Vanessa Stewart

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest.

The respondent, who has schizophrenia, became agitated during execution of a Form 1 under the Mental Health Act and punched an officer.

The Crown argued the trial judge demonstrated reasonable apprehension of bias through excessive interventions during witness examination, erred in analyzing an alleged Charter section 10(b) breach, and wrongfully took judicial notice.

The appellate court found the trial judge's numerous interjections and cross-examinations from the bench, combined with certain comments suggesting a predetermined position, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant, Alex Beseiso, sought a stay of proceedings on the basis that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter was breached.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, attributing some to the defence and some to exceptional circumstances, and found the net delay to be below the 30-month ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Alex Beseiso, brought an application alleging abuse of process and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the application.

The court, proceeding in writing, found that all of the applicant’s allegations were manifestly frivolous and summarily dismissed the application.

The ruling applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Babos and R. v. Haevischer regarding the test for abuse of process and the standard for summary dismissal.

The applicant police officer sought judicial review of a hearing officer's interlocutory decision refusing to order the production of an unredacted copy of her duty book during a disciplinary proceeding.

The respondent moved to quash the application for prematurity.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify interrupting the ongoing administrative process to review a discrete disclosure ruling.

The court also held that the hearing officer should not be named as a party to the proceedings to preserve his objectivity.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Child and Family Services Review Board, the Children's Aid Society, and the Ottawa Police Services Board regarding a brief child protection investigation.

The court upheld a motion judge's dismissal of the application against the police board as frivolous under Rule 2.1.01.

The court dismissed the remainder of the application due to excessive and unexplained delay in perfecting it, and alternatively found that the board's decision was reasonable and procedurally fair.

The accused, a former foster mother, was charged with historical sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a former foster child.

The complainant alleged a sexual relationship occurred when he was a teenager living in the accused's care.

The accused testified and denied the allegations, providing plausible explanations for their relationship and interactions.

Applying the W.(D) framework, the court found the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt and noted significant inconsistencies and a lack of detail in the complainant's testimony.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and various firearms offences after shooting a man during a drug deal.

The accused testified that he attended the apartment to sell drugs, but the victim pulled a gun and attempted to rob him.

A struggle ensued, the accused gained control of the gun, and shot the victim as he lunged at him.

The court found the accused's version of events plausible and held that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in self-defence.

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder and related assault charges, but convicted of firearms offences for possessing the restricted weapon after fleeing the scene.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a trial on December 19, 2019, the court reserved judgment.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The court also raised concerns about section 7 and 11(d) Charter violations based on the credibility and reliability of the police officer's testimony.

The section 10(b) application was dismissed, but the court found that the officer's misleading and evasive testimony during trial constituted an abuse of process violating sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

As a result, the breath evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal.

Colleen Cahill, charged with multiple provincial and federal offences including theft, break and enter, and administration of justice offences, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on primary and secondary grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice granted judicial interim release, finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances, particularly given Cahill's HIV-positive status and chronic lung disease, which placed her at significant risk in detention.

The court determined that her proposed release plan, involving supervision by the John Howard Society and continuation of a methadone program, sufficiently mitigated the risks of non-attendance and reoffending, and that her release would not undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

The defendant was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer tests taken more than two hours after the defendant was stopped, requiring expert toxicology evidence to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The Crown's expert opined the defendant's BAC was 95 to 140 mg/100ml at the time of driving, based on an assumption of no "bolus drinking." The defendant challenged the admissibility of his weight statement on Charter grounds and argued the Crown failed to prove the absence of bolus drinking.

The court rejected the Charter challenges, admitted the defendant's weight statement, and found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not consume two standard drinks within 20 minutes before driving.

The defendant was convicted.