Howard Krongold

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of oxycodone, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He appealed on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's characterization of 216 days as defence delay, attributable to the appellant's failure to raise the delay issue despite knowing trial dates were set beyond the Jordan ceiling.

Net delay fell well below the 18-month ceiling, and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted by a jury of historical sexual offences against his daughter and sentenced to eight years, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant would attend court but argued detention was necessary in the public interest given the seriousness of the offences, the lengthy sentence, and outstanding breach charges.

The motion judge found a serious issue to be tried regarding the trial judge's exercise of exclusionary discretion over relevant defence evidence, that the breach allegations had a problematic foundation reducing their weight, and that the applicant's age, health problems, and long history of compliance with release conditions favoured release.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of accessory after the fact to murder.

The court found that the evidence did not support leaving the charge to the jury on the basis of wilful blindness, as there was no basis for a reasonable jury to find that the respondent knew or was wilfully blind to the fact that the victim had died.

The court also held there was no air of reality to the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder, as the evidence established the victim died and there was no live issue as to causation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Adam Picard’s appeal from his conviction for first degree murder.

The court found that the trial judge did not err in excluding Picard’s prior consistent statements to his first lawyer, in instructing the jury on constructive first degree murder, or in the adequacy of the jury charge.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of the law on prior consistent statements, the requirements for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, and the sufficiency of jury instructions in complex homicide cases.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed N.S.'s appeal from convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to consider his mixed out-of-court statements and erred in finding that Crown witnesses corroborated each other.

The Court found no reversible error, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and did not misuse the concept of corroboration.

The decision clarifies the use of mixed out-of-court statements and the proper approach to corroborative evidence in sexual offence trials.

The appellant, Shawn Frederick Prindle, appealed his sentence for multiple convictions including assault, assault with a weapon, theft, mischief to property, and breach of recognizance.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by not granting credit for time spent under strict bail conditions (Downes credit) and by rejecting a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reducing the global sentence to 365 days’ imprisonment (with 21 days presentence custody deducted), but declined to substitute a conditional sentence, finding a custodial sentence was still required given the gravity and context of the offences.

The appellant, D.W., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred by improperly relying on the complainant's lack of embellishment to enhance credibility and by misusing a 2015 Children's Aid Society (CAS) record to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's use of the lack of embellishment was permissible to assess motive to lie, and the CAS record was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement to rebut recent fabrication, not for the truth of its contents.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant, E.M., sought leave to appeal a 30-month imprisonment sentence for sexually assaulting his intimate partner, requesting a conditional sentence or a shorter term of incarceration.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the sentencing judge's discretion.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to sentencing decisions and found the sentence proportionate and not demonstrably unfit, despite the appellant's guilty plea and remorse.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, alleging trial judge errors in the jury charge regarding the W.(D.) instruction on consent and the consideration of absence of injury.

The Court of Appeal found no misdirection, affirming that the trial judge's consent instruction, read holistically, was not misleading, and that the absence of injury was not a contradiction given the complainant's testimony and lacked a common sense inference of injury from pain alone.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence.

On consent, the conviction for permitting the transmission of sexually explicit material to a person under 16 years was quashed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence was varied.

Specifically, the prohibition orders under s. 161(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code were modified, and the duration of the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order was reduced from life to 20 years, with the quashed conviction removed from its scope.

The appellant, Johnathan Impey, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's response to a jury question regarding the definition of reasonable doubt, and the alleged failure to instruct the jury on how to deal with the complainant's motivation to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's response to the jury's question was appropriate, especially given counsel's joint submission, and that the general instructions on witness credibility were sufficient to address the issue of motive to fabricate.

The appellant, Michael Belleus, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the admission of a deceased witness's hearsay police statement, the trial judge's inquiry into juror apprehension of bias, and the jury instruction on aiding and abetting first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds, finding that the hearsay statement met the threshold reliability test under R. v. Bradshaw, the juror inquiry was sufficient, and the jury instructions on aiding and abetting were clear when read as a whole.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing and relying on the complainant's voice identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the voice recognition evidence was a minor part of a broader constellation of evidence, including DNA, physical injuries, and the complainant's visual identification of the appellant.

The court held that the trial judge's overall scrutiny of the complainant's evidence, despite minor mischaracterizations, was sufficient to address reliability concerns.

The applicant, convicted of 33 counts of voyeurism and sentenced to two years incarceration, sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed on grounds of public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered the applicant's history of pre-meditated voyeurism and indecent acts, as well as recent allegations of impersonating a police officer while on bail.

The motion judge found a substantial likelihood of the applicant committing further offences and that his detention was necessary for public safety.

Furthermore, releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence given the serious and escalating nature of his conduct, despite the relatively short sentence and the possibility of an expedited appeal.

The application for interim release was dismissed.

The appellant, Robert Lavergne, appealed his 17-month global sentence for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, arguing the sentence was unfit and that post-sentence changes to conditional sentencing law (Bill C-5) required reconsideration, including the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual exploitation.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal.

The court found that the changes in law did not compel a reconsideration of the sentence or the constitutional challenge, as the trial judge's imposed sentence was fit and exceeded the minimum, and a conditional sentence would not have been imposed even under the new law.

The sentences were not demonstrably unfit, considering the profound psychological harm to the victims and the appellant's abuse of trust as a teacher.

The appellant, Laura Coristine, appealed her convictions for six counts of assault against her ex-husband, Jim Quinn.

She argued that the trial judge misapprehended her evidence and erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge did misapprehend some minor aspects of the appellant's evidence, these errors did not amount to a miscarriage of justice given the overall assessment of credibility.

The court also found no reversible errors in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, including his consideration of the complainant's motive to lie, the "unusual" nature of some allegations, and the proper use of notes as an aide mémoire.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a teacher, was convicted of sexual exploitation and assault involving multiple students.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge adequately analyzed the potential for inadvertent tainting of witness evidence due to extensive discussions among complainants and other witnesses.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge acknowledged the risk, his reasons lacked sufficient analysis and articulation of how he concluded the evidence was reliable despite the "extreme danger" of tainting.

The court emphasized that inadvertent tainting affects reliability, not just credibility, and requires a clear explanation of how the concern was resolved.

The appellant, Robert Francis Fox, appealed his conviction for sexual assault after pleading guilty mid-trial.

He sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary due to misinformed advice from his trial counsel regarding the collateral consequence of losing access to his young daughter if convicted.

The Court of Appeal, considering fresh evidence from a family and criminal lawyer, found that the trial counsel's advice was exaggerated and incorrect, leading to an improperly informed plea.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, R.F., appealed convictions for two sexual offences involving his niece, while having been acquitted of two other sexual offences involving the same complainant.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, specifically arguing that the judge erred by not considering all evidence holistically and by applying a lessened standard of scrutiny appropriate for children, despite the complainant being a teenager at the time of testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to credibility or the assessment of the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding the core allegation of the "couch incident" versus peripheral inconsistencies.

The appellant, a former high school teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving two former students (D.R. and L.G.).

The appeal focused on alleged misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge concerning L.G.'s and a corroborating witness's testimony, and a misdirection on the reasonable doubt standard, particularly regarding the R. v. W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's errors in summarizing evidence were not material and that, despite a misstatement of the W.(D.) steps, the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard to all allegations.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.