Sean Ronald Campbell

The applicant, a hedge fund shareholder, brought an urgent application under section 248 of the OBCA seeking to adjourn the respondent corporation's annual general and special meeting of shareholders and to reset the record date.

The applicant alleged the notice was non-compliant with the OBCA and that the board acted oppressively by setting a timeline that effectively prevented shareholders from nominating an alternative slate of directors.

The court found that the respondent was not an "offering corporation" and had met all statutory notice requirements under sections 95(4) and 96(1) of the OBCA.

The court held that the notice procedures followed past practice and did not breach the reasonable expectations of shareholders as established in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders.

The application was dismissed with costs of $75,000 to the respondent.

The plaintiff moved for certification of a class action against FedEx, alleging undisclosed and unsolicited fees for customs clearance services (Advancement Fee and Clearance Entry Fee) in violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff, a non-commercial purchaser, received an invoice for these fees after being promised "free shipping," believing them to be government levies.

The court found that the claim disclosed viable causes of action under the CPA, including unsolicited services and unfair practices, and unjust enrichment.

It rejected FedEx's arguments regarding agency, territorial reach of the CPA, and the sufficiency of website disclosures.

The court also found the proposed class identifiable, common issues present, and a class action to be the preferable procedure given the small individual claims and the goals of judicial economy, access to justice, and behaviour modification.

The action was certified.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal and a motion to quash.

The respondent, successful on the appeal, sought substantial indemnity costs of over $230,000.

The appellants argued for a net award of $30,000.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity, agreeing that costs for the unsuccessful motion to quash should be deducted.

The court ultimately awarded the respondent $90,000 in all-inclusive partial indemnity costs, finding the amounts and issues involved in the appeal significant.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision that denied leave to appeal an arbitration award exceeding $100 million.

The central issue was whether the arbitration agreement precluded appeals on questions of law, specifically interpreting phrases like "finally settled" and "final and binding" in the context of the Arbitration Act, 1991 and ICC Rules.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the arbitration agreement precluded appeals, thereby confirming that leave to appeal was not available.

The court also addressed and dismissed a motion to quash the appeal, clarifying the narrow circumstances under which a denial of leave to appeal by a Superior Court judge can be appealed to the Court of Appeal.

This motion concerned an application by Tower-EBC G.P./S.E.N.C. (TEBC) to enforce two arbitral awards (a Partial Final Award on liability and damages, and a Final Award on costs) against Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation and Baffinland Iron Mines LP (BIM).

BIM raised several defenses, including a pending application to set aside or appeal the awards, which had previously been dismissed by the court.

The court granted TEBC's application to enforce both awards, confirming the awarded amounts for damages and costs, with a condition regarding the transfer of equipment title and excluding "applicable taxes" as not provided for in the original arbitral awards.

Pre-judgment interest was maintained as per the Tribunal's award.

The applicants, Baffinland Iron Mines LP and Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation (BIM), sought to set aside an arbitration award of over $70 million and a subsequent costs award in favour of the respondent, Tower-EBC G.P./S.E.N.C. (TEBC), pursuant to s. 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and for leave to appeal under s. 45(1) of the Act.

The court dismissed BIM's application, finding no grounds to set aside the award for lack of jurisdiction or procedural unfairness, and further held that the arbitration agreement precluded an appeal from the Tribunal's decision.

The plaintiff, Robert Drynan, brought a motion to approve a third-party litigation funding agreement in a class action against Bausch Health Companies Inc. and related entities, alleging misleading marketing of COLD-FX® products.

The court addressed the defendants' objections concerning security for costs, litigation autonomy, overcompensation, and access to justice.

After amendments to the funding agreement to cap recovery for the funder and class counsel at 33.3% of proceeds and defer court approval for certain expenses, the court approved the agreement, finding it fair, reasonable, and conducive to access to justice, while protecting the defendants' interests.

The court approved the class action distribution plan, which allocated proceeds proportionally based on prior wind-down payments, and the class counsel's retainer agreement, fees, and disbursements.

The court also approved honourariums for the representative plaintiff and another instrumental class member.

A dispute regarding priority between General Motors' security interest and Class Counsel's first charge was noted for a subsequent decision.

This appeal arises from the 2009 General Motors of Canada bailout and the termination of franchise dealerships.

The franchisor offered Wind-Down Agreements to 240 dealers, providing payment in exchange for comprehensive releases of all claims, including those under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The dealers were required to obtain independent legal advice before signing.

A class action was subsequently brought by terminated franchisees claiming breaches of statutory rights.

The trial judge found the releases valid under the Tutor Time exception to section 11 of the Wishart Act, as they constituted settlements of known and existing claims entered into with legal advice.

The trial judge also held that covenants not to sue and indemnity provisions were void for public policy reasons but were severable from the release.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the validity of the releases and the severance of the covenant not to sue.

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order compelling the Commissioner of Competition to provide further particulars of alleged misleading representations pleaded under paragraph 74.01(1)(a) of the Competition Act concerning premium text messaging services.

The defendants argued that the statement of claim failed to identify the specific alleged misrepresentations and related details necessary to prepare their defences.

The court held that the pleading sufficiently described the alleged deceptive marketing practices and that the requested particulars largely sought evidentiary details, which are properly obtained through discovery rather than particulars.

Given that the alleged representations could number in the hundreds or more and concerned matters within the defendants’ knowledge, the court exercised its discretion to refuse the request for further particulars.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

The defendant landlord moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim seeking rectification of a lease amendment.

The tenants alleged that an early termination clause permitting the landlord to terminate the lease on 270 days’ notice had been inserted without their knowledge or agreement.

The court held that rectification requires convincing proof of a definite and ascertainable prior oral agreement, knowledge of the mistake amounting to fraud or its equivalent, and proof of the precise form of the corrected instrument.

The evidentiary record consisted largely of self‑serving assertions unsupported by documentary evidence and failed to demonstrate any prior agreement excluding the termination clause.

Summary judgment was granted, the claim for rectification dismissed, and the certificate of pending litigation vacated.