Andrew Locatelli

In a professional discipline proceeding, the registrant entered a no contest plea to allegations that he knowingly submitted false OHIP claims for services not rendered while practising emergency medicine and then failed to cooperate with the regulatory investigation.

The Tribunal accepted uncontested facts showing unsupported billings, including claims for patients the registrant did not treat, dates on which patients were not present, and procedures unsupported by any charting, together with repeated refusals to attend an interview or answer detailed written questions.

Applying the Anthony-Cook framework to a joint penalty submission, the Tribunal held that revocation, a reprimand, and tariff costs would not bring the administration of the discipline system into disrepute.

The registrant’s certificate of registration was revoked immediately and costs of $6,000 were ordered.

The applicants sought to appeal or set aside a Partial Final Award of an arbitrator that granted the respondents a 50% constructive trust interest in a commercial property adjacent to a jointly owned shopping centre.

The arbitrator had found an ad hoc fiduciary duty despite the Co-Tenancy Agreement explicitly excluding partnership and fiduciary obligations.

The Superior Court of Justice granted leave to appeal, finding that the arbitration agreement did not preclude appeals on questions of law.

The court set aside the relevant portions of the award, holding that the arbitrator committed extricable errors of law by ignoring the unambiguous exclusionary language of the agreement and exceeded his jurisdiction by deciding an unpleaded claim for an ad hoc fiduciary duty.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to correct the misnomer of several John Doe defendants, identifying them as specific treating physicians and a wound care provider (ParaMed).

The underlying action involved allegations of medical malpractice relating to the development and failure to treat the deceased's bedsores at various care facilities.

The proposed defendants opposed the motion, arguing it was an attempt to add parties after the expiry of the strict two-year limitation period under the Trustee Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the pleadings were drafted with sufficient particularity such that the 'litigation finger' pointed squarely at the proposed defendants, and that a properly informed defendant would have recognized they were the target of the allegations.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the proposed defendants.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add the defendant's professional liability insurer as a defendant.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that his claim and another client's claim against the defendant constituted separate claims under the insurance policy, thereby maximizing available coverage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendment was impossible of success because the coverage issue could not be determined until the underlying actions were finally decided, as previously held in a related application.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The representative plaintiffs in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy for packaged bread sought to amend their pleadings and the Certification Order to add Maple Leaf Foods Inc. as a certified defendant.

The original Certification Order had refused certification against Maple Leaf on the basis that the pleadings disclosed no cause of action against it, and this decision was not appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the motion, finding that the original refusal to certify was a final order that gave rise to res judicata.

The court held that the Class Proceedings Act does not permit relitigation of matters finally decided, and the motion judge did not err in refusing to exercise his limited discretion to bypass res judicata.

The applicant sought to enforce paragraph 7 (the "Comeback Provision") of an arbitral award dated June 20, 2024, which permitted any party to bring the matter back before the arbitrator for guidance regarding the sale process of real property.

The respondents opposed enforcement, arguing the provision fell within the exceptions under section 50(7) of the Arbitration Act because it was not a remedy a court would grant.

The court found that the provision was made on consent, was limited to matters involving the property sale process, did not limit counsel rights, and did not require expedited hearings.

The court distinguished the case from Thompson v. Thiessen and enforced the Comeback Provision.

This costs endorsement followed a decision on an appeal and cross-appeal.

Given the divided success of the parties on both the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion to reconsider a previous certification ruling that dismissed the action against Maple Leaf Foods Inc. (MLF) in a class action alleging price-fixing.

The Plaintiffs sought to certify the action against MLF, presenting new evidence including a Second Information to Obtain (ITO), MLF's annual reports, Canada Bread's Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) from a criminal proceeding, and emails from Canada Bread's files.

MLF opposed the motion and brought cross-motions to exclude the new evidence and strike the Plaintiffs' amended claims.

The court dismissed the Plaintiffs' motion, finding that the 'new evidence' was either not new, inadmissible hearsay, or did not substantively alter the lack of a viable cause of action against MLF.

The court emphasized the principle of finality in litigation, stating that a certification dismissal for lack of cause of action is a final order and cannot be revisited without meeting a strict test for new evidence (Sagaz test), which was not met here.

The court also granted MLF's motion to exclude the evidence and strike the amended statements of claim against MLF.

The parties entered into a contract in 1999 for the provision of market pricing data.

The appellant, a custodial bank, redistributed the data to its numerous affiliates without authorization.

The respondent discovered the breach in 2016 and sued.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the contract and awarded damages based on a rateable approach, but also awarded damages for sharing data with a specific affiliate.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, concluding the contract only authorized the appellant itself to access the data.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to change his unentered judgment and rejected the appellant's limitations defence.

On damages, the Court struck the award relating to the specific affiliate as double compensation but otherwise upheld the damages assessment, including an adverse inference drawn against the appellant for spoliation of evidence.

The University of Toronto brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to dismantle a protest encampment set up by students and others on Front Campus.

The protesters argued the encampment was a protected exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.

The court granted the injunction, finding that the University established a strong prima facie case of trespass and ejectment.

The court held that the protesters' appropriation of University property to the exclusion of others constituted irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured the University, as the injunction only prohibited camping and erecting structures, while allowing the protesters to continue demonstrating elsewhere on campus.

In an alternative analysis, the court found that the Charter does not apply to the University's management of its property, and even if it did, the trespass notice was a justified limit under section 1.

The plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of Canadian cattle farmers against the Government of Canada, alleging negligence in its response to the threat of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 'mad cow disease'.

The plaintiff claimed that Canada failed to implement a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in a timely manner and failed to prevent cattle imported from the United Kingdom from entering the animal feed chain, which led to the discovery of a BSE-infected Canadian cow in May 2003 and the subsequent closure of international borders to Canadian cattle and beef.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the claim was barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the class members had received compensation through various government financial assistance programs.

Furthermore, the court held that Canada did not owe a private law duty of care to the cattle farmers and that its policy decisions regarding the monitoring of imported cattle and the timing of the feed ban were reasonable and did not breach the standard of care.

During a class action trial regarding the federal government's alleged negligence in preventing mad cow disease, the defendant sought to read into evidence discovery transcripts from the current representative plaintiff, the deceased former representative plaintiff, and other class members.

The court denied the request to read in the current representative plaintiff's evidence, applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn, as the plaintiff had already testified and the evidence did not merely fill a gap.

The court also denied leave to read in the deceased former plaintiff's evidence under Rule 31.11(6) and (7), finding the excerpts to be of limited importance and lacking cross-examination.

However, the court permitted the defendant to read in discovery evidence from other class members, as it provided helpful real-world insight into the financial impact on different cattle producers.

During a common issues trial regarding the federal government's alleged negligence in preventing the spread of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (mad cow disease), the plaintiff sought to admit eight foreign public records for the truth of their contents.

The defendant argued the documents should only be admitted to show the government's knowledge of them.

The court held that the documents, which included reports from the World Health Organization and the European Commission, met the criteria for the public documents exception under s. 25 of the Ontario Evidence Act and were admissible for the truth of their contents, though the court reserved judgment on the weight to be given to them.

During a common issues trial concerning the impact of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) on Canadian farmers, the plaintiff sought to admit the affidavit and cross-examination transcript of a deceased witness, Mr. Mel McCrea.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, objected on the basis of necessity, arguing that other witnesses could provide similar information.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that Mr. McCrea's evidence met both the necessity and reliability thresholds.

The court emphasized the unique nature of Mr. McCrea's first-hand account regarding the first Canadian-born BSE-diagnosed cow and the prior cross-examination, ruling the evidence admissible.

This ruling addresses a hearsay objection raised by the defendant during a common issues trial concerning the 2003 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak.

The defendant sought to strike out several paragraphs from the affidavit of Lawrence Sears, the plaintiff's principal, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay.

The court dismissed the objection, finding that the statements in the affidavit were based on Mr. Sears' personal knowledge, experience, and observations, and thus were not hearsay.

The judge emphasized that the evidence could be tested through cross-examination.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of the plaintiff's expert reports as evidence-in-chief in a complex common issues trial concerning the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak.

The defendant objected to the hybrid trial process, arguing that expert evidence should be presented viva voce rather than through reports.

The court dismissed the defendant's objection, affirming the trial judge's discretion to admit expert reports as direct evidence in non-jury hybrid trials, consistent with prior case management orders.

The decision emphasized that this approach enhances trial efficiency and does not prejudice the opposing party's right to cross-examination.

The plaintiff in a certified class action regarding the federal government's response to the Mad Cow Disease outbreak brought a motion under the Interprovincial Summonses Act to compel the attendance of the former federal Minister of Agriculture, Ralph Goodale, as a witness at trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the proposed witness's evidence would be relevant, it was neither necessary nor essential to the administration of justice.

The plaintiff already had copious documentary and oral discovery, and the federal government planned to call sixteen civil servants from Agriculture Canada at trial.

Epix Resource Finance Corporation applied for an order under section 127 of the Securities Act against Aberdeen International Inc., alleging Aberdeen failed to comply with obligations applicable to non-redeemable investment funds.

The Commission considered whether Epix should be granted standing to proceed as a private party.

The Commission dismissed the application, finding that Epix failed to demonstrate it was in the public interest to bypass Commission Staff's usual gatekeeper processes and policy-based filtering.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission alleged that Kuber Mortgage Investment Corporation and Sutharsan Kunaratnam engaged in unregistered trading by selling approximately $26 million worth of preferred shares to 200 investors without an available exemption.

The parties entered into a settlement agreement, which included a $400,000 administrative penalty, $30,000 in costs, a reprimand, and undertakings to remediate the conduct.

The Commission approved the settlement, finding it fell within a range of reasonable outcomes and was in the public interest.