Jonathan Paul Krashinsky

Family law trial following separation of a married couple with one child.

The parties resolved most issues by consent at the outset of trial, leaving parenting time, spousal support, equalization, occupational rent, and carrying costs.

The court maintained the existing parenting schedule with the mother as primary parent, ordered periodic spousal support of $1,200 per month on compensatory and non-compensatory grounds, awarded $10,000 in net retroactive spousal support after crediting $30,000 in post-separation transfers, and determined an equalization payment of $22,434.29 owed by the applicant to the respondent.

The respondent's claim for occupational rent was dismissed, and the money taken from the respondent's mother's farm account for home renovations was found not to be a loan.

A divorce was granted.

This costs endorsement follows a 13.5-day trial in a family law matter.

The court considered the parties’ submissions on costs, the divided success at trial, and the reasonableness of offers to settle.

The court applied the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, ultimately ordering the respondent, Mr. Elliott, to pay the applicant, Ms. Churchill, $15,000 in costs.

This decision addresses a high-conflict family law dispute involving decision-making responsibility, parenting time, child support, and spousal support between Katherine Churchill and Christopher David Elliott.

The court considered the best interests of the children, the credibility of the parties, and the recommendations of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL).

The court ordered a week-about parenting schedule for N.E., parallel decision-making (with Mr. Elliott responsible for health and Ms. Churchill for dental and extracurriculars), and set child support obligations.

The court declined to set aside the separation agreement for spousal support due to insufficient pleadings and evidence.

The OCL’s recommendations were not followed due to concerns about neutrality and methodology.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from the dismissal of the applicant mother's motion for interim changes to parenting arrangements, including primary residence, schooling, decision-making authority, and child support, just three months before a scheduled 10-day trial.

The court found the mother's motion lacked evidence and justification for such significant changes to a long-standing status quo.

Despite the mother's financial circumstances, the court ordered her to pay the respondent father $14,000.00 in costs, emphasizing that litigants are responsible for the choices they make and the expenses they create, particularly when pursuing unreasonable claims, and that impecuniosity does not shield a party from costs liability.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking an interim order to change the primary residence and school of her eight-year-old son, Nathan, from the father to her.

This motion was brought despite a 10-day trial on the same issue being scheduled in three months.

The child had been primarily residing with the father for two years following serious mental health issues in the mother's household.

The mother argued the father engaged in "self-help" by not returning the child and sought to rely on certain factual findings from an OCL report.

The court dismissed the mother's motion, finding insufficient compelling evidence to justify disrupting the two-year status quo, especially given the imminent trial where all evidence could be fully tested.

The decision emphasized the child's need for stability and the importance of maintaining a successful status quo in interim parenting orders.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated October 13, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking to relocate to Nova Scotia with the parties' five-year-old son to start a farming business.

The parties had a shared parenting arrangement in Guelph, Ontario.

The court applied the relocation provisions of the Children's Law Reform Act and found that the mother bore the burden of proving the move was in the child's best interests.

The court concluded the mother's financial and farming plan was uncertain and that the move would drastically reduce the child's time with his father and extended family.

The motion to relocate was dismissed.

The Family and Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington County brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a child, R., seeking placement with her aunt and uncle.

The father opposed, requesting the child's return to his care or expanded access, while the mother and aunt/uncle supported the Society's plan.

The court applied the two-part test under subsection 94(10) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, requiring the Society to demonstrate reasonable grounds of a real possibility of harm if the child were returned to parental care, and that an interim supervision order would be insufficient.

The court found a long history of neglect, including unhygienic living conditions, missed medical appointments, school absences, and concerns arising from the tragic death of another child in the parents' care.

The parents' responses were deemed insufficient to refute the established risks.

The court concluded that the child was at risk of harm and could not be adequately protected by a supervision order with either parent.

Consequently, the motion for temporary care and custody with the aunt and uncle was granted, with supervised access for the parents, and the Society was directed to monitor the child's hygiene and school attendance.

This ruling addresses a status review proceeding by summary judgment motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court assessed whether the child, "G", remained in need of protection due to emotional harm stemming from past domestic violence involving the parents and the father's ongoing actions.

While the mother had made significant progress in her ability to protect the child, "G" continued to exhibit aggressive behaviors and fear related to the father.

The court denied the Society's request for a deemed custody order, opting instead for a protection order.

This order placed the child in the mother's care subject to nine months of Society supervision, with no access for the incarcerated father until he brings a new application and demonstrates reduced risk.

The Society brought a summary judgment motion in a Status Review application seeking to terminate its supervision order and impose a deemed custody and no access order for the child with the Mother and against the Father.

The Father opposed, arguing the motion was premature and impacted his access claim.

The court found deficiencies in the evidence, particularly regarding the Mother's therapeutic progress, the child's trauma counselling, and the Father's in-custody rehabilitation.

Consequently, the court declined to grant summary judgment and instead directed a mini-trial to gather specific, clarified evidence on these issues to determine the child's need for future protection and best interests.

This is a costs decision arising from two custody and access motions heard on August 11, 2020.

The father sought recovery of costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $3,957.59, arguing he was mostly successful.

The mother contended that success was divided and therefore no costs should be awarded.

The court found divided success on the issues: the father was successful on the primary issue of parenting time, while the mother was successful on the secondary issue of schooling.

However, the court found the mother's conduct regarding the schooling issue to be unreasonable, as she had agreed to keep the child in his original school but unilaterally removed him and restricted the father's access to information about the child.

The court awarded costs to the father in the amount of $3,000.00 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable within 60 days.

The court addressed temporary parenting arrangements and schooling for a nine-year-old child following the separation of the parents.

The father sought shared parenting and the child's return to his original school in Moorefield.

The mother sought sole custody and enrollment at a new school in Elmira.

The court found that the parents had shared caregiving responsibilities prior to separation and that the mother's unilateral relocation did not create a valid new status quo.

The court ordered interim shared custody on a week-about basis with equal parenting time, while allowing the child to continue at the new school in Elmira to minimize further disruption.

The applicant, Daniel L. Thornhill, brought an urgent motion during the COVID-19 pandemic seeking primary residence of the children and specific access arrangements.

He raised concerns about the respondent, Rena Schmidt, allowing a new partner and his son to move into her home without providing information on public health precautions, particularly given one child's pre-existing health vulnerabilities.

The court found the motion urgent due to these specific concerns, but did not grant the substantive relief immediately.

Instead, it directed the parties to a settlement conference, followed by a motion hearing if no agreement is reached on interim parenting arrangements.

The applicant child welfare agency brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection application concerning twin infants born prematurely and testing positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine at birth.

The parents did not respond to the motion.

The court found a prima facie case of risk based on the mother's untreated addiction history and the father's inadequate addiction treatment.

The court granted an order for extended society care (Crown wardship) with placement in a kinship home.

The court declined to grant access to the parents, finding that while the parents demonstrated warmth and affection during supervised visits, the unresolved addiction issues and lack of meaningful progress toward rehabilitation made ongoing access not in the children's best interests.

The applicant father sought an interim order allowing the children to travel from Germany to Ontario, pending a determination of whether the Ontario court had jurisdiction over custody and access under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The applicant argued the court could make the order under s. 40 of the CLRA or its parens patriae jurisdiction.

The court held that s. 40 only applies after a court has determined it lacks jurisdiction, not before.

The court also declined to exercise parens patriae jurisdiction, finding no situation of necessity.

The request was dismissed pending the jurisdictional hearing.

A status review hearing concerning a child in the protection system where the applicant society sought to place the child with paternal grandparents, while the foster parent sought custody.

The court found that the child had formed a secure and selective attachment to the foster parent and that severing this attachment would cause significant trauma.

The court rejected the society's plan and granted custody to the foster parent under section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act, finding that the child's best interests required maintaining the established attachment relationship.

The decision addresses the tension between family reunification principles and the child's psychological well-being, and clarifies the scope of foster parent rights at the status review stage.

The mother brought a motion seeking temporary custody of two children, supervised access for the father, and a restraining order.

The father brought a cross-motion seeking joint custody, equal time-sharing, and transfer of the case to Guelph.

The court found evidence of domestic violence by the father against the mother and awarded temporary custody to the mother with limited unsupervised access to the father on Saturdays.

A restraining order was granted restricting the father's contact with the mother.

The case was transferred to Guelph as the children's ordinary residence, though the mother was not required to relocate.