Gary T. Trotter

The appellant challenged an order holding that a dispute over vested options to acquire shares in a related corporate entity had to be resolved in Delaware rather than under the mediation-arbitration clause in his Ontario employment agreement.

The court held that the competence-competence principle did not require referral to an arbitrator because arbitral jurisdiction could be determined through a superficial review of the contractual record.

Reading the employment agreement, option agreement, and incorporated equityholders agreement together, the court held that the options dispute was not contemplated by or connected with the employment agreement and was instead governed by the Delaware forum selection clause.

The court also rejected the argument that the forum selection clause was unconscionable, finding no improvident bargain or evidence that the chosen forum placed a remedy out of reach.

In an addendum to its earlier reasons dismissing the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal addressed the calculation of partnership net profits for the purpose of determining the respondent's damages.

The appellants argued that notional income taxes should be deducted from amounts the trial judge ordered included in corporate income, such as diverted wages and personal expenses.

The Court rejected this argument, finding no evidence that taxes were paid on the diverted funds.

However, the Court ordered the appellants to provide Canada Revenue Agency documentation to prove actual income taxes remitted by one of the corporate defendants, which would be deducted from its net income if substantiated.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import cocaine into Australia and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The Crown's case relied heavily on cell phone data, including text messages, WhatsApp group chats, and audio recordings involving the appellant and his co-conspirators.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admissibility of the audio recordings, the trial judge's treatment of a co-conspirator's testimony, the application of the wilful blindness standard, and the characterization of the conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or legal analysis.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the nine-year sentence was fit and did not violate the principle of parity when compared to the co-accused's sentence, given the co-accused's early guilty plea.

The appellants brought actions in Ontario against Barrick Gold Corporation for alleged human rights abuses committed by Tanzanian police at a mine in Tanzania.

The motion judge dismissed the actions for lack of jurisdiction and alternatively stayed them on the basis of forum non conveniens, finding Tanzania to be the clearly more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in his forum non conveniens analysis by misapprehending the location of Barrick's head office, applying the wrong evidentiary standard, and failing to properly assess the risk of unfairness in Tanzania.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's discretionary weighing of factors, particularly given that the vast majority of witnesses and evidence were located in Tanzania.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon after the complainant was stabbed in the torso.

The sole trial issue was identity of the assailant.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the trial judge erred in treating a post-offence apology as consciousness of guilt.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasons, though brief, were adequate when read in light of the whole record and counsel's submissions.

The court further held that the trial judge did not err in using the apology as confirmatory evidence, as no alternative explanation for it appeared on the record.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three counts under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to self-instruct on Vetrovec in relation to the co-accused's testimony and that the trial judge unevenly scrutinized the evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting ample independent corroborative evidence supported the co-accused's testimony.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to perform a proper Gladue analysis, but the court found no error given the Gladue Writer Program's inability to prepare a report and the trial judge's careful consideration of the appellant's circumstances.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for firearm-related offences.

The firearm, ammunition, and an oversized magazine were seized from the appellant's home pursuant to a search warrant obtained after a threatening interaction between the appellant and his associates and a restaurant owner.

The appellant challenged the warrant through a Garofoli application, arguing the affiant mischaracterized the video evidence in the information to obtain and that the trial judge misapprehended the video surveillance evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no mischaracterization in the ITO and no error in the trial judge's assessment of the video evidence, dismissing the appeal.

A law firm appealed an application judge’s decision interpreting a contingency fee retainer agreement and rejecting its claim to a share of damages awarded on appeal.

The client had retained new counsel for the appeal, which resulted in a substantial damages award after an unsuccessful trial.

The firm argued it was entitled to fees under the retainer or alternatively on a quantum meruit basis.

The Court of Appeal held that the retainer expressly limited fee entitlement to damages recovered by settlement or judgment at trial and did not include recovery obtained on appeal.

The court also held that quantum meruit relief was unavailable where the parties had expressly defined the circumstances of payment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order refusing an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in high-conflict family litigation.

The court applied the deferential standard under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act and confirmed intervention is limited to legal error, error in principle, or an unreasonable result.

It held the motion judge applied the correct legal framework, including the best interests of the children as the overarching consideration.

The court found no error in assessing the proposed appeal's limited merit, the five-month delay, and prejudice from continued uncertainty in parenting arrangements.

The review motion was dismissed with costs.

In a conviction appeal, the appellant sought production of a post-Hason Crown communication, plus a list of cases reviewed by the prosecution service concerning a forensic psychiatric expert and reasons for selection.

The court applied the two-step appellate production framework requiring a reasonable possibility the materials could assist a fresh-evidence motion and a reasonable possibility of eventual admissibility as fresh evidence.

It held the request was speculative, case-specific concerns from prior proceedings did not establish relevance in this record, and the requested internal review rationale was privileged.

The court further held that any standalone direction, divorced from justification, would not satisfy the relevance threshold.

The production motion was dismissed.

The moving party sought panel review of an order refusing a further extension of time to perfect an appeal from a Superior Court order.

The court held that review of a motion judge's decision is deferential and not a de novo reconsideration.

The moving party identified no legal error or misapprehension of evidence in the motion judge's reasoning on delay and prejudice.

The panel declined to reweigh the factors and dismissed the motion with costs.

The appellant sought to appeal a superior court bail review decision under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after release relief was denied.

The respondent moved to quash for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held that no criminal appeal right exists to the court from decisions under ss. 520 or 521, and provincial legislation cannot create an appeal route in criminal matters absent federal statutory authority.

The court also held that asserting Charter issues did not establish jurisdiction where no statutory right of appeal exists.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, and the fresh-evidence request was left unaddressed.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence about cannabis-related perception issues, applied an improper reliability analysis, and failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.

The court held that any alleged misapprehension was not material to the conviction reasoning and that the trial judge identified and decided the live reliability issue correctly.

It further held that trial reasons are assessed functionally and need not expressly resolve every inconsistency, particularly those not emphasized in closing submissions.

Appellate deference applied to the trial judge’s factual reliability findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with offences under the Taxation Act, 2007 and brought a certiorari application that was dismissed.

After filing a notice of appeal from that dismissal, the appellant entered guilty pleas and was sentenced.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was moot, as any decision on the certiorari ruling would have no impact on the guilty pleas, convictions, and sentence.

The appeal was dismissed without adjudication on the merits.

The appellant's application for a publication ban on his full name was also dismissed, as he failed to establish that court openness posed a serious risk to an important public interest.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order of the Superior Court refusing to order payment into court of a "costs reserve." The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, characterizing the order as interlocutory and akin to an order dismissing a motion for security for costs.

The court directed that an appeal from such an order must be brought to the Divisional Court, with leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the agreed amount of $7,500 all inclusive.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after a jury verdict of guilty on one count of sexual assault.

The application judge found a breach of the respondent's s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time, concluding that net delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

On appeal, the Crown argued that the adjournment of the first trial to await the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. J.J. constituted a discrete exceptional event.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge was not functus officio after the jury's verdict for purposes of a s. 11(b) application, distinguishing prior authorities.

The court further held that adjourning a trial to await guidance from a higher court in a different proceeding does not constitute a discrete exceptional event under the Jordan framework, but rather is a factor in assessing case complexity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's finding that the parties entered into an oral partnership agreement to deliver milk through a numbered company, and disputed the resulting damages award under the OBCA oppression remedy, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the partnership or credibility assessments, and upheld the prejudgment interest calculation as a reasonable exercise of discretion under s. 130(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The allegation of judicial bias was dismissed for failing to meet the high threshold to displace the presumption of impartiality.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, except that further submissions were required on whether income taxes should have been deducted from certain amounts included in the damages calculation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault causing bodily harm, break and enter, and two counts of threatening to use a weapon, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

He claimed trial counsel usurped his right to elect the mode of trial and his right to testify.

The Court of Appeal rejected the election claim, finding the appellant had not established the factual foundation and had not shown a reasonable probability he would have elected differently.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the right-to-testify ground, finding trial counsel failed to make clear that the decision to testify was the appellant's to make, failed to obtain written instructions, and that the police interview was not a functional equivalent of in-court testimony.

A new trial by judge and jury was ordered.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.