Nicole Rivers

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, two counts of assault, and threatening death committed against his 12-13 year-old step-daughter, as well as his indeterminate sentence as a designated dangerous offender.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant and argued the trial judge erred in principle by misapprehending expert evidence regarding age-related attenuation of violence and reoffending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning or application of the law.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeals of David Beak and Yostin Murillo from their convictions for first degree murder and sexual assault in the killing of Rhoderie Estrada.

The court found that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury on constructive first degree murder, post-offence conduct, and the handling of evidence and objections were accurate and complete.

The grounds of appeal advanced by both appellants, including issues of causation, post-offence conduct, jury instructions, and procedural fairness, were all rejected.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Mason Perry’s appeal from a lifetime driving prohibition imposed as an ancillary order following his conviction for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving.

The court reviewed the facts, sentencing principles, and comparable cases, finding that the sentencing judge did not err in principle and that the prohibition was not demonstrably unfit.

The court emphasized the individualized nature of sentencing, the importance of public protection, and the relevance of mental health as a mitigating factor.

The decision confirms that lifetime driving prohibitions, though rare, may be appropriate in serious cases, especially where public safety is at risk.

The accused, Ahsanullah Salehi, was tried on multiple charges, including assault with a weapon and uttering threats, following a series of confrontations at a college campus.

The allegations involved two complainants, one of whom was allegedly struck with an imitation firearm and threatened.

The trial judge assessed the credibility of the complainants, the accused's police statement, and his girlfriend's testimony alongside campus surveillance footage.

Ultimately, the court found the accused guilty of carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and breach of probation, while acquitting him of one count of uttering threats.

Mr. Stephens, convicted of mischief and failing to comply with a probation order in 2009, sought to reopen his appeal to argue for a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) defence.

He had previously been found NCR for unrelated 2011 offences.

His summary conviction appeal of the 2009 convictions was dismissed in 2014, and subsequent motions to reopen were also dismissed.

He brought a new motion relying on a 2024 psychiatric assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the new report lacked the cogency to establish an NCR defence or to justify reopening the appeal, especially given the applicant's own inconsistent factual account of the events.

This is an appeal of a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by permitting extensive cross-examination of the s. 752.1 expert by the Crown after the defence had cross-examined him, which allegedly undermined the fairness of the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found that while the procedure was unusual, it did not result in unfairness or affect the outcome.

The sentencing judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable expectation that measures other than an indeterminate sentence would adequately protect children, given the offender's history of refusing treatment, was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The trial judge had found the complainant generally not credible or reliable but convicted on one sexual assault allegation, providing insufficient reasons for this specific finding in contrast to the other rejected allegations.

The Court of Appeal found this to be an insufficiency of reasons, as the trial judge failed to explain how he reconciled his concerns over the complainant's overall credibility with the finding of credibility on the single conviction.

The conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant's sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended documentary evidence (Uber records, Google timeline, text messages) and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal found that the Uber and Google documents were inconsequential and did not constitute a misapprehension of evidence.

While the text messages did contradict the complainant's testimony regarding the exact time of the assault, the court found this error immaterial to the overall credibility of her narrative, especially given the strong credibility findings made by the trial judge.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and forcible seizure, arguing the trial judge failed to provide assistance in advancing a s. 7 lost evidence claim.

The alleged lost evidence involved WhatsApp messages on phones seized by police, but the appellant repeatedly refused to provide passwords.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no viable lost evidence claim as the evidence remained in the appellant's control and police efforts to access the phones were bona fide.

The court also noted the formidable nature of the Crown's case, including an inculpatory email from the appellant.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, sought a panel review of a bail judge's decision denying bail pending appeal.

The bail judge had denied bail on the tertiary ground, finding that detention was necessary in the public interest.

The applicant argued that the bail judge erred in assessing alleged misapprehensions of evidence, in treating the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and in requiring evidence from trial counsel for the ineffective assistance claim.

The court found no arguable material errors of fact or law by the bail judge, affirming that the bail judge's assessment of the strength of the appeal grounds was appropriate and that a credible evidentiary foundation is required for ineffective assistance claims, even at the bail stage.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from a conviction for sexual assault and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended defence evidence regarding sleeping arrangements and erred in the authentication of photographs.

The sentence appeal challenged the trial judge's consideration of a conditional sentence in light of Supreme Court and Court of Appeal precedents concerning sexual assault against children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and no error in principle in sentencing.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an 8.5-year sentence for five counts of driving while disqualified.

The appellant had a lengthy criminal record, including numerous prior driving offences and a previous 10-year sentence for criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The current offences were committed while the appellant was on parole and subject to multiple driving prohibitions, including a lifetime ban, and involved the use of a fraudulent driver's licence.

The Court of Appeal considered arguments regarding proportionality, parity, the jump principle, and the totality principle.

The court found no errors in principle by the sentencing judge, emphasizing the appellant's incorrigibility and the increased maximum sentence for driving while disqualified.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed, upholding the original sentence.

The appellant, Mr. Berhe, sought leave to appeal from three orders made by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge (SCACJ) relating to four summary conviction appeals.

Two applications (C63256, M49551) concerned his awareness of immigration consequences when entering guilty pleas, and one (M49552) challenged a conviction for harassing communications.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal for the harassing communications conviction (M49552), finding no error of law in the SCACJ's decision to dismiss the appeal as abandoned and no merit to the proposed grounds, including the interpretation of "person" under s. 372(3) of the Criminal Code.

For the immigration-related appeals (C63256, M49551), leave was granted, but the appeals were dismissed.

The court found that the appellant had sufficient knowledge of the negative immigration implications of his guilty pleas, given his extensive history with the immigration system, and that his claim of subjective prejudice was not supported by objective circumstances, as the Crown's case was overwhelming.

This is an appeal from a conviction for arson, which arose from a guilty plea.

The appellant did not understand the implications of the guilty plea on her immigration status, rendering the plea uninformed.

The parties reached a joint position to set aside the arson conviction and substitute it with a conviction for mischief under $5,000.

The court accepted this proposal, considering the appellant's circumstances, including mental health challenges, and found it would achieve the parties' original intent.

The appeal was dismissed, the arson conviction set aside, and the new conviction for mischief under $5,000 was substituted, with the DNA order also set aside.

The appellant sought leave to appeal her sentence for fraud.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence concerning the health of her four-year-old son, who required ongoing care that her partner could not provide.

While the court found the original sentence to be fit, it reduced the carceral portion of the sentence to time served due to these unusual circumstances, while maintaining the three-year probation order and other conditions.

R.S., a young person, appealed his sentence for two counts of sexual assault, which included an 18-month custody and supervision order.

The appeal raised three grounds: the availability of a deferred custody and supervision order under s. 42(5) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the harshness of the sentence, and the impact of fresh evidence regarding his progress.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had sufficient evidence to conclude that serious psychological harm was caused to the victims, precluding a deferred custody order.

The court also determined that the sentence was not unduly harsh given the serious nature of the offences and their profound impact on the victims, despite mitigating factors and the appellant's rehabilitative potential.

Fresh evidence of the appellant's positive progress post-disposition did not alter the fitness of the original sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, E.A.P., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised three grounds: undue reliance on the complainant's demeanour for credibility assessment, an overly narrow view of how consent can be communicated, and a reversal of the burden of proof on the question of mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessment was holistic and not unduly reliant on demeanour, that the trial judge's view of consent was not overly narrow given the complainant's explicit refusals, and that the factual findings negated any air of reality to a mistaken belief in consent, thus no burden reversal occurred.

The moving party pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for the killing of his pregnant wife and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Over two and a half years later, he brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal his conviction, arguing he was previously unaware he could appeal a guilty plea and that his plea was uninformed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no bona fide intention to appeal within the required period, no reasonable explanation for the delay, and no merit to the proposed appeal, as the record demonstrated the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and fully informed.

The appellant, convicted of multiple assaultive offences and fraud related to cosmetic injections, appealed her conviction alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

She claimed counsel failed to respect her wish for a jury trial and refused to permit her to testify, and did not adequately consider her mental health.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to establish the factual basis for her claims and that counsel's advice was within the range of professional judgment.

The appellant, Kellie-Lynne Gracie, appealed her conviction for robbery.

She argued that the trial judge reversed the onus of proof and made an unreasonable inference regarding her involvement in the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge, despite using the term "prima facie" did not reverse the onus of proof or improperly use the appellant's failure to testify as a make-weight.

The court concluded that the cumulative circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the trial judge's inference that the appellant was a party to the planned robbery.