Andrew Benjamin Cappell

The appellant, convicted by a jury as a party to a commercial robbery for acting as the getaway driver, challenged both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the circumstantial evidence, including cellphone searches, call activity, her links to the robbers before and after the offence, and her role in transporting the robbers and stolen property, reasonably supported the inference that she knew in advance that a robbery involving violence or threats would occur.

The court also held that although Crown counsel's reconstructed dialogue in closing submissions was improper and should not be used, the tactic did not render the trial unfair in light of the qualifications given, the evidentiary foundation for the inferences, and the trial judge's corrective instruction.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because no error in principle or factual error was shown and there was no basis to interfere with the custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence due to interpretation issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and upholding the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The appellant also sought a stay of proceedings for Charter breaches arising from his delayed release and strip search at a correctional complex following a bail order.

The Court found his Charter rights were violated and granted a one-month sentence reduction as a remedy.

The appellant challenged an indeterminate sentence imposed after a dangerous offender designation, arguing that his risk could be managed in the community through a fixed custodial term followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The court held that the sentencing judge made no error in finding that the appellant’s violent risk was driven by multiple factors, including personality pathology not meaningfully amenable to medication.

The psychiatric evidence established high risk, chronic non-compliance with treatment and supervision, and an absence of insight or motivation to change.

The court concluded that the conditions necessary to control the risk could only be achieved in custody and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was arrested by police who mistakenly believed he was his brother, the target of a search warrant.

Upon arrest, police found a loaded handgun and crack cocaine in his possession.

The trial judge found the arrest lawful and admitted the evidence, convicting the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal unanimously found that the police lacked objectively reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant, rendering the arrest and subsequent search unlawful under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The majority held that the Charter breaches were serious and their impact on the appellant's rights was significant, outweighing the public interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and acquittals were substituted.

The appellant appealed her conviction for second degree murder arising from a home invasion during which her uncle was fatally stabbed.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant organized the break-in intending for the deceased to be killed by her co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found two errors in the jury charge: first, the jury was not adequately instructed about the limited probative value of the appellant's after-the-fact conduct if they rejected the Crown's theory that the killing was planned; second, the jury was not properly instructed that the appellant's partially exculpatory police statements could contribute to a reasonable doubt even if not affirmatively believed.

The curative proviso was not applied, as the Crown's case on murder was not overwhelming.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of weapons trafficking under section 100 of the Criminal Code for possessing 43 handguns, parts, and high-capacity magazines.

He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

The appellant applied for bail pending appeal, raising three grounds: insufficient reasons, a Villaroman error regarding the inference of guilt, and failure to apply the proper test for knowledge and control of items in a motor vehicle.

The motion judge found that while the appeal grounds met the low threshold of not being frivolous, the proposed appeal was extremely weak and the public interest in the immediate enforcement of the conviction for this serious firearms trafficking offence outweighed the appellant's interest in reviewing the conviction.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Shafaq Joya, appealed the Ontario Review Board’s decision to continue his conditional discharge and deny his Charter application for an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board’s assessment of risk and refusal to grant an absolute discharge were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also found no Charter breach, as the Board’s decision was based on public safety, not resource limitations.

The appellant, S.D.C., appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his daughter.

He argued that the trial judge unevenly scrutinized the evidence and failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s approach, holding that her reasons were careful, comprehensive, and entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Malcolm Copeland’s appeal from his conviction for second degree murder.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation.

The court held that there was no air of reality to the defence of provocation, as the evidence did not support that Copeland lost self-control and acted on the sudden before his passion could cool.

The court found that the evidence was consistent with self-defence, not provocation, and that the trial judge properly applied the law.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, incest, and sexual interference involving his biological daughter.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding the frequency of the abuse and failed to consider the implausibility of the allegations given the presence of a home surveillance camera.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario rejected these arguments, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or her treatment of the evidence.

The court also clarified the proper limits of admitting out-of-court statements under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who speaks Taishanese and has no English language capability, was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that his right to an interpreter under section 14 of the Charter was breached because the interpreter provided for the first half of his trial interpreted in Cantonese rather than Taishanese.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence confirming the linguistic differences between the two languages and the interpreter's use of Cantonese.

The Court found that the interpretation fell below the constitutionally guaranteed standard, creating a real possibility that the appellant did not understand the proceedings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants, convicted of murder, appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and violation of their right to be present.

The trial judge repeatedly encouraged guilty pleas in chambers and directly to the accused, expressing strong opinions on the evidence and linking rulings to plea outcomes.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and infringed the accused's right to be present under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code, compromising the fairness and integrity of the trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for aggravated assault and weapon possession, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention order at a forensic hospital.

He argued the Board made material factual errors and that he should be granted an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Board made mischaracterizations of the evidence, these errors did not impact the reasonableness of its risk assessment or disposition.

The court concluded that the Board understood the correct factual context when its reasons were read as a whole, and that the detention order remained the least onerous and restrictive disposition consistent with public safety, given the appellant's ongoing substance abuse and lack of insight into his mental illness.

The appellant was convicted of firearm offences and appealed both his convictions and sentence.

He sought a pre-trial stay of proceedings due to multiple Charter breaches (unjustified strip search, excessive force in prison, and prolonged segregation).

The trial judge found Charter breaches but denied a stay, opting to consider them at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Babos test for a stay, as an alternative remedy was available.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal sentence, finding the trial judge's reasons for the 18-month sentence reduction (for Charter breaches, Gladue factors, and Duncan credit) were conclusory and insufficient for appellate review.

Consequently, the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant was convicted of various firearms offences.

He appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for drug trafficking, which led to an arbitrary detention and an unlawful search incident to arrest, and that the evidence (a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition) should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The court emphasized that the assessment of reasonable and probable grounds proceeds from a holistic consideration of all facts, including prior surveillance of a suspected drug trafficker, a drug overdose in the hotel room, and the suspicious conduct of the appellant and his associate, Ms. Gaspari.

The court found the trial judge's reasoning for the arrest was sound, making it unnecessary to address the s. 24(2) Charter argument.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his drug dealing partner.

At trial, he claimed self-defence, abandoning his initial statements to police that the victim was killed during a robbery by unknown intruders.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter delay application, excluding expert evidence on 'fight or flight' syndrome, and admitting statements made to police.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay or expert evidence rulings, but held that the appellant was psychologically detained at the police station earlier than the trial judge found.

The failure to advise him of his right to counsel violated ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, requiring exclusion of the statements under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Pheonix Haist, appealed her convictions for gun-related offences and refusal to provide a breath sample.

She argued that her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated due to delays in being informed of the right and in facilitating access to counsel.

She also contended that her convictions for firearm possession were unreasonable, alleging misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the delays in advising and facilitating counsel were justified by the immediacy requirements of breath demands and officer safety concerns.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of circumstantial evidence regarding firearm possession, affirming that the inference of possession was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Mohinder Saini, appealed his conviction for four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, as well as his six-year sentence.

The collision involved 17 vehicles, resulting in four fatalities and nine serious injuries.

At trial, the appellant claimed momentary inattention due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and "microsleep" but the trial judge rejected this, finding his conduct a marked departure from the standard of care.

On appeal, Saini argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to defence evidence, the sentence was unfit, and his s. 14 Charter right to an interpreter was breached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, the sentence was within the appropriate range, and while some interpretation errors occurred during the reading of sentencing reasons, they were not material to the trial's fairness or the appellant's ability to participate, ordering a certified translation of the reasons as a remedy.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge erred in failing to find breaches of his ss. 9 and 10(a) Charter rights during a motor vehicle stop and in failing to exclude the gun and drugs under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal found a s. 10(a) breach occurred when police delayed informing the appellant he was being investigated for a firearm, but concluded under a fresh s. 24(2) analysis that the evidence should not be excluded.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Daniel Castellano, appealed his convictions for various criminal offences, including mischief, careless storage of a firearm, possession of stolen property, explosives, and a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He raised two grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in concluding his police statement was voluntary, and in dismissing his application to cross-examine the affiant on the information to obtain the search warrant (ITO).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's holistic approach to voluntariness and her discretion in denying cross-examination on the ITO, finding no error in principle or application of the relevant tests.