Maybelline Reyes Massey

A trial concerning child and spousal support following the separation of a long-term marriage.

The primary issues involved imputing income to both parties.

The respondent husband was employed by Canada Post until his discharge in 2020, after which he operated a courier business and subsequently worked for Ford Canada before ceasing employment.

The applicant wife had been out of the workforce for approximately 20 years at separation and subsequently received Ontario Works and ODSP benefits.

The court imputed income to the respondent for child support purposes and determined that the applicant was entitled to spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory bases at the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The applicant mother sought an order for reunification therapy with her 14-year-old child, alleging parental alienation by the respondent father.

The father brought a cross-motion for child support and individual counselling for the child.

The court found no overwhelming evidence of parental alienation to warrant reunification therapy on an interim motion, noting conflicting evidence and the child's stated preferences to distance herself from the mother.

The mother's motion for reunification therapy was dismissed.

The court ordered the mother to pay interim child support based on her projected income of $36,340, rather than the father's higher imputed amount, and ordered further financial disclosure.

Parenting time for the mother was ordered on a temporary, without prejudice basis, in accordance with the child's stated views and preferences.

This decision addresses the respondent's claim for costs following the applicant's unsuccessful attempt to set aside a separation agreement.

The court found the applicant's claims lacked evidentiary support, that she had received independent legal advice, and that she had failed to fully disclose her assets, purposely misleading the court.

The respondent was entirely successful in defending the application and had made reasonable offers to settle which were rejected by the applicant.

Given the applicant's unreasonable conduct and the respondent's success, the court awarded full indemnity costs to the respondent in the amount of $15,582.69.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding of a material change in circumstances for a motion to change under the Family Law Rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the issue of material change was properly determined by summary judgment and that the factors (respondent's move, new partner, work schedule change) clearly constituted a material change under the Gordon and Goertz test, relevant to the children's best interests.

This costs endorsement followed the dismissal of the respondent's motion to change, making the applicant the successful party at trial.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of $42,535.20, while the respondent argued for a lower amount, citing reasonable behaviour and financial hardship.

The court found the respondent's trial position, seeking sole custody and severely limited access for the applicant, to be manifestly unreasonable.

The court also rejected the respondent's claim of financial hardship, noting the applicant's lower income.

Applying the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, the court reduced the applicant's former counsel's accounts by 50% and current counsel's accounts by 10%, ultimately awarding the applicant $32,310 in costs.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a prior custody order, seeking sole custody and termination of child support, alleging material changes in the children's educational needs, supervision needs, over-identification with the mother, and unmet medical needs.

The applicant mother opposed the motion.

The court applied the two-stage test from *Gordon v. Goertz*, requiring a material change in circumstances before considering the children's best interests.

The court found that the respondent failed to demonstrate any material change in circumstances on any of the four bases alleged, dismissing the motion to change.

The parties, separated since 2015, brought cross-motions for temporary orders concerning the residence and access of their two daughters.

The respondent sought police enforcement of access, an order compelling the applicant to retain a therapist, and make-up time.

The applicant sought a restraining order against the respondent, suspension of access, temporary custody, and permission to change the children's school.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion in its entirety, finding his requests unfounded and noting his failure to facilitate therapeutic intervention and potential parental alienation.

The respondent's motion was largely granted, affirming previous access orders and directing the applicant to comply with therapeutic requirements, encourage the children's relationship with their mother, and cease disparaging the respondent or involving his new partner in access exchanges.