Cole Sayer Carl Vegso

The Estate of Karen Rail brought a summary judgment motion to recover amounts owing under two promissory notes issued by the defendant corporations.

The first note, dated January 12, 2012, was for $100,000 plus interest issued by 284 Ontario Limited.

The second note, dated December 8, 2017, was for $100,000 plus interest issued by Interra Management Group Limited.

The Estate also sought to pierce the corporate veil to hold Patrick Cronin, the sole director and shareholder of both corporations, personally liable.

The court granted summary judgment against the corporate defendants on both promissory notes but dismissed the action against Cronin personally.

The court found that the July 21, 2020 text message from Cronin constituted a valid acknowledgment of the debts under the Limitations Act, 2002, thereby resetting the limitation period.

The court declined to pierce the corporate veil, finding no evidence of fraudulent or improper use of the corporations.

This appeal concerned a real estate transaction where the purchaser missed the closing payment deadline by 35 minutes, leading the vendor to terminate the contract based on a "time is of the essence" clause.

The appellant purchaser sought a declaration that the vendor breached the agreement and that the contract was unconscionable, also seeking damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's decision that the strict enforcement of the payment deadline was valid.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the interpretation of the agreement, the application of the "time is of the essence" clause, or the finding that the contract was not unconscionable, emphasizing the clear contractual language and prior warnings given to the sophisticated parties.

The applicants, Mejo Varghese and Bincy Joseph, brought an application seeking the return of their $60,000 deposit after refusing to close on the purchase of a new home constructed by the respondent, Hogg Construction Ltd. The applicants alleged a material breach of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) due to a significant reduction in the living room size (approximately 3'6" shorter than planned), which they argued was not a "minor change" permitted by the contract.

The respondent contended the applicants misinterpreted the plans and that any changes were minor.

Applying the principle from Stefanovska v. Kok, the court found the reduction in the living room's length was objectively significant, affecting the property's use and enjoyment, and thus constituted a major change and a repudiation of the APS.

The applicants were not obligated to complete the transaction.

The appellants, several Turtle Jack's restaurant franchisees, appealed a motion judge's order that set aside an Associate Judge's decision to add a new defendant (11554891 Canada Inc.) and allow amendments to their statement of claim regarding supplier contributions to an advertising fund.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that adding the new party and allowing the amendments would constitute an abuse of process due to inordinate delay, the dubious nature of the claims, and the fact that the amendments introduced new, statute-barred claims.

The court also upheld the costs award against the appellants.

Following a successful appeal setting aside a Master's order that amended pleadings and added a defendant, the successful appellants sought costs.

The court found the amounts sought excessive because the appellants were unsuccessful on several grounds of appeal and the costs of the underlying motion were fixed at $5,000.

The court awarded the TRG defendants $13,000 and the added defendant $12,000, inclusive of the underlying motion costs.

The defendants appealed a Master's order that granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim to add new defendants and new claims regarding supplier contributions to an advertising fund, and ordered related documentary production.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal in part.

The court found that adding a new corporate defendant on the eve of trial constituted an abuse of process given the extensive delays in the nine-year-old franchise dispute.

The court also held that the Master erred in allowing the amendments regarding supplier contributions, as they constituted a new cause of action that was statute-barred and not legally tenable under the clear terms of the franchise agreements.

The Master's orders adding the new party and allowing the supplier contribution amendments were set aside.

This appeal concerns a franchise dispute where the motion judge granted partial summary judgment for rescission of a franchise agreement and damages of $964,805.33 against the franchisor.

The central issue was whether the franchisor failed to disclose earnings projections that were allegedly shown to the franchisees at a May 2010 meeting, constituting material non-disclosure under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The appellate court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the rescission judgment and damages award on the basis that the motion judge erred in determining the key disputed factual issue on contradictory evidence without oral testimony.

However, the court upheld the motion judge's determination that the rescission claim was timely, as the limitation period ran from the replacement agreement signed in September 2010 rather than the original agreement signed in June 2010.

The parties, involved in two cross-applications concerning alleged competitive conduct, returned to court seeking further documentary production.

The court noted their non-compliance with previous procedural orders from Justice Raikes, including timelines for discovery and setting the matter down for trial.

Emphasizing the principle of proportionality under the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rules 1.04(1.1) and 29.2, the court declined to order the wide-ranging production sought.

The judge highlighted the excessive volume of material already produced and the relatively low value of the dispute, stressing that discovery must be focused, relevant, and proportionate.

The parties were advised to refine their requests after examinations for discovery and a Rule 37.15 order.

This endorsement provides preliminary procedural orders following arguments on "second production motions" in two related court files involving cross-applications.

The court directed the parties to immediately seek an order under Rule 37.15 for the appointment of a single judge to hear all motions, make procedural orders, and give directions as necessary.

The court also ordered that parties are not required to provide a chart of requests or a table of concordance, and that counsel must prepare and exchange Bills of Costs in advance of every court appearance, providing copies to their clients.

This motion addressed a novel procedural question: the order of cross-examinations on a summary judgment motion where both the moving and responding parties have filed affidavits.

The court, drawing an analogy to trial procedure and emphasizing the principles of proportionality and expeditious resolution, ruled that the moving party's witnesses should be cross-examined first, followed by the responding party's deponents.

No costs were awarded due to the novelty of the issue.

The plaintiffs sought partial-summary judgment for rescission of a franchise agreement and damages under the Arthur Wishart Act, alleging fundamental disclosure deficiencies, specifically the non-disclosure of earnings projections.

The defendants argued proper disclosure, timeliness issues, and issue estoppel.

The court, utilizing enhanced summary judgment powers, found that the non-disclosure of earnings projections constituted a material and fundamental omission, tantamount to no disclosure under AWA s. 6(2), thereby triggering the plaintiffs' right to rescission.

The court dismissed the defendants' arguments regarding timeliness, issue estoppel, and other alleged deficiencies, and granted the plaintiffs' motion for rescission and damages.

This was a correction endorsement relating to a prior costs decision following trial.

The court identified an error in the numerical figure used in discussing a defence settlement offer and corrected the amount from $31,400 to $93,900.

The court held that the corrected figure would have been sufficient to engage the presumptive costs consequences under Rule 49.10(2), but the treatment of settlement offers remained a neutral consideration in the circumstances.

The original costs disposition was left unchanged.

Following a civil jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $158,760.27 after recovering substantially less than pleaded and less than sought in settlement offers.

The court applied the Rule 57.01 reasonableness and proportionality framework, balancing the amount claimed and recovered, indemnity considerations, complexity, party conduct, refusal to admit liability, and the practical realities of trying a personal injury action.

The court found legitimate concerns about over-lawyering, duplicated effort, and inclusion of work tied to accident benefits and uninsured motorist claims, but also found the defendants' late admission of liability unnecessarily increased the plaintiffs' litigation burden.

The defendants' failure to mediate or make settlement offers did not attract adverse costs consequences because they were not obligated to mediate under s. 258.6 of the Insurance Act and defendants are generally entitled to put plaintiffs to proof.

The plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $110,000 all-inclusive.