Brent Christopher Balmer

The applicant society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order to place the child in extended Society care.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the return of the child under a supervision order.

Relying on expert evidence that the mother lacked the capacity to safely parent the child full-time due to a psychological disorder, the court found no genuine issue for trial.

The court granted the summary judgment, placing the child in extended Society care, but ordered that the mother, sibling, and maternal grandparents have a right of access to the child.

The respondent father brought an urgent motion seeking to enroll the parties' two children in in-person school, contrary to the applicant mother's unilateral decision to enroll them in virtual learning.

The court granted leave to hear the motion prior to a case conference due to the impasse between the joint custodial parents.

Applying the best interests of the child test in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the court found that the risk of the virus to the healthy children was extremely low and ordered that they attend school in person.

The children's aid society brought a motion within a status review application to vacate a previous statutory finding that a child in extended society care was not a First Nations child.

The society sought a new finding that the child is a First Nations child based on new evidence of the paternal aunt's self-identification as Indigenous.

The foster parents and maternal grandfather opposed the motion, arguing the previous finding could not be varied.

The court held that a child's identity is fluid and can be revisited on a status review application if new evidence arises and it is in the child's best interests.

The court accepted the paternal aunt's self-identification and declared the child a First Nations child under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Society brought a motion to adjourn a hearing regarding its refusal of the applicants' adoption application for a child who had been in their care for almost three years.

The Society sought the adjournment to reassess family and community plans under the new federal legislation respecting Indigenous children, citing COVID-19 delays.

The Child and Family Services Review Board dismissed the motion, finding that the Society had ample time prior to the pandemic to conduct reassessments and that further delay was not in the child's best interests or required for an adequate hearing.

The applicant sought an urgent interim order prohibiting a funeral home from releasing the deceased's remains pending the resolution of an estate dispute.

The matter was reviewed by a triage judge under the COVID-19 protocol to determine urgency.

The court found that the matter was not urgent and declined to hear the motion before the resumption of regular court operations.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to find two children in need of protection and to place them with their respective fathers.

The mother, who suffers from severe and chronic mental health issues, did not respond to the motion.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and ordered the children placed with their fathers.

The court declined the society's request to delegate access discretion to the fathers, holding that a court cannot delegate its statutory duty to determine access based on the best interests of the children, and instead ordered supervised access with specific parameters.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment to place three children with their father under a six-month supervision order, with the mother's access to be supervised at the Society's discretion.

The father consented, and the mother did not actively oppose the motion.

The court applied the test for summary judgment in child protection proceedings, screened the evidence for admissibility (including business records and children's hearsay statements), and found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court concluded that the children continued to be in need of protection and that the proposed order was in their best interests.

The appellant brought a motion to extend the time to perfect an appeal.

A threshold jurisdictional issue arose regarding whether the appeal properly lay to the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court interpreted the term 'single payment' in the statute, concluding that it refers to lump sum payments as opposed to periodic payments, and that multiple lump sum payments in an order do not strip the Divisional Court of jurisdiction provided the amounts fall under the $50,000 threshold.

The court found it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and granted the extension of time.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to extend the time to file an appeal of a final family law order.

A threshold jurisdictional issue arose regarding whether the appeal properly lay to the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court interpreted the term 'single payment' and concluded that multiple lump sum payments ordered for section 7 expenses, which individually and combined fell under the $50,000 threshold, constituted a 'single payment'.

The court granted the extension of time and confirmed the Divisional Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the respondent's unsuccessful motion to change child support.

The applicant, who successfully resisted the motion, sought costs.

The court considered the principles of costs, including Rule 24, Rule 18, proportionality, and the impact of settlement offers.

While some costs for earlier conferences were disallowed due to lack of timely request, the court ultimately awarded the applicant $4,000.00 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable forthwith by the respondent, and declared them enforceable by the Director of F.R.O. as support-related expenses.

The Respondent Father brought a motion to change his child support obligations for two adult children, Jamie Lee Duesling and Damya Skye Duesling, as ordered in 2008.

The Applicant Mother brought responding motions, which were dismissed without costs.

The court addressed the father's significant child support arrears and his contribution to the children's post-secondary education expenses (s.7 expenses), noting his increased income since the original order and his evasion of obligations.

The court declined to apply the D.B.S. guideline of 3 years for retroactive support and also declined to adjust the basic guideline support amount despite the rationale in Park v. Thompson, citing the father's "support holiday." The father was ordered to pay substantial arrears of guideline child support and one-third of the children's s.7 education expenses forthwith, and ongoing child support for the younger child.