David Ionis

This decision concerns two related shareholder applications under section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act involving SpassMed Inc. and its affiliates.

The court reviews the procedural history, including consolidation of the applications, amendments to the relief sought, and the appointment of an interim monitor.

Due to significant disputes of fact and credibility, the court orders that the consolidated application be converted to an action to allow for a full trial process.

The court-appointed Receiver sought approval for the sale of a property owned by the Debtor, 253 Queen Street Inc., and an Administration Order.

The sale was supported by secured creditors Homedale-Eagle Corporation and Sky Mortgage Corporation but opposed by the Debtor and its equity holders.

The opposing parties argued the purchase price was too low, the environmental indemnity was not assumed by the purchaser, and their beneficial interest in the property was not recognized.

The court applied the Soundair principles for approving sales in receivership, finding the Receiver acted providently and fairly.

The court rejected the claims of beneficial ownership based on trust law and the Land Titles Act, affirming the priority of registered mortgages over unregistered beneficial interests.

The Receiver's motion for approval of the sale and the Administration Order was granted.

This appeal concerned the quantum of class counsel fees and a representative plaintiff honorarium following a $153 million class action settlement for unpaid overtime.

The motion judge had awarded $25 million in fees and denied a $30,000 honorarium.

The appellants sought an increase in fees to $44 million and the honorarium.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision on both fees and honorarium, finding no palpable and overriding error or misdirection on law.

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation, having been entirely successful in the liability phase of a bifurcated proceeding concerning the status of the "Disputed Beach" as reserve land, sought costs.

This endorsement addresses the costs awards and apportionment among the multiple defendants.

The court awarded Saugeen their costs on a partial indemnity scale, totaling $3,221,802.54, on a joint and several liability basis.

These costs were apportioned for indemnification purposes among Canada (10%), Ontario (40%), and the Town of South Bruce Peninsula (50%).

Additionally, the court granted Canada a Sanderson order, requiring the Town to pay Canada $470,000 in partial indemnity costs, recognizing Canada's success on the essential issue of the reserve boundary location.

The Town's claim for costs against Canada was dismissed.

Stelco Inc. sought leave to appeal an order from the CCAA supervisory judge concerning the reconveyance of land (the "DGAP Parcel") to LandCo, a precondition for DGAP Investments Ltd. to purchase the land.

Stelco had previously been ordered to specifically perform this obligation but failed to do so.

The motion judge affirmed the court's authority to impose terms for reconveyance if the parties could not agree.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, given prior judicial determinations and Stelco's previous concession that the court could determine the agreements.

The court also considered the significance of the issues to practice and the action, and the undue hindrance that an appeal would cause to the progress of the CCAA proceeding.

In the context of a CCAA restructuring, the respondent was previously ordered to specifically perform its obligation to reconvey certain lands to a special purpose entity, which had agreed to sell a portion of those lands to the moving party.

The respondent refused to complete the reconveyance, arguing that the parties had not agreed on the terms of 'shared facilities and/or reciprocal easement agreements' required under the reconveyance agreement.

The moving party brought a motion for the court to interpret the agreement and impose terms.

The court held it had jurisdiction to determine the terms of the reconveyance and found that the respondent's demanded easements (including for undefined future utilities, carbon sequestration, and emissions) were not valid easements at common law and did not meet the contractual requirement of being 'shared' or 'reciprocal'.

The court directed the parties to attempt one final negotiation before it would impose the final terms of the easement agreement.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for judgment in a land claim case.

Following an earlier declaration that a substantial portion of Sauble Beach was reserved for the sole use and benefit of the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and forms part of Saugeen Indian Reserve No. 29, the court considered whether to grant a life interest in certain 'Disputed Lots' to current family title owners (Landowners).

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and Canada opposed this.

The court determined it lacked jurisdiction to impose a proprietary interest contrary to the Indian Act and Constitution Act, as reserve land is inalienable.

It also found that granting such an interest would not advance reconciliation.

Consequently, the temporary delay in the original declaration that no third parties have an interest in the land was terminated, making the declaration effective immediately.

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation brought an action seeking a declaration that a 1.4-mile strip of Sauble Beach (the Disputed Beach) is part of their unsurrendered reserve land under Treaty 72 of 1854.

The court found that the Imperial Crown's surveyor, Charles Rankin, improperly marked the northern terminus of the reserve's eastern boundary further south than the Treaty stipulated, depriving the First Nation of the promised coastline.

The court held that the Imperial Crown and the federal Crown breached their sui generis fiduciary duties and acted inconsistently with the honour of the Crown by failing to properly survey, protect, and preserve the reserve.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the First Nation's claim was defeated by Crown patents, the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the Limitations Act, laches, dedication, or proprietary estoppel.

The court declared that the Disputed Beach remains unsurrendered reserve land for the sole use and benefit of the First Nation.

The applicant estate sought a preservation order to prevent the respondent mining company from dealing with a 1.5% net smelter return royalty interest.

The interest had escheated to the Crown after the corporate owner was dissolved in 1989, and was recently sold by the Public Guardian and Trustee to the respondent.

The applicant acknowledged lacking standing to challenge the sale without a special statute to revive the dissolved corporation, which the Legislature had already refused to pass.

The court dismissed the application, holding that Rule 45.01 does not permit a standalone application for a preservation order in contemplation of a future, possible lawsuit by a party that currently lacks standing.