Patrick Joseph Ducharme

The appellant appealed a conviction for child luring, arguing an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant was 18 years of age.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings.

The trial judge found that the complainant had explicitly told the appellant she was 14, and the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the complainant was under 18.

The appellate court affirmed that the trial judge's credibility findings, which were fully explained and entitled to deference, precluded any air of reality for the appellant's defence.

The accused, Gurmanpreet Grewal, applied under s. 715.23 of the Criminal Code to participate remotely by videoconference, along with his counsel, for an upcoming multi-accused trial involving serious charges.

Counsel cited age and COVID-19 vulnerability as reasons.

The court denied the application, finding that remote participation would seriously impair the accused's right to a fair hearing due to communication limitations with counsel and the unwieldy nature of technological accommodations for audio and visual evidence, especially given the seriousness of the alleged offences.

The appellant sought to continue the assessment of solicitor accounts, which the application judge dismissed due to a jurisdictional issue (late requisition under the Solicitors Act).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, emphasizing that courts should facilitate account assessment and that procedural defects should not be treated as nullities, especially when parties have consented and participated for years.

The court ordered the Assessment Officer to issue a decision on the merits without delay.

The appellant, D.E., appealed convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

The primary defence at trial was an honest but mistaken belief in the complainant's age, as per s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the appellant did not honestly believe the complainant was 16 years of age and did not take all reasonable steps to ascertain her age, concluding that he acted with reckless indifference.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis or findings, including a minor misapprehension of evidence that was not material to the outcome.

The appeal was dismissed.

Samantha Curow sought interim judicial release pending her appeal of a committal order for extradition to the United States on an extortion charge.

The Crown conceded that Curow met the criteria for surrender and public interest, but argued her appeal was frivolous.

The court, applying the test under s. 20 of the Extradition Act and s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, found that Curow failed to demonstrate her appeal was not frivolous.

The application judge had correctly applied the committal test, determining there was a prima facie case of extortion based on presumptively reliable evidence in the Record of the Case.

The motion for interim judicial release was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States of America, applied for an order to commit Samantha Curow into custody for extradition on an extortion charge.

It was alleged that Ms. Curow and others attempted to extort money from a celebrity athlete by threatening to publish a sex video.

The court applied the two-part test for committal under the Extradition Act, assessing the sufficiency of evidence for a prima facie case of extortion and confirming the identity of the person sought.

Finding both criteria met, the application for committal was granted.

The accused, Joseph DiCarlo, charged with first-degree murder, sought judicial release on bail.

The Crown opposed, arguing for detention under the reverse onus provision of s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code, which requires detention to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The court considered the strength of the Crown's case (overwhelming evidence including a firearm, multiple gunshot wounds, and presence of children), the gravity of the offence (first-degree murder), the circumstances surrounding the commission (domestic violence, children present, alleged deliberation), and the potential lengthy imprisonment.

Despite a comprehensive bail plan and concerns about the pandemic's impact on pre-trial custody, the court concluded that a reasonable member of the public, properly informed, would find detention necessary to maintain confidence in the justice system.

The bail application was denied, and a detention order was issued.

The accused was charged with child luring under section 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused communicated with a minor via online platforms with the purpose of facilitating the commission of child pornography offences.

The accused claimed the complainant told him she was 18 years old and never disclosed her true age until police became involved.

The trial judge rejected the accused's evidence as self-serving and inconsistent, finding it lacked credibility.

The judge accepted the complainant's evidence that she disclosed her true age (14) early in their relationship.

The court found the Crown proved all essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, including the accused's knowledge of the complainant's age and his purpose in facilitating child pornography offences.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a trial on December 19, 2019, the court reserved judgment.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The court also raised concerns about section 7 and 11(d) Charter violations based on the credibility and reliability of the police officer's testimony.

The section 10(b) application was dismissed, but the court found that the officer's misleading and evasive testimony during trial constituted an abuse of process violating sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

As a result, the breath evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of the allowable limit following a traffic incident.

The Crown's case relied on observations of erratic driving by a witness, physical signs of impairment observed by police officers, and breath test results.

The defendant claimed to have consumed alcohol after arriving home and prior to police arrival.

The court found a reasonable doubt regarding post-driving consumption of alcohol and, in the absence of expert evidence to perform a readback calculation, acquitted the defendant on both counts.

The court emphasized that the Crown must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and that evidence of bad driving does not necessarily establish impairment by alcohol.

The accused was charged with three offences arising from Project Raphael, an investigation into underage prostitution in York Region.

The accused sent text messages to an undercover officer posing as a 15-year-old girl in response to an online advertisement.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed he was communicating with a person under the age of 16 or was wilfully blind to that fact.

The court found that while the accused was reckless in continuing discussions about purchasing sexual services where it was possible the other person might be underage, the Crown failed to prove the necessary belief beyond a reasonable doubt.

The charges were dismissed.

The plaintiff, a criminal defence lawyer, sued the Halton Regional Police Service and several police officers for negligence after he was shot by a man who was under police surveillance.

The police defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing they did not owe the plaintiff a private law duty of care.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, finding no special relationship of proximity existed between the police and the plaintiff that would give rise to such a duty.

The court emphasized that police duties are generally owed to the public as a whole, and the circumstances did not establish the plaintiff as part of a "narrow and distinct group of potential victims at risk from a specific threat" before the shooting.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death, operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, and two counts of driving while impaired causing bodily harm, following a head-on collision that resulted in one death and injuries to two passengers.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: alleged violation of s. 8 Charter rights regarding blood sample seizure; alleged violation of s. 10(b) Charter rights regarding access to counsel; alleged misapprehension of evidence regarding a third vehicle; and alleged error in rejecting evidence of bolus drinking prior to the collision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The appeal was dismissed as it constituted an attempt to retry the case and revisit the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility.

The trial judge had provided thorough reasons explaining the rejection of the appellant's version of events and the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

No appealable issue was raised.

Michael Canavan was sentenced after being found guilty of impaired driving causing death, two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm, and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

The court considered aggravating factors including the loss of life, severe injuries to two passengers, significant intoxication, and a problematic driving record with a prior impaired driving conviction and numerous speeding convictions.

Mitigating factors included a positive pre-sentencing report, 56 positive reference letters, and a sincere apology to the victims' family.

The court imposed a sentence of five and a half years in penitentiary, concurrent on each count, a 10-year driving prohibition in addition to the jail sentence, and a DNA sample order, recommending counselling.

The applicant, Stephen Jurkus, jointly charged with Leslie Lonsbary for failing to provide the necessaries of life, sought severance from Lonsbary for their joint jury trial.

Jurkus argued that a joint trial would be unjust due to differing allegations, roles, and evidence, and that severance would allow for an earlier judge-alone trial.

The Crown opposed, citing judicial economy, avoiding inconsistent verdicts, and the Court of Appeal's prior comments on complexity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Jurkus failed to establish that severance was in the interests of justice, emphasizing the legal and factual nexus between the charges and the jury's capacity to compartmentalize evidence.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted on the basis of unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The respondents, correctional officers, were charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life following the death of an inmate at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre.

The application judge found the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that no exceptional circumstances justified the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in calculating defence delay, failed to recognize a discrete event, and failed to account for case complexity.

The court concluded that the resulting delay for one respondent fell just below the ceiling and for the other fell only three weeks above, justified by case complexity and transitional exceptional circumstances.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of impaired driving and driving over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge acquitted on both counts, finding the Crown could not prove impairment and could not rely on the presumption of identity in s. 258(1)(c) to establish the blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The Crown sought to rely on the included offence of care or control over 80, but the trial judge rejected this, holding that s. 258(1)(c) applied only to the charged offence.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the acquittals on fairness grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the included offence issue, holding that the presumption of identity applies to included offences and that it is not unfair to convict on an included offence arising from the same facts as the charged offence.

The defendants were charged with sexual assault.

The Crown sought to admit expert toxicologist evidence regarding the effects of "date rape" drugs, consistent with the complainant's symptoms of incapacitation, despite no direct evidence of drug administration.

The defence objected, arguing irrelevance due to the absence of a drug charge and late disclosure of new testimonial details.

The court ruled the expert evidence admissible, finding it relevant to the issue of consent and the complainant's incapacitation, even without knowing the exact drug or its administration method.

The court noted that late disclosure, if remedied by adjournment, affects weight rather than admissibility.

The offender was convicted on two counts of possessing child pornography under separate informations.

The first offence occurred in December 2013 when police discovered 10,613 images and 257 videos on the offender's computer, depicting pre-pubescent males as young as age six.

While on bail with conditions prohibiting computer access, the offender committed a second offence in November 2015, possessing approximately 700 sexually explicit images and videos on a cell phone.

The court imposed concurrent sentences of 16 months and 18 months custody respectively, followed by 3 years probation on each count, along with mandatory sex offender registration for life, DNA sampling, and a 15-year prohibition order under section 161.