Steve A. Coroza

The appellants appealed the case conference judge's dismissal of their action against the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The action was dismissed as a nullity because there was no pleading of bad faith, the PGT had immunity, the action should have been brought against Ontario, and the requisite 60-day statutory notice was not given.

The appellants argued the judge erred by determining the subject matter on the merits, prejudicing their second action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the judge had jurisdiction to dismiss the action as a nullity without prejudice to a new action against Ontario, and made no decision on the merits.

The appellant general contractor appealed a decision finding that the former Construction Lien Act, rather than the amended Construction Act, applied to its dispute with the respondent owners.

The application judge held that the procurement process commenced before July 1, 2018, triggering the transitional provision in s. 87.3(1)(b), even though the initial proposal contemplated a different property and the respondents did not own the final property at the time of the proposal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the proposal and the final contract related to the same improvement, and that a functional approach to ownership meant the respondents only needed to own the premises at the time of construction.

The moving party brought a motion to quash four appeals from orders dealing with the care, residence, and decision-making of the parties' 102-year-old father.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the orders were interlocutory because they did not finally determine any substantive issues between the parties, as evidenced by a subsequent order suspending enforcement and allowing the father to reside with his son pending a contempt motion.

The appeals therefore lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The motion to quash was allowed, with substantial indemnity costs awarded to the moving party.

In an appeal arising from a failed residential real estate transaction, the appellants challenged the dismissal of their third-party negligence claim against their real estate agent and brokerage.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by confining the analysis to whether the agent had actively misled the appellants, without determining whether the agent negligently failed to advise them of the consequences of breaching the agreement and failed to address misleading communications with the vendors.

The court also held it was erroneous to rely principally on signatures and initials on the agreement to infer that the agreement had been adequately explained, without resolving whether the appellants reasonably misunderstood its effect.

Because the appeal record required factual and credibility findings that an appellate court should not make, a new trial before a different judge was ordered.

The costs order below was set aside, and the appellants received $20,000 in appeal costs.

The appellant sought review of a single judge’s refusal to award costs after granting an extension of time to perfect an appeal.

Applying the deferential standard under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, the panel held that intervention is available only for an error in principle, failure to identify the applicable principles, or an unreasonable result.

The panel rejected the request to remove comments about the apparent weakness of the underlying appeal, holding that merits were relevant to both the extension and costs determinations.

The review motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to two responding parties.

The Crown appealed directed and trial acquittals arising from a fatal collision in which the respondent accelerated through an intersection and struck a left-turning vehicle, causing one death and one serious injury.

On the impaired driving counts, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that the evidentiary presumption in s. 320.31(2) of the Criminal Code could not apply because the blood samples were seized under a s. 487 warrant rather than under Part VIII.1.

On the dangerous driving counts, the court held that the trial judge misapplied the Roy mens rea analysis by focusing unduly on the other driver’s conduct instead of assessing whether the respondent’s manner of driving created foreseeable and avoidable risks to the public when all relevant evidence was considered.

All four counts were remitted for a new trial.

The parties settled a civil appeal and an associated motion to produce fresh evidence.

On consent, the Court of Appeal dismissed both proceedings with prejudice and without costs.

As part of the settlement, Ontario undertook not to enforce the $3,000 costs award made below.

The court directed that the order issue on consent in accordance with the settlement terms.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action arising from the termination of a memorandum of understanding concerning a proposed national memorial.

The appellant conceded that its damages claim was statute-barred but argued that its claim for declaratory relief was exempt from the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the requested declaration would serve no practical purpose and was being advanced to circumvent the limitation period.

The court also agreed that no statutory exemption applied and upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action.

The appellant abandoned her appeal on the eve of the hearing after the respondents had delivered responding materials in an estate accounting dispute.

The court applied r. 61.14(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and held that the respondents were entitled to their costs of the abandoned appeal.

The respondents' motion for leave to cross-appeal the application judge's discretionary costs award, seeking full indemnity costs, was denied because no reversible error was shown and the elevated scale was not justified.

The appellant was awarded costs of the cross-appeal motion, set off against the appeal costs, leaving a net amount payable to the respondents.

The appellants challenged an order refusing leave to amend their amended statement of defence in an insurance indemnity proceeding under s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act.

They sought to characterize alleged lies by the insureds about the mechanism of injury as civil fraud.

The court held that, regardless of whether civil fraud was legally available in such a proceeding, the existing pleading already allowed the appellants to advance the factual allegations necessary to defend the indemnity claim and oppose relief from forfeiture.

The proposed amendment was therefore irrelevant in the circumstances, and the motion judge made no reversible error in finding non-compensable prejudice on the eve of trial.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondent.

On a family law appeal concerning a separation agreement, divorce order, and entitlement to the proceeds of sale of a matrimonial home, the court held that adult children identified as intended recipients of a parent's gifted share had a clear interest in the proceeding and should have received notice and full participation rights.

The appellate court admitted fresh evidence from the parties and the adult children, including evidence potentially bearing on whether the gifting provisions were understood and intended.

Because the application proceeded without participation by persons whose interests were directly affected, the trial judge's orders, including the costs order, could not stand.

The appeal was allowed, the orders were set aside, and a new trial was directed before a different judge.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of her motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing her action for delay.

The parties settled the appeal on consent terms that set aside the registrar's dismissal and the motion judge's orders, reinstated the action, imposed litigation deadlines for documentary discovery, examinations for discovery, and setting the matter down for trial, and provided for dismissal for delay if those deadlines were missed on motion by the respondents.

The court held that the justice of the case warranted allowing the appeal pursuant to the agreed terms.

Appeal costs were fixed at $2,000 payable by the appellant to the respondents, and previously awarded motion costs were reserved to the trial judge.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment determination that funds advanced by one respondent to the appellant and the other respondent were a loan rather than a gift.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge was entitled to determine the matter on an extensive paper record, despite credibility issues, and was not required to order a mini-trial or full trial.

The court found no reversible error in the motion judge’s credibility findings or no-genuine-issue analysis, and no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings.

The appeal was dismissed, with partial indemnity costs awarded to one respondent and substantial indemnity costs awarded to the other because the appeal was entirely without merit and repeated baseless allegations of fraud and perjury.

Appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing a detention order for a not criminally responsible accused who sought an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued that the Board’s reasons were insufficient, that its significant-threat finding was unreasonable, and that it misapprehended the treating psychiatrist’s evidence regarding medication compliance and substance abstinence.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the Board’s analysis was brief and imperfect, the reasons read as a whole and in light of the record adequately explained why the appellant remained a significant threat to the safety of the public.

The court found the risk assessment was grounded in evidence of poor insight, prior failed community placement, substance-use history connected to the index offence, and the very recent return to community living.

The appeal was dismissed.

In an appeal from a guardianship order, family members challenged the application judge’s appointment of the incapable person’s wife and adult daughter as guardians of property and personal care.

The appellants argued that the judge mishandled the evidence, ignored material arguments, engaged in uneven scrutiny, and made improper procedural rulings.

The Court of Appeal held that the arguments merely sought a reweighing of the record, which is not the appellate role, and found no reversible error.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

Following the release of its reasons allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal directed the parties to agree on the quantum of trial costs payable to the successful appellant.

The parties agreed on the amount, and the court ordered the respondent to pay the appellant trial costs in the agreed-upon sum of $250,000, all inclusive.

Following the allowance of the appeal, the Court of Appeal requested submissions on costs for the motion, which had not been addressed at the hearing.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the appellant $4,000 all-inclusive, in accordance with the parties' agreement.

The appellant, a retiree, posted comments on a community Facebook page accusing the respondent real estate developer of corrupt business tactics and bribery.

The developer sued for defamation, and the appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The motion judge dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, allowing the defamation action to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding grounds to believe the defamation claim had substantial merit and that the appellant had no valid defence of fair comment, as the statements could be viewed as factual assertions and there was a basis to find malice.

The Court also upheld the finding that the likelihood of serious harm to the developer outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the motion judge's substantial indemnity costs award to partial indemnity.

The appellant's employee drove a crop sprayer across a private bridge on the respondent's farm.

The bridge collapsed because the outer three feet on either side were unsupported by steel beams, a hidden danger of which the driver was not warned.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the driver's failure to stay centered caused the accident and the lack of warning was not a factual or legal cause.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by conflating causation with the standard of care and by defining the duty to warn too narrowly.

The respondent breached its duty under s. 3(1) of the Occupiers' Liability Act by failing to warn of the hidden danger, which was both a factual and reasonably foreseeable legal cause of the accident.

The appellant landlord appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent tenant damages for overpayment of rent, common area maintenance (CAM) charges, and the cost of replacing a roof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of the commercial lease.

The court upheld the findings that the lease unambiguously required the landlord to replace the roof, that the tenant's calculation of additional rent during renewal periods was correct, and that the landlord's claim for historical CAM charges was statute-barred because a party cannot indefinitely toll a limitation period by delaying the issuance of invoices.