Leah Mangano

Centurion Mortgage Capital Corporation brought a motion for determination of a mortgage priority dispute with The Guarantee Company of North America (GCNA) regarding a condominium development project.

The court found that counsel for both parties had agreed in May 2016 that Centurion's mortgage would have priority over GCNA's mortgage, except with respect to purchasers' deposits.

The court also held that GCNA was precluded by proprietary estoppel from relying on a registered postponement acknowledgment to assert priority over Centurion's mortgage.

The court declared Centurion's mortgage subordinate only with respect to deposits and ordered the deletion of the postponement acknowledgment from title.

The applicants, comprising raw milk producers and consumers, challenged federal and provincial prohibitions on the sale and distribution of unpasteurized milk, alleging violations of their freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that the applicants' belief in raw milk's health benefits did not constitute a profound moral dimension for freedom of conscience, the religious interference was trivial and insubstantial, and the equality claim lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court further held that even if Charter violations were established, they would be justified under section 1 due to the compelling public health objective of preventing milk-borne illnesses, which pasteurization effectively mitigates.

The defendants brought a motion seeking dismissal or stay of certain claims, setting aside service on individual defendants, and striking specific pleadings.

The court struck claims made by trust plaintiffs (with leave to add trustees), unjust enrichment claims (with leave to amend), breach of trust claims (with leave to amend), and pleadings regarding pre-contractual representations (with leave to amend).

Crucially, the oppression remedy claims against all defendants were struck without leave due to a lack of jurisdiction, as neither corporate defendant was governed by the OBCA, and service on the individual defendants was set aside.

The plaintiffs were granted 30 days to amend their Statement of Claim for the claims struck with leave.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer a Small Claims Court action to the Superior Court of Justice.

The plaintiffs, an osteopathic federation and its president, sued the defendant insurer for defamation after the insurer delisted their services.

The court applied the five-factor test from Farlow v. Hospital for Sick Children and found that the complexity of the issues, the need for expert evidence, the need for discovery, and the general importance of the matter favoured a transfer.

The court also noted the plaintiffs sought mandatory orders beyond the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction.

The motion to transfer was granted.