Megan Savard

The appellant was convicted of child sexual abuse material offences.

During the execution of a search warrant at his home, police detained him for hours without properly advising him of his right to counsel.

Upon arrest weeks later, he was subjected to a routine strip search.

The trial judge found breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the computer evidence.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred by failing to consider the strip search in the section 24(2) analysis.

Conducting a fresh analysis, the Court excluded the evidence due to the seriousness of the breaches and police ignorance of Charter standards, quashing the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her handling of a s. 276 application regarding prior sexual conversations with the complainant.

The summary conviction appeal court found that while the trial judge correctly subjected the evidence to the s. 276 regime, she erred by dismissing the application at stage 1 and failing to advance it to an admissibility hearing.

The trial judge further erred by maintaining her ruling in the face of shifting evidence at trial, which prevented the appellant from advancing a defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Five organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provincial legislation that required the removal of bicycle lanes in Toronto.

The underlying judgment found the legislation violated section 7 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to all five proposed interveners, but limited the scope of their interventions to specific issues such as the positive/negative rights dichotomy, the interpretation of recent section 7 jurisprudence, and the application of equality and child-interest principles to the gross disproportionality analysis.

The interveners were restricted to 10-page factums and brief oral submissions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, possession of child pornography, making sexually explicit material available to a child, and assault.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider expert evidence regarding his cognitive disability when admitting his police statements and assessing his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's admission of the statements or credibility assessment.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding two errors in principle: the trial judge failed to recognize that the appellant's intellectual disability attenuated his moral blameworthiness despite his understanding of consequences, and the trial judge erred in refusing to grant COVID-19 credit.

The sentence was reduced from six years to four years and three months.

This decision concerns the prosecution of five members of the 2018 Canadian World Junior Hockey Team for sexual assault.

The complainant, E.M., alleged that after consensual sexual activity with Michael McLeod, she was sexually assaulted by McLeod and his teammates in a London hotel room.

The accused maintained that E.M. was a willing and active participant.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant’s evidence, including contradictions with video evidence and other witness testimony.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the accused and acquitted all five.

The judgment provides a detailed analysis of the law of consent, credibility, and the use of myths and stereotypes in sexual assault trials.

This decision addresses the Crown's application to admit a text message as hearsay evidence under the principled exception in a high-profile sexual assault prosecution.

The court reviews the necessity and reliability requirements for hearsay, ultimately finding that the reliability threshold is not met and dismissing the application.

The ruling provides a detailed application of the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Bradshaw and R. v. Charles on the dangers of hearsay and the use of corroborative evidence.

The Crown sought to admit a text message sent by Brett Howden to Taylor Raddysh as past recollection recorded, an exception to the hearsay rule.

The court reviewed the requirements for admissibility, including reliability, timeliness, absence of memory, and the witness’s ability to vouch for the accuracy of the record.

The court found that while the first three requirements were met, Mr. Howden could not vouch for the accuracy of the text message, as he had no memory of sending it and could not confirm its truthfulness.

As a result, the application to admit the text message as past recollection recorded was denied.

This decision addresses a defence motion for a mistrial after a jury note alleged unprofessional conduct by defence counsel, raising concerns about jury impartiality.

The court reviews the legal principles governing mistrials, including the presumption of jury impartiality, the test for reasonable apprehension of bias, and the discretion to discharge jurors or declare a mistrial.

The court finds that the fairness of the trial has been compromised and grants the motion for a mistrial, emphasizing that such a remedy is reserved for the clearest of cases where no other remedy will suffice.

The court considered whether Jheidon Serieaux, convicted of first-degree murder, should be found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

After a bifurcated hearing, the court found that Mr. Serieaux suffered from schizoaffective disorder at the time of the offence, with persistent psychotic symptoms, and that he was not malingering.

The court preferred the evidence of Dr. Komer and Dr. Grimes over Dr. Gojer, concluding that Mr. Serieaux was unable to appreciate the nature and quality of his act or know that it was morally wrong.

Mr. Serieaux was found NCRMD and remanded to the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Mason Perry’s appeal from a lifetime driving prohibition imposed as an ancillary order following his conviction for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving.

The court reviewed the facts, sentencing principles, and comparable cases, finding that the sentencing judge did not err in principle and that the prohibition was not demonstrably unfit.

The court emphasized the individualized nature of sentencing, the importance of public protection, and the relevance of mental health as a mitigating factor.

The decision confirms that lifetime driving prohibitions, though rare, may be appropriate in serious cases, especially where public safety is at risk.

The court acquitted Nicol Oliver White of sexual assault, finding that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant, Z.E., did not consent to the sexual activity in question.

The decision turned on the credibility and reliability of the evidence provided by both the complainant and the accused, as well as corroborating evidence from a third party witness.

The court found material inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence and accepted the accused’s version of events as raising a reasonable doubt.

Jacob Hoggard appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm to J.B., arguing the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on the neurobiology of trauma, failing to correct the Crown's closing submissions, delivering an unbalanced jury charge, and improperly admitting discreditable conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting the expert testimony as it was not necessary and risked misuse, but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred due to the trial judge's effective corrective instructions.

The other grounds of appeal were dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Bruce Cavey, brought an application to stay his sexual assault charge for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The aggregate delay was 911 days.

The court deducted 31 days for defence delay related to counsel retention and 138 days for a portion of the delay caused by exceptional circumstances (volume of third-party disclosure, Toronto Star involvement) which were partially offset by Crown delay (late complainant's counsel, late Seaboyer application).

The court rejected the Crown's arguments for further deductions based on a "complex case" exception or a "COVID ripple effect" emphasizing the need for concrete evidence and a holistic "bird's-eye view" as per *Jordan*.

The court found the total attributable delay to be 742 days, exceeding the 18-month ceiling for provincial court cases, and consequently stayed the charge.

The appellant appealed his convictions and life sentence for terrorism-related offences, including conspiracy to commit murder.

He raised several grounds of appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in handling national security privilege claims during O'Connor and Garofoli applications, failing to sever his trial from a disruptive co-accused, misdirecting the jury on the law of conspiracy, and finding the co-accused fit for sentencing.

He also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on an out-of-court comment by the trial judge praising an undercover agent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no procedural or legal errors that compromised trial fairness, and upheld the life sentence as fit for the gravity of the offences.

The appellant, N.C., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's credibility were insufficient and conclusory, failing to provide an adequate explanation for perceived inconsistencies in testimony.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by not explicitly addressing the mens rea requirement of the sexual assault offence, having only found that the actus reus was proven.

The court emphasized the necessity for trial judges to provide comprehensive reasons that allow for proper appellate review of all elements of an offence.

The appellant, Edson Neto, appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm.

The trial judge had convicted him based on the complainant's consistent testimony and powerful confirmatory medical evidence, despite concerns about the complainant's reliability on other charges (human trafficking, of which he was acquitted).

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge erred in finding the medical evidence confirmatory of the sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found no error, concluding that the medical evidence (vaginal bleeding, lacerations, abrasions, swelling) was consistent with a violent sexual assault and inconsistent with the appellant's claim of menstruation, thereby confirming the complainant's account and disposing of the defence's alternative hypothesis.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's jury charge regarding the sufficiency of cautions on eyewitness identification evidence and an ante-mortem statement, and sought to admit fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it did not meet the Palmer threshold.

It also dismissed the conviction appeal, concluding that the trial judge's jury instructions on eyewitness identification (including photo/in-dock identification and collusion) and the ante-mortem statement were sufficient and did not constitute an error, particularly given that the accused was known to the eyewitness.

The appellant, H.S., appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault against his ex-girlfriend, raising three grounds: the trial judge's dismissal of an application to reopen the case to cross-examine the complainant on an alleged inconsistency in her Victim Impact Statement (VIS), the dismissal of a s. 276 application to introduce evidence of their sexual relationship, and a flawed credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistency in the VIS, upholding the s. 276 ruling as the evidence lacked probative value beyond prohibited inferences, and affirming the trial judge's credibility assessment as entitled to deference.

The applicants, L.H. and D.P., charged with manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, and failing to provide necessaries of life, brought an application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court analyzed the total elapsed time against the Jordan ceiling, considering periods of delay attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and defence actions as exceptional circumstances.

The court found that after deducting these periods, the delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

Furthermore, the court determined that the defence had not taken meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case had not taken markedly longer than it reasonably should have, dismissing both applications for a stay.

The Toronto Star and journalist Morgan Bocknek appealed a Superior Court decision refusing to quash a subpoena for journalistic notes related to an interview with a sexual assault complainant.

The subpoena was sought by the accused, Bruce Timothy Cavey, under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for potential prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision not to grant certiorari, finding that the trial judge was the appropriate forum to address issues of journalistic privilege and relevance within the s. 278 application process.