Adam Syed Gilani

The appellant union engaged in secondary picketing at the respondent's premises during a lawful strike against Canada Post.

The respondent obtained an ex parte injunction under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The union appealed, arguing the injunction should have been governed by s. 102, which requires notice for injunctions connected to a labour dispute.

Although the underlying dispute had settled and the appeal was moot, the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to hear the case.

The Court held that s. 102 applies whenever an injunction is sought to restrain picketing that has an identifiable and distinct connection with an underlying labour dispute, regardless of whether the moving party is a direct disputant.

Because the required notice under s. 102 was not provided, the injunction was issued without jurisdiction and was set aside.

The plaintiff moved to certify a class action against the manufacturers and distributors of allegedly defective cochlear implants.

The plaintiff claimed the devices suffered from a design defect causing fluid ingress and premature failure, requiring invasive revision surgery.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed viable causes of action for negligent design, failure to warn, and failure to recall.

The court amended the class definition to include only patients whose devices experienced a 'hard failure' to ensure the class was properly bounded.

With limitations placed on the scope of general damages to ensure common issues predominated over individual medical histories, the court certified the action and appointed the plaintiff as the representative plaintiff.

In a proposed class action alleging defective cochlear implants, the defendants moved for production of comprehensive medical records from the representative plaintiff and a putative class member.

The plaintiff had produced only limited medical records, asserting that other health issues were not relevant to the implant defect claim.

The court granted the defendants' motion, finding that the full medical records were necessary to assess issues of commonality, preferability, and negligence at the certification stage, particularly given the plaintiff's acknowledgment of co-morbidities and his disagreement with his physician regarding the source of his symptoms.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether an injunction restraining secondary picketing by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers at a Purolator facility was governed by section 101 or section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The majority held that the definition of "labour dispute" in section 102 encompasses secondary picketing, and therefore, the appeal route lies to the Court of Appeal without leave under section 102(10).

The dissenting judge would have quashed the appeal, holding that the order was made under section 101 and thus appealable only to the Divisional Court with leave.

The plaintiff sought to extend an ex parte interim injunction restraining the respondents from picketing at its premises in a manner that blocked vehicles.

The respondent union requested amendments to the order, specifically to remove a provision precluding the inducing of breach of contract and to narrow the scope of the order to the specific premises rather than province-wide.

The court dismissed the union's requests, finding that the tort of inducing breach of contract does not capture legitimate free speech or boycotts, and that a province-wide order was a preferable use of judicial resources.

The injunction was extended for a further 30 days.

Purolator Inc. sought and was granted an injunction against unknown persons, including members of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW), who were obstructing access to and egress from its Scarborough facility.

The court determined that the special rules for labour injunctions under section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act did not apply, as Purolator was a third party to the Canada Post-CUPW labour dispute and not an alter ego of Canada Post.

Applying the conventional test for an interim injunction, the court found a strong prima facie case of nuisance due to prolonged obstruction, irreparable harm to Purolator's critical delivery services, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction.

The court also addressed the lack of prior notice to CUPW for the initial ex parte order, noting it was problematic but did not warrant refusing the injunction given the strength of Purolator's case.

The plaintiff sought an ex parte interim injunction to restrain secondary picketing at its facility by individuals associated with a union engaged in a strike against the plaintiff's majority shareholder.

The picketers blockaded the facility, significantly delaying the departure of delivery vehicles, including those carrying critical medical supplies.

The court found that the statutory rules for labour injunctions did not apply because there was no labour dispute between the plaintiff and the picketers.

Applying the test for a conventional interim injunction, the court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding unlawful obstruction, irreparable harm to the plaintiff and its customers, and a balance of convenience favouring the plaintiff.

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a class proceeding claiming damages against the Crown for negligence related to the presence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada between 2003 and 2008.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding it barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, and also that no duty of care was owed and no negligence occurred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, focusing solely on the application of section 9.

It found that various government programs providing financial assistance to cattle farmers in response to the BSE outbreak constituted "compensation" under section 9, thereby barring the negligence claim as it sought double recovery for the same factual basis of loss.

The defendants moved to dismiss the proposed class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiffs did not oppose the dismissal but requested a 60-90 day delay of the effective date to locate new representative plaintiffs for a fresh action.

The court held that s. 29.1 is a mandatory provision and the court lacks discretion to delay the effective date of the dismissal.

The motion to dismiss was granted.

This is a joint decision from the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, and Superior Court of Québec concerning the administration and termination of the national Hepatitis C class action settlement.

Class Counsel sought orders approving a third pro rata payment from the PELD Fund, payment of class counsel disbursements, approval of administrative expenses, waiving a future audit, and a declaration terminating the Settlement Agreement.

The courts approved all requests, with a minor variation regarding the termination process, and also granted relief from forfeiture to a class member for a missed payment.

The plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of Canadian cattle farmers against the Government of Canada, alleging negligence in its response to the threat of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 'mad cow disease'.

The plaintiff claimed that Canada failed to implement a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in a timely manner and failed to prevent cattle imported from the United Kingdom from entering the animal feed chain, which led to the discovery of a BSE-infected Canadian cow in May 2003 and the subsequent closure of international borders to Canadian cattle and beef.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the claim was barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the class members had received compensation through various government financial assistance programs.

Furthermore, the court held that Canada did not owe a private law duty of care to the cattle farmers and that its policy decisions regarding the monitoring of imported cattle and the timing of the feed ban were reasonable and did not breach the standard of care.

During a class action trial regarding the federal government's alleged negligence in preventing mad cow disease, the defendant sought to read into evidence discovery transcripts from the current representative plaintiff, the deceased former representative plaintiff, and other class members.

The court denied the request to read in the current representative plaintiff's evidence, applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn, as the plaintiff had already testified and the evidence did not merely fill a gap.

The court also denied leave to read in the deceased former plaintiff's evidence under Rule 31.11(6) and (7), finding the excerpts to be of limited importance and lacking cross-examination.

However, the court permitted the defendant to read in discovery evidence from other class members, as it provided helpful real-world insight into the financial impact on different cattle producers.

During a common issues trial regarding the federal government's alleged negligence in preventing the spread of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (mad cow disease), the plaintiff sought to admit eight foreign public records for the truth of their contents.

The defendant argued the documents should only be admitted to show the government's knowledge of them.

The court held that the documents, which included reports from the World Health Organization and the European Commission, met the criteria for the public documents exception under s. 25 of the Ontario Evidence Act and were admissible for the truth of their contents, though the court reserved judgment on the weight to be given to them.

During a common issues trial concerning the impact of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) on Canadian farmers, the plaintiff sought to admit the affidavit and cross-examination transcript of a deceased witness, Mr. Mel McCrea.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, objected on the basis of necessity, arguing that other witnesses could provide similar information.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that Mr. McCrea's evidence met both the necessity and reliability thresholds.

The court emphasized the unique nature of Mr. McCrea's first-hand account regarding the first Canadian-born BSE-diagnosed cow and the prior cross-examination, ruling the evidence admissible.

This ruling addresses a hearsay objection raised by the defendant during a common issues trial concerning the 2003 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak.

The defendant sought to strike out several paragraphs from the affidavit of Lawrence Sears, the plaintiff's principal, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay.

The court dismissed the objection, finding that the statements in the affidavit were based on Mr. Sears' personal knowledge, experience, and observations, and thus were not hearsay.

The judge emphasized that the evidence could be tested through cross-examination.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of the plaintiff's expert reports as evidence-in-chief in a complex common issues trial concerning the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak.

The defendant objected to the hybrid trial process, arguing that expert evidence should be presented viva voce rather than through reports.

The court dismissed the defendant's objection, affirming the trial judge's discretion to admit expert reports as direct evidence in non-jury hybrid trials, consistent with prior case management orders.

The decision emphasized that this approach enhances trial efficiency and does not prejudice the opposing party's right to cross-examination.

The applicants, comprising raw milk producers and consumers, challenged federal and provincial prohibitions on the sale and distribution of unpasteurized milk, alleging violations of their freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that the applicants' belief in raw milk's health benefits did not constitute a profound moral dimension for freedom of conscience, the religious interference was trivial and insubstantial, and the equality claim lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court further held that even if Charter violations were established, they would be justified under section 1 due to the compelling public health objective of preventing milk-borne illnesses, which pasteurization effectively mitigates.

The defendant in a wrongful dismissal action brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer five questions refused during his examination for discovery.

The refused questions related to a motor vehicle accident the plaintiff was involved in prior to his termination, and the subsequent litigation and settlement arising from it.

The defendant argued the information was relevant to mitigation and preventing double recovery.

The Master dismissed the motion, finding that the payment obligations of an unrelated tortfeasor are distinct from those of an employer, and therefore the motor vehicle accident litigation was not relevant to the quantification of wrongful dismissal damages.