David Ionis

The applicant brought a motion under s. 13(7) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 to stay an ongoing arbitration proceeding pending the resolution of an application challenging the arbitrator for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant argued the arbitrator acted improperly by aggressively cross-examining witnesses.

Justice Myers granted the motion, finding the applicant established a strong prima facie case of bias and that proceeding before the arbitrator would cause irreparable harm.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to stay class proceedings and individual actions against them.

They argued they were entitled to a stay because they did not receive timely disclosure of a partial settlement between the plaintiffs and a co-defendant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the strict partial settlement disclosure rule does not apply to class proceedings, which are governed by the settlement approval regime in the Class Proceedings Act.

The court found the appellants received timely disclosure and were not prejudiced.

In an appeal arising from a failed residential real estate transaction, the appellants challenged the dismissal of their third-party negligence claim against their real estate agent and brokerage.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by confining the analysis to whether the agent had actively misled the appellants, without determining whether the agent negligently failed to advise them of the consequences of breaching the agreement and failed to address misleading communications with the vendors.

The court also held it was erroneous to rely principally on signatures and initials on the agreement to infer that the agreement had been adequately explained, without resolving whether the appellants reasonably misunderstood its effect.

Because the appeal record required factual and credibility findings that an appellate court should not make, a new trial before a different judge was ordered.

The costs order below was set aside, and the appellants received $20,000 in appeal costs.

The applicant minority shareholder sought remedies for alleged oppression by the respondents, claiming they concealed conflicts of interest in related-party transactions.

The parties agreed that the respondents should buy out the applicant's shares, but disputed the valuation and whether the applicant was subject to Canadian economic sanctions against Russia due to its principals' ties to a sanctioned Russian entity.

The court found no oppression, as the applicant knew or ought to have known of the overlapping ownership.

The court set the buyout value based on the midpoint of the experts' market approaches and applied a 10% minority discount.

However, finding considerable evidence that the applicant might be subject to sanctions, the court ordered that no payment be made until Global Affairs Canada rules on the sanctions issue.

The applicant, a private party, sought standing to bring an application under s. 127(1) of the Securities Act to cease trade the shares of the respondent corporation.

The applicant alleged the respondent's non-offering prospectus contained a misrepresentation regarding the completion of an amalgamation with its Peruvian subsidiary, which the applicant argued could prejudice its contingent creditor claim in Peru.

The Capital Markets Tribunal dismissed the motion for standing, finding that the applicant failed to raise its concerns with Commission staff first, the allegations did not raise a novel securities law issue, the Tribunal was not the appropriate forum to adjudicate Peruvian corporate law, and the applicant was not directly affected by the alleged conduct.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of two decisions by City Council to sanction him based on reports from the Integrity Commissioner.

The Integrity Commissioner found the applicant breached the Code of Conduct by making disparaging comments in emails and by disclosing confidential complaint forms to other councillors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding no procedural unfairness in the investigations, no reasonable apprehension of bias by the Integrity Commissioner or City Council, and that the findings and sanctions were reasonable.

On a Rule 20 motion for summary judgment in a proposed class proceeding, the court held that s. 68(1) offering statement requirements under the Credit Unions and Caisses Populaires Act apply to primary issuances and sales by a credit union, not to inter-member share transfers shown on this record.

Because the plaintiff and proposed class members acquired shares through transfers or dividend issuances that did not engage the statutory cause of action in s. 75(3), there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendant regulator's motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim was granted.

Following a failed residential real estate transaction in which the purchasers did not pay the required deposit, the defendants pursued a third party claim against their real estate agent and brokerage for indemnity.

The central allegation was that the agent had advised the purchasers that the agreement was effectively conditional on delivery of the deposit and that non-payment would permit them to walk away without liability.

The court rejected that factual theory, finding the signed agreement and surrounding communications supported the conclusion that the purchasers had been committing to a firm deal and were later attempting to avoid completion after family advice.

The court accepted the general statement of the real estate agent’s duty of care but held no breach was established on the evidence.

The third party claim was dismissed.

This decision concerns two related shareholder applications under section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act involving SpassMed Inc. and its affiliates.

The court reviews the procedural history, including consolidation of the applications, amendments to the relief sought, and the appointment of an interim monitor.

Due to significant disputes of fact and credibility, the court orders that the consolidated application be converted to an action to allow for a full trial process.

The court-appointed Receiver sought approval for the sale of a property owned by the Debtor, 253 Queen Street Inc., and an Administration Order.

The sale was supported by secured creditors Homedale-Eagle Corporation and Sky Mortgage Corporation but opposed by the Debtor and its equity holders.

The opposing parties argued the purchase price was too low, the environmental indemnity was not assumed by the purchaser, and their beneficial interest in the property was not recognized.

The court applied the Soundair principles for approving sales in receivership, finding the Receiver acted providently and fairly.

The court rejected the claims of beneficial ownership based on trust law and the Land Titles Act, affirming the priority of registered mortgages over unregistered beneficial interests.

The Receiver's motion for approval of the sale and the Administration Order was granted.

This appeal concerned the quantum of class counsel fees and a representative plaintiff honorarium following a $153 million class action settlement for unpaid overtime.

The motion judge had awarded $25 million in fees and denied a $30,000 honorarium.

The appellants sought an increase in fees to $44 million and the honorarium.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision on both fees and honorarium, finding no palpable and overriding error or misdirection on law.

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation, having been entirely successful in the liability phase of a bifurcated proceeding concerning the status of the "Disputed Beach" as reserve land, sought costs.

This endorsement addresses the costs awards and apportionment among the multiple defendants.

The court awarded Saugeen their costs on a partial indemnity scale, totaling $3,221,802.54, on a joint and several liability basis.

These costs were apportioned for indemnification purposes among Canada (10%), Ontario (40%), and the Town of South Bruce Peninsula (50%).

Additionally, the court granted Canada a Sanderson order, requiring the Town to pay Canada $470,000 in partial indemnity costs, recognizing Canada's success on the essential issue of the reserve boundary location.

The Town's claim for costs against Canada was dismissed.

Stelco Inc. sought leave to appeal an order from the CCAA supervisory judge concerning the reconveyance of land (the "DGAP Parcel") to LandCo, a precondition for DGAP Investments Ltd. to purchase the land.

Stelco had previously been ordered to specifically perform this obligation but failed to do so.

The motion judge affirmed the court's authority to impose terms for reconveyance if the parties could not agree.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, given prior judicial determinations and Stelco's previous concession that the court could determine the agreements.

The court also considered the significance of the issues to practice and the action, and the undue hindrance that an appeal would cause to the progress of the CCAA proceeding.

In the context of a CCAA restructuring, the respondent was previously ordered to specifically perform its obligation to reconvey certain lands to a special purpose entity, which had agreed to sell a portion of those lands to the moving party.

The respondent refused to complete the reconveyance, arguing that the parties had not agreed on the terms of 'shared facilities and/or reciprocal easement agreements' required under the reconveyance agreement.

The moving party brought a motion for the court to interpret the agreement and impose terms.

The court held it had jurisdiction to determine the terms of the reconveyance and found that the respondent's demanded easements (including for undefined future utilities, carbon sequestration, and emissions) were not valid easements at common law and did not meet the contractual requirement of being 'shared' or 'reciprocal'.

The court directed the parties to attempt one final negotiation before it would impose the final terms of the easement agreement.

The Regional Municipality of York brought an application for judicial review seeking mandamus after the Minister failed for several years to make a decision on its environmental assessment for a wastewater project.

After the application was commenced, the Ontario legislature passed legislation that effectively repealed the requirement for a decision and mandated a different wastewater solution, rendering the application moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot constitutional and administrative law issues.

However, due to the government's 'reprehensible' delay and 'egregious' conduct in covertly passing legislation to bypass the environmental assessment process, the court relieved the applicant from a prior agreement to waive costs and awarded the applicant its costs on a full indemnity basis.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for judgment in a land claim case.

Following an earlier declaration that a substantial portion of Sauble Beach was reserved for the sole use and benefit of the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and forms part of Saugeen Indian Reserve No. 29, the court considered whether to grant a life interest in certain 'Disputed Lots' to current family title owners (Landowners).

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and Canada opposed this.

The court determined it lacked jurisdiction to impose a proprietary interest contrary to the Indian Act and Constitution Act, as reserve land is inalienable.

It also found that granting such an interest would not advance reconciliation.

Consequently, the temporary delay in the original declaration that no third parties have an interest in the land was terminated, making the declaration effective immediately.

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation brought an action seeking a declaration that a 1.4-mile strip of Sauble Beach (the Disputed Beach) is part of their unsurrendered reserve land under Treaty 72 of 1854.

The court found that the Imperial Crown's surveyor, Charles Rankin, improperly marked the northern terminus of the reserve's eastern boundary further south than the Treaty stipulated, depriving the First Nation of the promised coastline.

The court held that the Imperial Crown and the federal Crown breached their sui generis fiduciary duties and acted inconsistently with the honour of the Crown by failing to properly survey, protect, and preserve the reserve.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the First Nation's claim was defeated by Crown patents, the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the Limitations Act, laches, dedication, or proprietary estoppel.

The court declared that the Disputed Beach remains unsurrendered reserve land for the sole use and benefit of the First Nation.

The applicant estate sought a preservation order to prevent the respondent mining company from dealing with a 1.5% net smelter return royalty interest.

The interest had escheated to the Crown after the corporate owner was dissolved in 1989, and was recently sold by the Public Guardian and Trustee to the respondent.

The applicant acknowledged lacking standing to challenge the sale without a special statute to revive the dissolved corporation, which the Legislature had already refused to pass.

The court dismissed the application, holding that Rule 45.01 does not permit a standalone application for a preservation order in contemplation of a future, possible lawsuit by a party that currently lacks standing.

The applicant and respondent both brought motions to compel answers to refused questions from cross-examinations on affidavits for a pending application.

The underlying application sought an interim preservation order over a mining royalty.

The applicant sought production of unredacted communications, a valuation report, and a purchase agreement between the respondent and the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The respondent sought answers regarding the deceased's will and the applicant's relationship with a third party.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the requested documents and answers were not relevant to the narrow issues to be decided on an interim preservation application.