Andrew Steven Faith

The applicant, Harry Littler, a director of CMC Credit Ltd., sought an order compelling the respondents to provide access to CMC’s books and records, including loan agreements.

The respondent, Michael Smith, objected on the basis of privacy legislation (PIPEDA) and alleged improper purpose.

The court found that directors have an unconditional statutory right to inspect corporate records under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, and that PIPEDA does not prevent such access.

The application was granted, and costs were fixed in favour of the applicant.

The decision grants summary judgment to the plaintiffs, who were defrauded of $2.65 million in a real estate investment scheme involving a solicitor’s law firm, his office manager/mother, and an in-house mortgage broker.

The court finds the solicitor and his firm liable for breach of trust, negligence, and fiduciary duty, and holds the property company and its principals jointly and severally liable.

The court awards compensatory and punitive damages, as well as substantial indemnity costs.

This endorsement addresses the sequencing of motions in a series of related class actions.

The 2018 plaintiffs sought a temporary stay of the 2022 actions.

The defendants proposed hearing the stay motion concurrently with their summary judgment motions, citing limitation period defenses.

The 2022 plaintiffs argued for their certification motion to proceed if the stay was delayed.

The court, acting as case management judge, directed that the motion to stay be heard first, finding no significant efficiencies in combining it with the summary judgment motions and stating that certification motions should only proceed after summary judgment motions are determined.

The plaintiffs in two putative class actions sought leave to discontinue one action entirely and partially discontinue the second against all but one defendant group.

This procedural step aimed to streamline the proceedings by converting omnibus actions into separate class proceedings against distinct defendant groups.

The defendants did not oppose the requests.

The court granted leave for both discontinuances, recognizing the efficiency gains.

A foreign-trained Chartered Accountant from India was charged with eight regulatory offences under three Ontario accounting statutes for unlawfully using professional accounting designations and initials (CPA, CA, CMA, FCA, FCMA) on multiple websites and social media platforms while not being a member of the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario.

The defendant was a student of CPA Ontario who failed the Common Final Examination three times and was deregistered.

Despite receiving a cease-and-desist letter in March 2017, the defendant continued to publicly display his foreign designations on websites, LinkedIn, Kijiji advertisements, and other platforms, implying he was qualified to practice accounting in Ontario.

The court found the defendant guilty on all eight counts after determining the prosecution proved the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant failed to establish a due diligence defence.

The court also dismissed the defendant's Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the prohibitions, finding that while the restrictions infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b), they were reasonable limits justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The appellant, FCT Insurance Company Ltd., appealed a trial judgment that found FCT responsible for losses sustained by the respondent, John Breen, arising from structural defects in a cottage property for which he had obtained title insurance.

The trial judge found that the defects rendered the title unmarketable and fell within the coverage of the title insurance policy, relying on the principles established in MacDonald v. Chicago Title Insurance Company of Canada.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in applying MacDonald to the facts of this case.

The court distinguished this case on two fundamental grounds: first, Mr. Breen was on notice at the time of purchase of potential problems with the building permit process; and second, even if a final inspection had been conducted, it would not have revealed the hidden construction defects.

The court concluded that the situation involved unmarketability of the land rather than the title, and that title insurance is designed to protect against defects that would be revealed by off-title searches, not hidden defects.

The appeal was allowed and the claim dismissed.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion for a publication ban and sealing order in an appeal concerning child vaccination.

The mother, who brought the original motion, sought costs, arguing the father's publicizing of the case necessitated the motion and increased her expenses.

The father argued for no costs or costs payable to him, asserting he protected the children's identity and consented to much of the relief.

The court found that while the mother achieved some confidentiality protections, she did not obtain all the relief sought (e.g., sealing the file).

The court concluded that the motion would have been necessary regardless of the father's actions due to the open court principle and the need to notify media.

Therefore, the father's behaviour did not cause or increase the mother's costs, and no costs were ordered for the motion.

The children's mother (L.K.) brought a motion for a publication ban, file initialization, and sealing of the court file in an appeal concerning the vaccination status of the parties' children.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test, finding a serious risk of harm and stigmatization to the children if their identities were revealed.

A tailored publication ban was ordered, prohibiting the publication of identifying information for the children (names, dates of birth, addresses, schools, genders, images, voices, and most health information, except their unvaccinated status) and the parties (names, voices, images).

The court also ordered that the title of proceedings and public documents use initials only, and that future publications not link to non-compliant prior reports.

The request to seal the court file and retroactively amend existing publications was dismissed due to lack of evidentiary basis and practical unenforceability, respectively.

The Chief Adjudicator of the Independent Assessment Process under the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement appealed two directions issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge.

The first direction prohibited the appellant from participating in three appeals and ordered him to withdraw his facta, finding him insubordinate and in defiance of the supervising courts.

The second direction rescinded the first and appointed an amicus curiae to bring a Request for Direction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside both directions, finding that the appellant was owed procedural fairness and natural justice, which were not afforded.

The court also found the second direction violated the principle of functus officio.

The court held that any future proceedings regarding the appellant's conduct must follow the mandated Request for Direction process and be conducted by a different supervising judge.

The appellants sought to add three health care providers as defendants to a medical malpractice action more than two years after the original injury.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the wrong test under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the motion judge failed to make proper findings of fact regarding when the appellants knew or ought reasonably to have known of their claims against the proposed defendants.

The court also found that the motion judge erred in treating lack of due diligence as a standalone ground for finding claims statute-barred.

The key distinction was that the claims against the proposed defendants differed from the claim against the original defendant, as they involved allegations that the health care providers failed to take immediate action once cauda equina syndrome was suspected, information that was only revealed during examinations for discovery in 2015.

The Chief Adjudicator of the Independent Assessment Process under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement appealed a direction issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge that rescinded an earlier direction prohibiting the Chief Adjudicator's participation in three appeals.

The Chief Adjudicator sought a stay of the second direction pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding serious issues to be tried regarding procedural fairness, the functus officio principle, and the propriety of the RFD process.

The court found that allowing parallel proceedings could result in irreparable harm through inconsistent results and damage to the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in her jury charge by failing to sufficiently caution the jury that items linking the appellant to a particular address were relevant only to his relationship with the vehicle's passenger and did not directly support his identification as the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions clearly identified the relevance of the evidence and that the jury was sufficiently instructed on identification and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, but as he had served the custodial portion, that issue was moot.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and ammunition offences, challenging the trial judge's admission of evidence seized during a search of a farmhouse.

The appellant argued that the use of tear gas during the execution of the search warrant constituted an unauthorized search in breach of section 8 of the Charter, and alternatively, that the manner of execution was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the use of tear gas was not a "search" within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter, as it was not conducted for the purpose of obtaining personal information but rather to safely flush out occupants.

The court also found that the search was executed in a reasonable manner given the circumstances known to police at the time.

The applicant, an almost 80-year-old woman suffering from severe osteoarthritis and intolerable pain, sought a court declaration to confirm her eligibility for medical assistance in dying (MAID) under s. 241.2(2)(d) of the Criminal Code, specifically that her natural death was "reasonably foreseeable." Two physicians had assessed her as eligible, but one declined to proceed due to fear of criminal charges given conflicting medical opinions on "reasonable foreseeability." The Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario opposed the declaration, arguing it was unnecessary, interfered with prosecutorial discretion, and that MAID eligibility was for medical professionals, not courts.

The court found the application misconceived as a constitutional challenge but recognized a live controversy regarding statutory interpretation.

The court declined to grant a declaration of eligibility or immunity but issued an interpretative declaration that, based on the evidence, the applicant's natural death was reasonably foreseeable within the meaning of the Criminal Code, aiming to clarify the statute for medical practitioners without interfering with prosecutorial discretion.

O.P., suffering from end-stage glioblastoma, applied for a declaration that his planned physician-assisted death was permitted by law under the criteria established in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5.

The applicant argued that court authorization was not legally required but sought a declaratory order for practical reasons due to healthcare providers' concerns about civil, criminal, or disciplinary liability, and issues with the Coroners Act.

The court rejected the premise that physician-assisted death was permissible without court order pending federal legislation, asserting that judicial authorization remained a constitutional remedy under s. 24(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to ensure the rule of law and safeguard vulnerable persons.

The court ultimately granted an authorization order for physician-assisted death, finding that O.P. met all the Carter criteria, and provided ancillary relief regarding the Coroners Act and Family Law Act.

M.N., suffering from terminal cancer with a prognosis of less than six months, sought a court order declaring that she met the criteria for a physician-assisted death under the constitutional exemption granted in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 4.

She also sought a declaration that her physician-assisted death would not require physicians to notify the coroner under the Coroners Act.

The court found M.N. to be a competent adult with a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering, and that she clearly consented to the termination of her life.

The application was granted, allowing M.N. to proceed with physician-assisted death and exempting involved healthcare providers from certain Criminal Code provisions and coroner notification requirements.

Following summary judgment dismissing two civil actions related to a proposed wind project, the successful defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded due to alleged novelty of the legal issues, broader public importance, assistance to future litigants, alleged reliance on unsworn materials, and the plaintiffs’ financial hardship.

The court rejected these submissions, holding that the claims were premature and unsupported by the evidentiary record, and that none of the factors justified departing from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The court emphasized that unsuccessful litigants cannot avoid costs merely because their claims may generate guidance for future cases.

Costs were awarded as claimed by the defendants.

Neighbouring landowners brought actions seeking damages and injunctive relief arising from a proposed wind turbine development, alleging negligence, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability based on anticipated noise, health impacts, and property value loss.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the claims on the basis that the project had not yet received regulatory approval and had not been constructed.

The court held that the claims were premature because the alleged harms were speculative and no actionable tort had yet occurred.

Pure economic loss arising from public concern about a proposed development was not compensable absent proof of tortious conduct.

The plaintiffs also failed to meet the threshold for a quia timet injunction because there was no high probability that the alleged harms would occur given the ongoing regulatory approval process.