Geneviève McInnes

The appellant challenged convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking arising from drugs found during an inventory search of a vehicle he was occupying.

Applying the circumstantial-evidence framework for constructive possession, the court held the trial judge erred by treating guilt as a reasonable inference rather than the only reasonable inference available on the whole of the evidence.

The evidence was equally consistent with sole possession by the co-occupant, particularly because the drugs were concealed in a backpack linked by DNA to that person and there was no evidence of the appellant handling the backpack or participating in trafficking activity.

The convictions were therefore unreasonable and were set aside, with an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of oxycodone, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He appealed on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's characterization of 216 days as defence delay, attributable to the appellant's failure to raise the delay issue despite knowing trial dates were set beyond the Jordan ceiling.

Net delay fell well below the 18-month ceiling, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted of possession of proceeds of crime after over $1.2 million in cash was excluded from his criminal trial under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown subsequently applied for forfeiture of the cash under s. 490(9) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, admitted the evidence, and ordered forfeiture.

On appeal, the appellant argued that his acquittal created an issue estoppel preventing the trial judge from finding his possession was unlawful or conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the acquittal did not logically necessitate a finding of lawful possession, and that a s. 24(2) analysis in a forfeiture proceeding involves different considerations than in a criminal trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal from sentence, finding that the sentencing judge erred in imposing a conditional sentence and in failing to order a consecutive sentence for participation in a criminal organization.

The court also set aside a restitution order that was not directed to a victim.

In light of the respondent's rehabilitation and time already served, the court substituted a sentence reflecting appropriate credit and stayed the remainder of the sentence and the criminal organization conviction.

The appellant, Ezra Harely, appealed his convictions for possession and production of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and his 18-month custodial sentence.

The appeal raised three grounds: a flawed s. 8 Charter analysis and admission of seized evidence, improper jury instructions, and the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's s. 8 Charter analysis or findings of fact regarding the search warrants, no reversible error in the jury charge, and no unfitness or error in principle in the imposed custodial sentence given the scale of the operation and the need for deterrence and denunciation.

The Crown appealed a sentence, specifically challenging the trial judge's finding that fine in lieu of forfeiture provisions were unconstitutional.

This decision addresses two issues: the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to remit a sentence to the trial court and the terms of a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court confirmed it lacks jurisdiction to remit sentencing to the trial court on a sentence appeal under s. 687 of the Criminal Code, and, based on joint submissions, imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $74,560 with a default imprisonment term of 18 months and a ten-year payment period.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision that sections 462.37(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code, concerning fines in lieu of forfeiture and default imprisonment, were unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter in certain foreseeable circumstances.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was bound by a prior ONCA decision (R. v. Chung) and, in the alternative, that the provisions do not violate s. 12 as they serve a different purpose than victim surcharges and offer judicial discretion and flexibility.

Jacques Trudel was found guilty of possession of over two kilograms of methamphetamine for trafficking, possession of hydromorphone, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of seven to nine years, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence or two to three years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the quantity of drugs, Trudel's principal role, and his lengthy criminal record, and mitigating factors such as his age, serious health conditions (HIV, Hepatitis C), and four years under strict house arrest.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, distinguishing Trudel's case from that of a co-accused due to his leadership role and failure to seek addiction treatment.

While acknowledging the impact of age, health, and house arrest, the court found these factors did not warrant a substantial reduction from the appropriate sentencing range for drug trafficking.

Trudel was sentenced to six and a half years of incarceration for trafficking, with concurrent sentences for the other offences.

The accused, Jacques Trudel, was convicted of trafficking crystal methamphetamine, possession of hydromorphone, and possession of proceeds of trafficking following a high-speed police chase and the seizure of drugs and cash.

The central issue was whether Mr. Trudel had constructive possession of the crystal methamphetamine.

The court found, based on circumstantial evidence, that the accused had knowledge and control over the drugs, given his active role in the common venture with his co-accused, his control over the vehicle's contents, and his instruction to evade police.

The defence's arguments regarding police testimony reliability and gaps in the Crown's case were rejected.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple drug and firearm offences, alleging the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for dismissing a Charter motion and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons adequate, noting no obligation to reconcile every inconsistency, only those relevant to the Charter application.

While conceding a misapprehension regarding the location of the appellant's wallet, the court determined it had no impact on the verdicts due to overwhelming evidence of possession, including a padlock code found in the appellant's wallet connecting him directly to contraband.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Hearing Officer's decision finding the respondent police officer not guilty of discreditable conduct.

The appellant argued that the Notice of Hearing was inaccurate and that her hearing impairment prevented her from fully participating in the hearing.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the Notice of Hearing provided reasonable notice and that the Hearing Officer took sufficient steps to accommodate the appellant's hearing impairment, ensuring procedural fairness.

Colleen Cahill, charged with multiple provincial and federal offences including theft, break and enter, and administration of justice offences, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on primary and secondary grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice granted judicial interim release, finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances, particularly given Cahill's HIV-positive status and chronic lung disease, which placed her at significant risk in detention.

The court determined that her proposed release plan, involving supervision by the John Howard Society and continuation of a methadone program, sufficiently mitigated the risks of non-attendance and reoffending, and that her release would not undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant brought a private prosecution against his wife's employer and her superiors, alleging criminal harassment, obstruction of justice, intimidation, and retaliation.

Following a pre-enquete hearing, the Justice of the Peace refused to issue process on six counts due to insufficient evidence, and the Crown Attorney stayed the remaining count.

The applicant sought certiorari and mandamus to quash the refusal and review the stay.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error by the Justice of the Peace and confirming the Crown Attorney's absolute discretion to stay the charge.

The offender was found guilty of sexual assault and theft under $5,000, and pled guilty to failing to comply with a SOIRA order.

The offences occurred when the offender followed an intoxicated victim into her apartment building and sexually assaulted her in the stairwell, subsequently stealing her bank cards.

At the time of the offences, the offender was on probation for a prior sexual assault conviction.

The court sentenced the offender to a total of 4 years and 2 months in custody, less credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by 3 years of probation and ancillary orders.

The applicants, charged with driving offences following a dirt bike collision, brought a Charter motion to exclude blood samples and medical records seized by police.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to establish the affiant's subjective belief in reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found the affiant only possessed a reasonable suspicion, rendering the search warrant and production order invalid and in breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), citing the overbroad production order, careless drafting, and the issuing justice's apparent failure to properly review the materials.

The accused, Liban Gure and Daniel Jean-Charles, were charged with manslaughter and aggravated assault following the death of an 18-year-old who fell from a 16th-floor balcony.

The Crown alleged the victim was beaten over a drug debt and fled to the balcony in fear for his life.

The court found that Gure initiated the assault and participated in the confinement and beating that caused the victim's fatal flight, rendering him guilty of manslaughter as a co-principal.

However, due to the unreliability of the Crown's key witnesses, the court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding Jean-Charles's participation and acquitted him.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, robbery, and fraud.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault and fraud.

For the robbery charge, the court found the accused guilty of the lesser included offence of theft under five thousand dollars, as the timing between the theft and the subsequent sexual assault was unclear, preventing a finding of "immediate" connection required for robbery.

The decision involved a detailed analysis of consent in sexual assault cases, the reliability of witness testimony given intoxication and memory gaps, and the application of reasonable doubt principles.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and criminal harassment, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 23 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The court found only 28 days of defence delay and rejected the Crown's arguments that the defence implicitly waived delay or engaged in illegitimate conduct regarding disclosure and scheduling.

The court also rejected the Crown's argument that the case was complex.

Finding no exceptional circumstances to justify the net delay of nearly 22 months, the court ordered a stay of proceedings.

The accused, David John Mayne Bullen, faced seven charges related to cocaine trafficking and conspiracy, including instructing an offence for a criminal organization and historical trafficking charges.

The trial was the second for the accused, following a mistrial.

The Crown relied on evidence from "Project Mayday" and "Project Adelaide" involving police surveillance and intercepted communications.

The Defence admitted guilt for a smaller conspiracy involving the first three police agent cocaine purchases but disputed the larger conspiracy and criminal organization charges.

The court applied the Carter analysis for co-conspirator hearsay and found the accused guilty of conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking cocaine, and possession for the purpose of trafficking (Counts #1, #2, #3) related to the main conspiracy and the first three police agent buys.

However, the court found the accused not guilty of directing a criminal organization (Count #4) and the historical trafficking charges (Counts #5, #6, #7), citing insufficient evidence for a criminal organization and reliability issues with the police agent's testimony for the historical charges.

The applicants, charged with manslaughter, brought an O'Connor application seeking the production of mental health and medical records of a key Crown eyewitness.

The witness suffered from cognitive deficiencies and mental illnesses, which the applicants argued affected her reliability and credibility.

The court found that the applicants met the 'likely relevance' threshold at the first stage of the O'Connor regime, relying on evidence from the preliminary inquiry regarding the witness's mental health challenges.

The court ordered the production of specific medical and psychiatric records to the court for review.