Gregory A. Campbell

The appellant appealed a sentence of 30 days custody imposed for being an unregistered motor vehicle dealer contrary to section 4(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002.

The sentencing judge imposed custody based on the appellant's prior convictions for fraud, unpaid fines and restitution, and an outstanding restitution order.

The appellate court found two errors in principle: first, the sentencing objective was specific deterrence of the appellant rather than general deterrence within a regulatory framework; second, the sentencing judge improperly equated the appellant's past fraudulent conduct with the regulatory offence of being an unregistered dealer.

The court held that the 30-day custodial sentence was clearly excessive and varied it to a fine of $7,500.00 plus administrative costs.

Two sentencing proceedings heard together concerning the availability of intermittent sentences in the Southwest Region.

The first accused pleaded guilty to simple possession of 16 fentanyl patches contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The second accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving, a second offence.

Both accused sought intermittent sentences to maintain employment.

The court learned of the Intermittent Community Work Program, which would allow offenders to serve their entire custodial sentences in the community through temporary absence permits.

The court found that this program rendered the sentences non-custodial in nature and therefore incompatible with the statutory requirement for "appropriate accommodation to ensure compliance" under section 732(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court declined to impose intermittent sentences and remanded both offenders into custody.

The offender was convicted on two counts of possessing child pornography under separate informations.

The first offence occurred in December 2013 when police discovered 10,613 images and 257 videos on the offender's computer, depicting pre-pubescent males as young as age six.

While on bail with conditions prohibiting computer access, the offender committed a second offence in November 2015, possessing approximately 700 sexually explicit images and videos on a cell phone.

The court imposed concurrent sentences of 16 months and 18 months custody respectively, followed by 3 years probation on each count, along with mandatory sex offender registration for life, DNA sampling, and a 15-year prohibition order under section 161.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the respondent's unsuccessful motion to change child support.

The applicant, who successfully resisted the motion, sought costs.

The court considered the principles of costs, including Rule 24, Rule 18, proportionality, and the impact of settlement offers.

While some costs for earlier conferences were disallowed due to lack of timely request, the court ultimately awarded the applicant $4,000.00 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable forthwith by the respondent, and declared them enforceable by the Director of F.R.O. as support-related expenses.

The Respondent Father brought a motion to change his child support obligations for two adult children, Jamie Lee Duesling and Damya Skye Duesling, as ordered in 2008.

The Applicant Mother brought responding motions, which were dismissed without costs.

The court addressed the father's significant child support arrears and his contribution to the children's post-secondary education expenses (s.7 expenses), noting his increased income since the original order and his evasion of obligations.

The court declined to apply the D.B.S. guideline of 3 years for retroactive support and also declined to adjust the basic guideline support amount despite the rationale in Park v. Thompson, citing the father's "support holiday." The father was ordered to pay substantial arrears of guideline child support and one-third of the children's s.7 education expenses forthwith, and ongoing child support for the younger child.

This appeal addressed systemic failures in the child welfare system, including trial counsel incompetence, judicial bias, and inordinate procedural delay, which led to a child remaining in legal limbo for over four years.

The court found the parents' trial counsel incompetent and the trial process unfair.

While the Crown wardship order was not challenged on appeal, the court overturned the "no access" order, replacing it with a contact order for the parents and the child.

It also established a "Pathway Plan" for an Openness Order Hearing, acknowledging a legislative conflict between a child's right to contact with parents and the requirement that such contact not impair adoption opportunities.

The appellant, K.F., appealed a Crown wardship order concerning her child, Z.A.F. The appeal raised issues of systemic delay in child welfare proceedings, alleged misfeasance by the Children's Aid Society, the standard of appellate review, the weight given to expert evidence (Dr. Amin's parenting capacity assessment), and access to the Crown ward.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error by the trial judge.

It emphasized that criminal law delay principles do not apply to child welfare cases and that continued access by the parent would impair the child's future opportunities for adoption.

The accused was charged with common assault on July 1, 2014, following an altercation with a co-worker.

The trial proceeded over multiple dates spanning from January 2016 to June 2016, with the decision rendered in September 2016.

The Crown established that the accused assaulted her former co-worker outside their place of employment on June 30, 2014.

However, the accused brought an application alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from charge to decision was 25 months and 8 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness based on exceptional circumstances.

Although the case was transitional under Jordan, the court determined that the degree of complacency in the prosecution could not be justified, even allowing for inherent time requirements and limited institutional delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with possessing Dilaudid and Fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and elected trial by judge of the Superior Court.

During a focus hearing for the preliminary inquiry, the Crown indicated it would not call the officer who made the arrest based on information from a confidential informant.

The defence sought to examine this officer regarding the lawfulness of the arrest and the grounds for arrest.

The Crown argued that a Dawson application was required and raised concerns about protecting the informer's privilege.

The court ruled on the scope and purpose of preliminary inquiries, the Crown's discretion not to call witnesses, the accused's right to call witnesses, the preliminary inquiry judge's authority to manage the hearing, and whether a Dawson application was necessary.

The Applicant sought costs for a motion argued on January 19, 2016, and for a September 14, 2015 consent order.

The court found the Respondent's tactics, including lack of disclosure and changing lawyers, forced the Applicant into court and increased costs.

While the January motion had mixed results, the Applicant succeeded on key issues like spousal support and an advance on equalization.

The court awarded the Applicant partial costs totaling $15,500 plus HST, with $10,000 declared as legal fees related to support, enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

The court also discussed principles of reasonableness and proportionality in costs awards, and confirmed that tax deductibility of legal costs is not a factor in quantifying costs.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, following a single-vehicle collision.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 149 milligrams per 100 millilitres.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest, having relied in part on an inadmissible compelled statement.

The breath samples were obtained in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Additionally, the court found the samples were not obtained as soon as practicable, depriving the Crown of the presumption of identity.

The court also found insufficient evidence of impairment based on the observations of the officers.

Both counts were dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs following a traffic stop where officers observed excessive speeding and unusual behavior.

A certified drug recognition evaluator conducted roadside and station-based evaluations and concluded the accused was impaired by drugs.

A urinalysis confirmed the presence of multiple substances including cocaine, opioids, and psychiatric medications.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by the drugs in his system.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the accused following his conviction for armed robbery with a knife, assault with a knife, and breach of probation.

The accused had an extensive criminal history spanning nearly three decades, including multiple violent offences, sexual assaults with weapons, robberies, and breaches of court orders.

The court found the accused met the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation under section 753 of the Criminal Code, establishing a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour showing failure to restrain conduct and likelihood of causing death or injury.

The court rejected the defence argument that cognitive behavioural therapy could adequately manage the accused's risk in the community and imposed an indeterminate sentence of detention in a penitentiary.

The Crown sought to introduce an out-of-court audio-recorded statement made by the deceased victim to police approximately two days after an alleged assault.

The victim died of unrelated causes approximately three months after making the statement.

The Crown relied on the principled exception to the hearsay rule to admit the statement as evidence.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the statement met the threshold reliability requirement.

The court found that the victim's capacity to recall events accurately was compromised due to his poor health, medical condition, alcohol consumption, and marijuana use.

The victim's account was disjointed and inconsistent regarding when and where he was struck.

The court also noted significant discrepancies between the victim's account and his mother's corroborating statement.

The court concluded that the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement did not provide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and that the absence of cross-examination could not be adequately substituted.

The motion was dismissed and the statement was ruled inadmissible.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath samples on the grounds that they were not obtained as soon as practicable, contrary to s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code and breaching the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found a breach occurred due to unexplained delays totalling approximately one hour between the demand and the first breath sample.

However, the evidence was admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the breach was not serious state conduct, the intrusion was minimal, and the public interest in prosecuting impaired driving was significant.

On the merits, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.

A mother appealed a summary judgment decision in child protection proceedings that found her child in need of protection and granted sole custody to the maternal grandparents.

The appellate court held that the motion judge relied heavily on inadmissible hearsay evidence, made unsupported credibility findings, and misapprehended key facts regarding the circumstances of the child's apprehension.

The court found the child had been voluntarily placed with grandparents prior to the Society’s involvement and was not in the mother’s care at the time of apprehension, undermining the protection finding.

The protection application was therefore ill-founded.

The order granting custody to the grandparents was set aside and the Society’s protection application dismissed.

Following several family law motions concerning disclosure, access, and recognition of a foreign custody order, the court addressed the issue of costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of over $31,000 for all work performed during the litigation.

The court found the respondent’s litigation conduct unreasonable, including failure to comply with disclosure orders and maintaining untenable positions until the hearing, which forced unnecessary preparation by the applicant.

However, the court also found the applicant’s counsel’s bill excessive in parts, particularly repeated charges for reviewing communications.

Applying a flexible and proportional approach to costs, the court fixed a fair and reasonable award recognizing the applicant’s success.

The court determined the costs arising from family law motions argued on May 16, 2013 concerning issues including the matrimonial home, return of personal belongings, and related financial matters.

The judge concluded that the motions produced predictable outcomes and largely reflected positions that had already been proposed in settlement correspondence.

Although neither party clearly succeeded overall, the court considered the parties’ settlement conduct under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The moving party’s counsel had previously proposed settlement and mediation, while the responding party did not respond.

As a balanced result, the court ordered partial indemnity costs in favour of the applicant.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 250 and 259 milligrams.

The defence challenged the reliability of the test results, arguing operator error occurred when the breath technician failed to observe the mandatory 15-minute waiting period after the accused used an inhaler.

The court found that although the technician deviated from recommended procedures, the deviation did not affect the reliability of the results.

The two test samples were in close agreement, the slope detector did not invalidate the sample, and the evidence did not support that the inhaler contained alcohol.

The court rejected the accused's credibility regarding the type of inhaler used and found the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with attempt to commit murder.

During trial, a voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police.

The accused had voluntarily contacted police to report historical homicides allegedly committed by his father and attended the police station voluntarily.

During questioning, the accused disclosed that he had brought his father to a river with the intention of killing him by throwing him in, but did not proceed because the river was frozen.

The court found that while the initial statements were voluntary, the police breached the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter when they continued questioning after the accused disclosed the assault element of the attempted murder.

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding that the police acted in good faith, the breach was not deliberate or flagrant, and the evidence would have been obtained in any event from third-party witnesses who corroborated the accused's statements.