Brian Kolenda

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment that dismissed its copyright claim under s. 13(3) of the Copyright Act over competing software secretly developed by a former employee.

The trial judge found the software was not created "in the course of employment" because the employee's actual responsibilities were limited to developing the employer's existing software, he was not directed to create new products, and the employer did not expend resources on the competing software's development.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that the proper test under s. 13(3) focuses on the employee's actual assigned responsibilities, not the class of work the employer could have directed, and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

In a landmark CCAA proceeding involving Hudson's Bay Company, the court declined to approve the assignment of 25 major retail department store leases across Canada to a new tenant, Ruby Liu Commercial Investment Corp., despite the transaction representing the highest bid and generating approximately $50 million in net proceeds for creditors.

The court found that the proposed assignee failed to meet the reasonableness standard under section 11.3(3) of the CCAA, particularly regarding its ability to perform the substantial and ongoing obligations under the leases.

The decision emphasizes that section 11.3 is an extraordinary power that must be exercised sparingly, and that the court must balance the interests of all stakeholders, including the contractual counterparties (landlords) who would be compelled into a long-term relationship with an untested and undercapitalized purchaser.

The court also rejected the applicants' arguments that certain lease provisions constituted ipso facto clauses violating the anti-deprivation rule and section 34 of the CCAA.

In a Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceeding, the applicant Hudson's Bay Company ULC and related entities sought approval of an Art Collection Auction Process Order to authorize the auction of artwork and artifacts held by the company.

The court approved the proposed auction procedures, which included both live and online auction components.

The court noted that certain items were excluded from the auction, including the Royal Charter, artifacts previously donated to the Manitoba Museum, the company's reference collection donated to the Archives of Manitoba, and war memorials.

Additionally, 24 artifacts believed to be of Indigenous origin or representative of Indigenous culture were excluded from the auction and would be donated to appropriate custodians in consultation with Indigenous communities.

The court found that the proposed procedures satisfied the applicable legal tests and represented the most appropriate process for disposing of the art collection while balancing the interests of creditors with cultural and historical considerations.

In this CCAA proceeding, the court granted multiple orders sought by Hudson's Bay Company and related entities, including approval of lease assignment agreements with YM Inc. and Ivanhoe Cambridge, sealing of confidential bid information, extension of the stay of proceedings to October 31, 2025, and approval of the Monitor's reports and activities.

The court rejected requests for adjournment and conditional distributions, finding the lease monetization process was fair and transparent, and that the proposed transactions represent a positive development for stakeholders.

The Trustee, KSV Restructuring Inc., sought substantive consolidation of the estates of ProEx Logistics Inc., Guru Logistics Inc., and 1542300 Ontario Inc., as well as authorization to accept claims by Paul Randhawa and to approve the Trustee’s reports.

The court granted substantive consolidation and approved the Trustee’s reports, but declined to authorize the Trustee’s acceptance of Paul’s claims, holding that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act provides a comprehensive code for the allowance and disallowance of claims, and that equity owners such as Rana Randhawa have no standing to challenge the Trustee’s decision to accept a claim.

The decision also addresses the effect of outstanding costs awards on standing and the finality of proceedings.

This costs endorsement followed a decision on an appeal and cross-appeal.

Given the divided success of the parties on both the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The parties entered into a contract in 1999 for the provision of market pricing data.

The appellant, a custodial bank, redistributed the data to its numerous affiliates without authorization.

The respondent discovered the breach in 2016 and sued.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the contract and awarded damages based on a rateable approach, but also awarded damages for sharing data with a specific affiliate.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, concluding the contract only authorized the appellant itself to access the data.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to change his unentered judgment and rejected the appellant's limitations defence.

On damages, the Court struck the award relating to the specific affiliate as double compensation but otherwise upheld the damages assessment, including an adverse inference drawn against the appellant for spoliation of evidence.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion by Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. for the production of a Crown Disclosure Brief from the defendants Vasos Georgiou and John Aquino.

The original motion was adjourned sine die after the Attorney General provided key undertakings.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs ($20,000) but not on entitlement.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57, decided that no costs should be awarded to any party.

The decision considered the novelty of the issues, the timing of the Attorney General's undertakings, and the fact that the outcome was not primarily based on the arguments presented by the defendants seeking costs.

In a securities class action, the plaintiff sought multiple orders in advance of a settlement approval motion.

The plaintiff requested leave to proceed against Tetra Tech, Inc. under the Securities Act, leave to discontinue common law negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims against Tetra Tech, and certification of the action as a class proceeding against Tetra Tech for settlement purposes.

Additionally, the plaintiff sought approval to discontinue the action against the Underwriter Defendants based on a Standstill and Tolling Agreement.

The court granted all requested orders, finding that the criteria for leave and certification were met and that the discontinuance against the Underwriter Defendants would not prejudice the class.

The plaintiff in a civil rescission action sought an order compelling the defendants to produce the Crown disclosure brief they received in related criminal proceedings concerning the same alleged fraud in a hospital procurement process.

The Attorney General opposed immediate production, arguing it could taint witnesses before they testified in the criminal trial.

The court balanced the interests under the Wagg framework and adjourned the motion sine die, accepting the Attorney General's undertaking to conduct a Wagg review and produce the documents within eight weeks after a verdict in the criminal proceedings.

The plaintiff, Bluemoon Capital Ltd., sought court approval under s. 29 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, to discontinue a proposed class action against the defendants on a with-prejudice and without-costs basis.

The action, alleging secondary and primary market misrepresentation under the Securities Act, was commenced to preserve claims while a Norwich application was pending.

Following the denial of the Norwich application by Justice Pattillo and its confirmation on appeal, the plaintiff determined the action was no longer viable.

The court approved the discontinuance, finding it was for a proper purpose and would not prejudice putative class members who were unaware of the action.

The plaintiff's request to suspend the discontinuance for 60 days to allow for potential class member action was denied, as no purpose would be served by giving notice or suspending the discontinuance.

This is a costs endorsement following an application concerning the allocation of sale proceeds from two properties.

The court found York University largely successful in the underlying application, as nearly all remaining sale proceeds were paid to York's benefit after mortgage discharge.

The applicant's allegations were unfounded, and her conduct (attempting to list property in contravention of an order) prolonged the litigation.

The court awarded York University costs on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $54,705.38, and also allowed $16,813.56 for legal fees incurred by York with McCarthy Tétrault LLP, payable from the sale proceeds.

The court declined substantial indemnity costs because some relief sought by York would have been necessary anyway.

The appellant, Bluemoon Capital Ltd., appealed the dismissal of its application for a Norwich order and the quashing of a Rule 39.03 notice of examination.

The appellant, a shareholder of Ceridian HCM Holding Inc., sought pre-action discovery regarding the alleged undervaluation of LifeWorks Corporation Ltd. shares during Ceridian's 2018 distribution and subsequent sale to Morneau Shepell.

The application judge dismissed the Norwich order, finding it unnecessary and not in the interests of justice, and quashed the notice of examination as moot.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision that the appellant had sufficient information to commence its class action and that the Norwich order was not sought for a legitimate purpose.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

During a trial of an issue on damages arising from an application, the applicant objected to numerous pieces of viva voce evidence introduced by the respondents.

The court had previously directed that the damages trial proceed on the closed record as it existed when the application was initially argued.

The court applied a bright-line test, ruling that any evidence not actually found in the underlying application record was inadmissible to prevent trial by ambush.

The court sustained the majority of the applicant's objections, rejecting the respondents' arguments that the new evidence was merely a permissible amplification of the existing record or a necessary response to the applicant's expert.

The applicant sought an equitable remedy to allocate the payment of a mortgage and a costs award from the proceeds of sale of a property (Osprey) that had been fraudulently conveyed to her, rather than from an adjacent lot.

The respondent university, a judgment creditor of the applicant's former partner, opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that previous court orders had nullified the applicant's interest in Osprey and granted the university enforcement rights against it.

The court also held that the mortgagee was entitled to pursue its remedy against the adjacent lot, and that the equitable doctrine of marshalling would have compelled this result to protect the university's unsecured interest.

The appellants, a group of subcontractors and a bank, appealed an application judge's decision that rescission of surety bonds might be possible even if it affects innocent third parties.

The bonds were issued by Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. for a large construction project, but Zurich later discovered alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and collusion that induced it to issue the bonds.

The appellants sought a declaration that rescission was unavailable as a matter of law due to the involvement of innocent third parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that prejudice to third parties is not an absolute bar to rescission, especially in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, and that such a determination requires a full factual record at trial.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing the appellants' action as statute-barred.

The appellants, a former employee and his investment corporation, sued the respondents for breach of a post-retirement compensation agreement, claiming a permanent 3% interest in a partnership.

The motion judge found the claims statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, ruling that a single breach with continuing consequences occurred, not a series of breaches giving rise to a rolling limitation period.

The motion judge also found the request for declaratory relief was, in substance, a claim for compensatory relief and therefore also statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, dismissing the appeal.

Zurich, the surety for the insolvent general contractor Bondfield, brought a motion to intervene as a party in a construction lien reference.

Zurich sought to participate in a vetting committee for the distribution of the owner's holdback among the timely lien claimants.

The court granted the motion, finding that Zurich had a direct interest in the holdback because it had made significant holdback advances to the major electrical and mechanical trades and had taken partial assignments of their lien rights.

The court ordered the timely claimants to pay Zurich's costs of $30,000.

The appellants, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and CIBC Mellon Global Securities Services Company, sought an order staying a lower court judgment pending appeal.

They argued that the application judge's amendments to his reasons for judgment created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion judge, Lauwers J.A., dismissed the motion, finding that the appellants failed to demonstrate a real likelihood or probability of bias.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience) and the overarching interests of justice, concluding that a stay was not warranted.

Leave was granted to file a Supplementary Notice of Appeal.

The Respondents brought a motion seeking the recusal of the presiding judge and a declaration of mistrial, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The allegations stemmed from the judge's conduct and rulings in three prior decisions related to the ongoing application, specifically claiming predisposition towards the Applicant, disparagement of the Respondents, and insinuation into the appeal process.

The Court dismissed the motion, finding that, when viewed realistically and in full context, the judge's actions did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The decision emphasized that adverse rulings, even if potentially erroneous, do not equate to bias and should be addressed through the appeal process.

Costs were awarded to the Applicant.