Howard Krongold

The accused was charged with historical sexual offences, including indecent assault and gross indecency, alleged to have occurred approximately 48 years ago during a cadet program.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the complainant's uncorroborated testimony.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found material inconsistencies and evidence of reconstructed memory in the complainant's account, while the accused's evidence was candid and raised a reasonable doubt.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to displace the presumption of innocence and acquitted the accused on both counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and sexual interference against a child complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by characterizing the complainant's mother's evidence as 'corroborative' when it only confirmed peripheral details.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not use the term in its technical legal sense, but rather as confirmative of the complainant's general reliability, which was a permissible use of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm, driving, and drug trafficking offences, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a key witness who had a motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not explicitly address the witness's motive to lie, the reasons demonstrated an awareness of the evidence's frailties.

Furthermore, the witness's testimony was corroborated by significant independent evidence, including the complainant's testimony, video surveillance, and text messages.

The appellant was convicted of intimidation of a justice system participant, criminal harassment, uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, and two counts of breach of undertaking arising from a sustained campaign of social media posts, threats, and communications targeting an OPP officer.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge failed to address the mens rea for the specific intent offences of intimidation and criminal harassment and erred in convicting on one breach of undertaking count.

The Court of Appeal held that the requisite mens rea findings were implicit in the trial judge's meticulous description of the appellant's conduct, which gave rise to irresistible inferences of intent.

However, the court set aside the conviction on the breach of undertaking count alleging the appellant went where the complainant was known to be, finding the trial judge misdescribed the count and failed to make findings supporting the conviction.

The applicant, a medical resident, sought judicial review of a Postgraduate Tribunal decision that dismissed her appeal of an Academic Review Board order requiring her to withdraw from the program.

She alleged procedural unfairness based on a reasonable apprehension of bias regarding one panel member and inadequate disclosure of redacted patient records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, agreeing with the Tribunal that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias and that sufficient disclosure had been provided.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of oxycodone, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He appealed on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's characterization of 216 days as defence delay, attributable to the appellant's failure to raise the delay issue despite knowing trial dates were set beyond the Jordan ceiling.

Net delay fell well below the 18-month ceiling, and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted by a jury of historical sexual offences against his daughter and sentenced to eight years, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant would attend court but argued detention was necessary in the public interest given the seriousness of the offences, the lengthy sentence, and outstanding breach charges.

The motion judge found a serious issue to be tried regarding the trial judge's exercise of exclusionary discretion over relevant defence evidence, that the breach allegations had a problematic foundation reducing their weight, and that the applicant's age, health problems, and long history of compliance with release conditions favoured release.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of accessory after the fact to murder.

The court found that the evidence did not support leaving the charge to the jury on the basis of wilful blindness, as there was no basis for a reasonable jury to find that the respondent knew or was wilfully blind to the fact that the victim had died.

The court also held there was no air of reality to the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder, as the evidence established the victim died and there was no live issue as to causation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Adam Picard’s appeal from his conviction for first degree murder.

The court found that the trial judge did not err in excluding Picard’s prior consistent statements to his first lawyer, in instructing the jury on constructive first degree murder, or in the adequacy of the jury charge.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of the law on prior consistent statements, the requirements for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, and the sufficiency of jury instructions in complex homicide cases.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed N.S.'s appeal from convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to consider his mixed out-of-court statements and erred in finding that Crown witnesses corroborated each other.

The Court found no reversible error, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and did not misuse the concept of corroboration.

The decision clarifies the use of mixed out-of-court statements and the proper approach to corroborative evidence in sexual offence trials.

The appellant, Shawn Frederick Prindle, appealed his sentence for multiple convictions including assault, assault with a weapon, theft, mischief to property, and breach of recognizance.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by not granting credit for time spent under strict bail conditions (Downes credit) and by rejecting a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reducing the global sentence to 365 days’ imprisonment (with 21 days presentence custody deducted), but declined to substitute a conditional sentence, finding a custodial sentence was still required given the gravity and context of the offences.

The appellant, D.W., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred by improperly relying on the complainant's lack of embellishment to enhance credibility and by misusing a 2015 Children's Aid Society (CAS) record to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's use of the lack of embellishment was permissible to assess motive to lie, and the CAS record was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement to rebut recent fabrication, not for the truth of its contents.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant, E.M., sought leave to appeal a 30-month imprisonment sentence for sexually assaulting his intimate partner, requesting a conditional sentence or a shorter term of incarceration.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the sentencing judge's discretion.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to sentencing decisions and found the sentence proportionate and not demonstrably unfit, despite the appellant's guilty plea and remorse.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, alleging trial judge errors in the jury charge regarding the W.(D.) instruction on consent and the consideration of absence of injury.

The Court of Appeal found no misdirection, affirming that the trial judge's consent instruction, read holistically, was not misleading, and that the absence of injury was not a contradiction given the complainant's testimony and lacked a common sense inference of injury from pain alone.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence.

On consent, the conviction for permitting the transmission of sexually explicit material to a person under 16 years was quashed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence was varied.

Specifically, the prohibition orders under s. 161(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code were modified, and the duration of the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order was reduced from life to 20 years, with the quashed conviction removed from its scope.

The appellant, a licensed chiropodist, appealed from misconduct findings and a $70,000 costs award made by the Discipline Committee of the College of Chiropodists of Ontario.

The Committee found that the appellant failed to comply with a prior suspension order by continuing to benefit financially from his practice, failing to update his website to reflect his suspended status, and engaging in regulated activities such as sterilizing medical instruments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Committee's liability findings and no error in principle in the costs award.

The appellant, Johnathan Impey, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's response to a jury question regarding the definition of reasonable doubt, and the alleged failure to instruct the jury on how to deal with the complainant's motivation to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's response to the jury's question was appropriate, especially given counsel's joint submission, and that the general instructions on witness credibility were sufficient to address the issue of motive to fabricate.

The appellant, Michael Belleus, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the admission of a deceased witness's hearsay police statement, the trial judge's inquiry into juror apprehension of bias, and the jury instruction on aiding and abetting first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds, finding that the hearsay statement met the threshold reliability test under R. v. Bradshaw, the juror inquiry was sufficient, and the jury instructions on aiding and abetting were clear when read as a whole.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing and relying on the complainant's voice identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the voice recognition evidence was a minor part of a broader constellation of evidence, including DNA, physical injuries, and the complainant's visual identification of the appellant.

The court held that the trial judge's overall scrutiny of the complainant's evidence, despite minor mischaracterizations, was sufficient to address reliability concerns.

The appellant, a manual osteopathy practitioner, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

He argued that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was breached and that the trial judge misapprehended his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in treating delay related to Bill C-75 as an exceptional circumstance, she correctly deducted the delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

After deducting the COVID-19 delay, the total delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court also found no misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.