium during the execution of a search warrant.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict, contending that his brother or a third party may have placed the firearm in the unit.

The Court of Appeal held these submissions amounted to speculative inferences unsupported by the evidentiary record and dismissed the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the court found no error in principle in the 20-month custodial sentence, holding it was restrained, consistent with parity, and appropriately reflected the aggravating circumstances of a loaded firearm in a residential building.

Two appellants, addicted to fentanyl, set fire to a rowhouse using Molotov cocktails at the direction of their fentanyl dealer, killing three occupants and seriously injuring a fourth.

Both pleaded guilty to three counts of manslaughter and one count of arson causing bodily harm and received sentences of 16 and 17 years respectively, plus $250,000 restitution orders each.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's treatment of mitigating factors including addiction and mental health, and held the sentences were not demonstrably unfit.

However, the court quashed the restitution orders, finding the sentencing judge failed to weigh the appellants' ability to pay and imposed them as a mechanical afterthought.

Fresh evidence of post-sentencing cooperation with authorities was not admitted.

The appellant, a bar manager, was convicted of sexual assault and voyeurism after sexually assaulting a female employee in the bar basement while intentionally having the incident recorded by a security camera.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) the trial judge over-relied on the complainant's demeanor when assessing credibility; (2) the trial judge misapplied the adopted admissions rule by relying on text messages between the appellant and his co-accused; and (3) the trial judge misapplied the doctrine of reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed from conviction and sentence for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on evidence of sexual touching during a car ride, while acquitting on two other alleged incidents due to reliability concerns.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's use of prior consistent statements (text messages) to assess credibility and reliability, and his application of the W.(D.) framework and the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The appellant also appealed the sentence of 21 months custody, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a position of trust, misapplying sentencing principles, and refusing to impose a conditional sentence.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal and the application for fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown’s appeal from a stay of proceedings entered after a trial judge found that correctional officers, including Officer Warburton, used excessive force and then colluded to cover up the incident by filing false reports and giving misleading testimony.

The trial judge found a violation of the respondent’s Charter rights and determined that a stay was the only appropriate remedy to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The appellate court held that the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence, her legal analysis was correct, and her remedy was justified in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed his sentence after being convicted of drug-related offences.

The sentencing judge had imposed a global sentence of four years of imprisonment followed by two years of probation, which violated section 731(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge declined to correct the error, believing he was functus officio.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal in part, vacating the probation order and reducing the sentence on count eight to three years to reflect the sentencing judge's original intention regarding pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the sentence of a young person, G.D., who committed serious offences at ages 15 and 16 and was sentenced as a youth at age 19.

The court reviewed fresh evidence of rehabilitation and determined that transferring G.D. to an adult correctional facility would undermine his progress.

The court set aside part of the custodial sentence and probation order, substituting shorter custody and a longer probation period, in the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeals of David Beak and Yostin Murillo from their convictions for first degree murder and sexual assault in the killing of Rhoderie Estrada.

The court found that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury on constructive first degree murder, post-offence conduct, and the handling of evidence and objections were accurate and complete.

The grounds of appeal advanced by both appellants, including issues of causation, post-offence conduct, jury instructions, and procedural fairness, were all rejected.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeals of Khalid Yousuf and Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed, who were convicted of multiple offences related to drug trafficking, proceeds of crime, and possession of firearms after being found in a "safe house" in Thunder Bay.

The court found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or err in law, and that the verdicts were reasonable based on the circumstantial and direct evidence connecting both appellants to the contraband and the operation of the safe house.

This decision concerns a judicial screening on a "faint hope" application under section 745.6 of the Criminal Code, in which Ronald Cyr seeks a reduction in his parole ineligibility period following a first-degree murder conviction.

The court reviews the statutory criteria, the facts of the offence, the applicant’s conduct and character, and the positions of the parties.

The judge finds that there is a reasonable prospect a jury could reduce the parole ineligibility period and orders that a jury be empaneled to hear the application.

The applicants, Cash Dillon and Jarra Shifara, challenged the admissibility of firearms and drug evidence seized during a vehicle stop, alleging violations of their Charter rights.

The court found that the police arbitrarily detained the applicants by transitioning a sobriety check into a Cannabis Control Act investigation without statutory or common law authority.

Additionally, the police failed to promptly inform the applicants of the reasons for their detention or advise them of their right to counsel, and subsequently conducted an unreasonably intrusive search of their groin areas.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the court determined that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the court granted the application and excluded all evidence and statements obtained during the stop.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Barrington Grant’s conviction for possession of a loaded firearm.

The appellant had challenged the admissibility of evidence obtained under a warrant, but his application was dismissed at trial.

After his conviction, related proceedings involving the same information to obtain (ITO) resulted in stays due to disclosure issues.

The Crown conceded the appeal in light of these developments and a prior Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Khamo, which quashed a conviction based on the same evidence.

The court set aside the conviction, ordered a new trial, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The decision concerns a "faint hope" application by Timothy Belisle, convicted of first-degree murder, seeking a reduction in his parole ineligibility period after serving 15 years.

The court reviews the legislative history and legal standards for faint hope applications, the applicant’s background, conduct, and rehabilitation efforts, as well as the positions of both parties.

Ultimately, the court finds that Mr. Belisle has not demonstrated a reasonable prospect of success before a jury and dismisses the application.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder following the shooting death of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm on the night prior to the shooting as prior discreditable conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed as to its permissible uses.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had found no error in the admission or instruction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered new trials.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the convictions.