Ian Gerald Theodore Smits

This case involved a final determination of parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and child support following the separation of the parties.

The applicant mother sought primary residence and decision-making, maintaining the existing parenting schedule, and child support arrears.

The respondent father sought a "week-about" equal parenting schedule, joint decision-making, and no retroactive child support.

The court maintained the status quo for parenting time, granting the mother primary residence and the father alternate weekend and midweek overnight parenting time, emphasizing the children's need for stability.

The mother was granted primary decision-making authority, subject to a mandatory consultation process with the father.

The court ordered the father to pay child support arrears and ongoing child support based on the Federal Child Support Guidelines, rejecting his arguments against retroactive support and undue hardship.

The applicant, Craig M., sought bail release pending appeal of his conviction for sexual offences.

His appeal was based on ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging inadequate advice regarding his right to testify and mode of trial, and general inadequate performance.

The court found the claims regarding mode of trial and general performance frivolous.

While the claim about advice on testifying was not frivolous, it did not clearly surpass the "not frivolous" threshold due to a lack of supporting evidence, absence of a waiver of privilege, and problematic, evolving affidavits.

Given the seriousness of the offences and the weakness of the proposed appeal, the application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a prior custody order, seeking sole custody and termination of child support, alleging material changes in the children's educational needs, supervision needs, over-identification with the mother, and unmet medical needs.

The applicant mother opposed the motion.

The court applied the two-stage test from *Gordon v. Goertz*, requiring a material change in circumstances before considering the children's best interests.

The court found that the respondent failed to demonstrate any material change in circumstances on any of the four bases alleged, dismissing the motion to change.

The appellants, towing companies owned by members of the Six Nations of Grand River Indian Reserve, sought to retain vehicles towed and stored at their facilities pending payment of towing and storage fees.

The respondent insurance company, which had acquired ownership of the vehicles following accidents or thefts, brought applications under the Repair and Storage Liens Act to retrieve the vehicles.

The appellants claimed exemption from the provincial lien regime under section 89(1) of the Indian Act, arguing that the vehicles constituted personal property of Indians located on a reserve and therefore could not be seized by non-Indian parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 89(1) of the Indian Act only protects against seizure by creditors or the Crown, not by debtors.

Since the respondent was a debtor rather than a creditor, the appellants could not claim the protection of section 89(1).

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, conceding that all grounds of appeal depended on the trial judge's finding that there was no fourth lease dated October 31, 2007, with Nemesis Entertainment as a tenant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's rejection of the lease's existence was well anchored in the evidence and contained no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

This was a correction endorsement relating to a prior costs decision following trial.

The court identified an error in the numerical figure used in discussing a defence settlement offer and corrected the amount from $31,400 to $93,900.

The court held that the corrected figure would have been sufficient to engage the presumptive costs consequences under Rule 49.10(2), but the treatment of settlement offers remained a neutral consideration in the circumstances.

The original costs disposition was left unchanged.

Following a civil jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $158,760.27 after recovering substantially less than pleaded and less than sought in settlement offers.

The court applied the Rule 57.01 reasonableness and proportionality framework, balancing the amount claimed and recovered, indemnity considerations, complexity, party conduct, refusal to admit liability, and the practical realities of trying a personal injury action.

The court found legitimate concerns about over-lawyering, duplicated effort, and inclusion of work tied to accident benefits and uninsured motorist claims, but also found the defendants' late admission of liability unnecessarily increased the plaintiffs' litigation burden.

The defendants' failure to mediate or make settlement offers did not attract adverse costs consequences because they were not obligated to mediate under s. 258.6 of the Insurance Act and defendants are generally entitled to put plaintiffs to proof.

The plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $110,000 all-inclusive.

Following dismissal of a commercial lease and nightclub-related civil action after trial, the successful defendants sought substantial or full indemnity costs, relying in part on an unaccepted offer to settle and alleged objectionable conduct by the plaintiffs.

The court held that Rule 49.10 did not automatically justify enhanced costs where the action was dismissed outright and, applying appellate authority, found no egregious or reprehensible conduct warranting substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49.13.

Costs for represented defendants were fixed at partial indemnity in the amount of $35,000 inclusive, while self-represented defendants were awarded a moderate partial indemnity amount of $6,000 inclusive after applying the governing framework for self-represented litigants.

Costs were ordered payable by the plaintiffs only.

Following a family law trial concerning the validity of a separation agreement and associated financial obligations, the court addressed costs after the parties were unable to agree.

The applicant had succeeded on the primary issue of the agreement’s validity and was overall more successful on the related monetary issues, although there was mixed success on collateral matters and some issues were settled during the trial.

The court held that the applicant was entitled to costs but declined to award substantial indemnity costs.

Considering proportionality, the parties’ conduct, and the factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules, the court fixed partial indemnity costs in a lump sum.

Following a family law proceeding involving support claims, the court addressed costs.

The respondent in the underlying application was generally successful, though not to the full extent of the relief sought.

No settlement offers justified a substantial indemnity award.

Considering the reasonable hours and hourly rate of counsel, as well as the expectations of the parties and the absence of a costs order at the case conference, the court ordered the unsuccessful applicant to pay partial indemnity costs.

A motion to change child support under the Divorce Act sought retroactive adjustment of child support and contribution toward section 7 extraordinary expenses including orthodontic treatment, driver’s education, and post-secondary education.

The responding parent cross‑moved for a retroactive reduction in support based on alleged reduced income and business losses.

The court rejected the claimed self‑employment losses due to insufficient evidence and calculated income based on employment earnings.

The court ordered proportional contributions to section 7 expenses and recalculated guideline support, resulting in arrears payable and prospective support adjustments including university costs for a child attending post-secondary education.

The appellant was successful on appeal, which resulted in an order for a new trial due to the trial judge's inadequate reasons.

The appellant sought costs for both the appeal and the first trial.

The Divisional Court awarded the appellant $15,000 in costs for the appeal, noting the issues were not complex.

However, because the need for a new trial was not the respondents' fault, the court ordered that the appeal costs not be payable until the completion of the second trial, and that the costs of the first trial be in the cause.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her libel action against the respondents regarding an allegedly defamatory article published in a newspaper.

The trial judge had dismissed the action, finding the statements were substantially true and constituted fair comment, largely based on an adverse credibility finding against the appellant.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for his credibility findings and failed to analyze conflicting or corroborating evidence, rendering the reasons insufficient for proper appellate review.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment interpreting a deed and finding him liable for trespass.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusion that a clause granting limited use of facilities to the original grantee and her guests did not extend to heirs and assigns, as it was a stand-alone provision distinct from the unconditional right of way.

The Court also upheld the finding of trespass regarding the appellant's use of the facilities for a large reunion.

On consent, the judgment was varied to correct an inadvertent error regarding the appellant's two access easements.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for inviting a minor to touch for a sexual purpose and sexual assault, as well as his sentence of six months' incarceration and two years' probation.

The offences occurred when the complainant was between nine and eleven years old.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and failing to reconcile inconsistencies in the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a custodial sentence was appropriate given the breach of trust and continuing course of conduct.

The appellant appealed the order of the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error and dismissed the appeal, fixing costs at $6,000.