Brent Christopher Balmer

The applicant Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order placing a medically complex child in Extended Society Care.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing she could care for the child with appropriate supports and that the Society relied heavily on hearsay evidence from third-party service providers.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the mother's ability to provide a viable plan of care, the reasons for the breakdown in relationships with service providers, and whether the Society fulfilled its statutory duty to assist the mother.

The Society brought a protection application regarding two children after discovering their mother's home in a state of severe disarray with accessible drugs and paraphernalia.

The court found the children in need of protection under s. 74(2)(b)(i) of the CYFSA due to the mother's opioid use disorder and the hazardous state of the home.

The court ordered the children placed in the father's care for four months subject to Society supervision.

Recognizing the mother's recent progress in engaging with relapse prevention services, the court ordered a schedule of gradually increasing, unsupervised access for the mother, culminating in equal shared parenting time.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an extended society care order for a six-year-old child with significant special needs.

The parent, who was represented by the Public Guardian and Trustee due to severe mental health challenges, opposed the motion and sought the child's return.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the parent's unaddressed mental health issues, lack of insight, and history of dysregulated conduct posed an unacceptable risk of harm.

The court ordered extended society care with supervised access once every other week, designating the child as the access holder to prevent the parent from delaying future adoption proceedings.

This decision concerns an application by J.D.S. to adopt A.A., a child with complex medical and developmental needs, and the subsequent motion by P.E., the biological father, to withdraw his previously given consent to the adoption.

The court reviews the statutory framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and applies the best interests of the child test.

The court finds that P.E. had capacity and was fully informed when he gave consent, and that his later dissatisfaction with parenting time arrangements does not vitiate that consent.

The court concludes that it is not in A.A.'s best interests to permit P.E. to withdraw his consent, given her strong bond with J.D.S. and her siblings, her special needs, and the lack of insight or planning by P.E. regarding her care.

The Openness Agreement remains in effect, and the parties are ordered to communicate via a parenting app.

This costs endorsement follows a 13.5-day trial in a family law matter.

The court considered the parties’ submissions on costs, the divided success at trial, and the reasonableness of offers to settle.

The court applied the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, ultimately ordering the respondent, Mr. Elliott, to pay the applicant, Ms. Churchill, $15,000 in costs.

This decision addresses two Applications for Openness brought by the Office of the Children's Lawyer on behalf of two Metis children placed for adoption with their younger siblings.

The court considered the best interests of the children, the meaningfulness and benefit of ongoing contact with birth parents, and the importance of cultural connection under both the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) and the Federal Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children.

The court balanced the children's strong desire for contact and cultural connection against the risks posed by the birth parents' aggressive and disruptive behavior, particularly the father's history of threats and criminal charges.

The final openness order permits indirect contact through annual updates and messages, with strict conditions to protect the adoptive placement's stability and safety.

This decision addresses a high-conflict family law dispute involving decision-making responsibility, parenting time, child support, and spousal support between Katherine Churchill and Christopher David Elliott.

The court considered the best interests of the children, the credibility of the parties, and the recommendations of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL).

The court ordered a week-about parenting schedule for N.E., parallel decision-making (with Mr. Elliott responsible for health and Ms. Churchill for dental and extracurriculars), and set child support obligations.

The court declined to set aside the separation agreement for spousal support due to insufficient pleadings and evidence.

The OCL’s recommendations were not followed due to concerns about neutrality and methodology.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from the dismissal of the applicant mother's motion for interim changes to parenting arrangements, including primary residence, schooling, decision-making authority, and child support, just three months before a scheduled 10-day trial.

The court found the mother's motion lacked evidence and justification for such significant changes to a long-standing status quo.

Despite the mother's financial circumstances, the court ordered her to pay the respondent father $14,000.00 in costs, emphasizing that litigants are responsible for the choices they make and the expenses they create, particularly when pursuing unreasonable claims, and that impecuniosity does not shield a party from costs liability.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking an interim order to change the primary residence and school of her eight-year-old son, Nathan, from the father to her.

This motion was brought despite a 10-day trial on the same issue being scheduled in three months.

The child had been primarily residing with the father for two years following serious mental health issues in the mother's household.

The mother argued the father engaged in "self-help" by not returning the child and sought to rely on certain factual findings from an OCL report.

The court dismissed the mother's motion, finding insufficient compelling evidence to justify disrupting the two-year status quo, especially given the imminent trial where all evidence could be fully tested.

The decision emphasized the child's need for stability and the importance of maintaining a successful status quo in interim parenting orders.

The parties, who share equal parenting time and joint decision-making for their four-year-old daughter, could not agree on which public school she should attend.

The applicant mother sought to enroll the child at a school near her home, while the respondent father sought a school near his home.

The court determined that it was in the child's best interests to attend the school near the applicant's home, as it would allow the applicant greater flexibility to secure employment and facilitate the involvement of the child's extended maternal family in before and after-school care.

The Children's Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo was ordered to pay costs to the respondent mother, J.P., following a successful motion by the mother for child placement.

While the Society's position on the underlying motion was deemed reasonable, the court found several procedural failings on its part, including inadequate information gathering regarding the father's incarceration, improper delegation of decision-making to another CAS, insufficient assessment of the proposed placement plan, and failure to disclose the father's partner's child protection involvement.

These failings were deemed "patently unfair and indefensible" justifying the costs award.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for leave to appeal an order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and lifted the stay of the order.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to one respondent and $3,000 to two other respondents.

The mother brought a motion in a child protection proceeding seeking a temporary order to place the child with former kin caregivers.

The child had been placed with the father, but the father was recently incarcerated and denied bail.

The children's aid society sought to keep the child in the care of the father's partner.

Applying the augmented best interests test for an Indigenous child, the court found that placement with the kin caregivers was more stable and in the child's best interests, despite historical concerns regarding the kin's ability to foster the child's cultural identity, which could be mitigated through supervision and education.

The parties sought costs following a family law trial regarding parenting and child support issues.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of nearly $170,000, while the respondent sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $2,500.

The court reviewed the parties' offers to settle and found that there was mixed success at trial.

The court also noted that both parties had conducted the litigation unreasonably, allowing personal conflict to dominate and incurring disproportionate legal expenses for relatively straightforward issues.

Consequently, the court declined to award costs to either party, ordering each to bear their own costs.

This divorce proceeding focused on decision-making responsibility and parenting time for the child, K.P.K., born in 2017, with property and support issues having been resolved.

The court granted joint decision-making for most areas, but awarded sole decision-making to the mother for health care, specifically regarding COVID-19 vaccination, after consultation with the father.

The existing parenting schedule, where the child primarily resides with the mother and spends regular time with the father, will continue.

However, an equal parenting time schedule will be implemented if the father relocates to the mother's community.

The father was ordered to pay child support based on the current schedule, which will terminate upon the implementation of the equal parenting schedule.

The parties made written submissions regarding the costs of the respondent's successful motion to set aside a default order.

The applicant sought costs of the motion on a partial indemnity basis, arguing that the respondent's default necessitated the motion.

The respondent argued no costs should be awarded or they should be in the cause.

The court found the applicant acted reasonably throughout and that setting aside the default order was an indulgence to the respondent.

The court ordered the respondent to pay the applicant's costs of the motion fixed at $3,911.28.

The Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application regarding a 7-year-old child.

The court found the mother lacked credibility regarding her severe substance abuse issues, domestic violence instigation, and failure to comply with court orders, including driving while prohibited.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to the risk of physical and emotional harm from the mother.

The child was ordered to remain in the care of the father for six months under CAS supervision, with the mother granted specified supervised access.

The applicant society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order to place the child in extended Society care.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the return of the child under a supervision order.

Relying on expert evidence that the mother lacked the capacity to safely parent the child full-time due to a psychological disorder, the court found no genuine issue for trial.

The court granted the summary judgment, placing the child in extended Society care, but ordered that the mother, sibling, and maternal grandparents have a right of access to the child.

The respondent father brought an urgent motion seeking to enroll the parties' two children in in-person school, contrary to the applicant mother's unilateral decision to enroll them in virtual learning.

The court granted leave to hear the motion prior to a case conference due to the impasse between the joint custodial parents.

Applying the best interests of the child test in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the court found that the risk of the virus to the healthy children was extremely low and ordered that they attend school in person.

The children's aid society brought a motion within a status review application to vacate a previous statutory finding that a child in extended society care was not a First Nations child.

The society sought a new finding that the child is a First Nations child based on new evidence of the paternal aunt's self-identification as Indigenous.

The foster parents and maternal grandfather opposed the motion, arguing the previous finding could not be varied.

The court held that a child's identity is fluid and can be revisited on a status review application if new evidence arises and it is in the child's best interests.

The court accepted the paternal aunt's self-identification and declared the child a First Nations child under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.