Joseph King Lam Cheng

On a motion for leave to intervene in a pending constitutional challenge to the mental-illness exclusion from medical assistance in dying, the court granted leave to four public-interest interveners to participate in an urgent July motion seeking individual constitutional relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

Applying Rule 13.02 and the generous constitutional intervention framework, the court found each proposed intervener had a sufficient interest, distinct perspective, or recognized expertise capable of assisting the court.

The court held it was premature to determine intervention in the underlying application because the evidentiary record was incomplete and additional intervener requests might follow.

Strict limits were imposed: no new evidence, no new issues, no submissions on the individual applicant’s personal circumstances, and no costs.

The appellant challenged the vires of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, enacted by the Governor in Council under the Divorce Act, arguing that the GIC exceeded its authority because the Guidelines require the payer parent to bear a greater share of child-related costs than the recipient parent.

The Supreme Court held that the reasonableness standard under the Vavilov framework presumptively applies when reviewing the vires of subordinate legislation, and that the 'irrelevant, extraneous or completely unrelated' threshold from Katz Group is no longer good law.

Applying reasonableness review, the Court concluded that the Child Support Guidelines fall within the GIC's extremely broad statutory authority under s. 26.1 of the Divorce Act and are therefore intra vires.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, Roger Foley, failed to comply with a prior court order requiring payment of over $100,000 in costs to the defendants by August 30, 2024.

Despite being given an opportunity to respond, the plaintiff did not dispute non-payment and failed to provide sufficient evidence of impecuniosity.

The court dismissed the action against all remaining defendants, refusing a further extension of time or to convert unpaid costs to costs in the cause, emphasizing the importance of compliance with court orders.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following the striking out of the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff sought to have his former lawyer personally pay costs or for no costs to be awarded.

The court dismissed the request for personal costs against the lawyer, finding his conduct did not cause unnecessary costs and did not meet the high threshold for such an order.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants and imposed terms requiring the plaintiff to pay all outstanding costs orders (including prior ones) before being permitted to amend his claim, failing which the action would be dismissed.

The plaintiff, a person with a severe neurodegenerative condition, brought an action against multiple defendants alleging Charter violations, public law breaches, and private law duties related to his hospital care, home care funding, and the constitutionality of the medical assistance in dying (MAID) provisions of the Criminal Code.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court struck the statement of claim in its entirety, finding it failed to plead material facts, asserted causes of action unknown to law (such as a freestanding Charter right to health care), and constituted an abuse of process by collaterally attacking binding Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The action was dismissed against the federal and provincial Crown defendants without leave to amend.

Leave to amend was granted on strict terms for specific claims against the hospital, the local health integration network, and the independent living centre.

The applicants, including several current and former sex workers and a sex worker advocacy organization, brought a constitutional challenge against several provisions of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA), which criminalized the purchase of sexual services and related activities.

The applicants argued that the provisions violated sections 7, 2(b), 2(d), and 15 of the Charter by replicating the harms of the previous prostitution laws struck down in Bedford.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the provisions did not violate sections 7, 2(d), or 15 of the Charter.

While the Attorney General conceded that certain provisions violated section 2(b) freedom of expression, the court found these limits were demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a proportionate response to the pressing and substantial objective of reducing the demand for sex work and protecting vulnerable persons from exploitation.

Roger Foley, the plaintiff, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to disqualify Neil Searles as counsel for the Centre for Independent Living in Toronto (CILT).

Foley alleged conflict of interest, divided loyalty, and that Searles would be a necessary witness due to a 1996 article he authored on physician-assisted suicide.

The court, on its own initiative, considered dismissing the motion as frivolous or vexatious.

The court found the motion frivolous, noting that CILT opposed the removal of its counsel, that accepting a binding Supreme Court decision (Carter) is not a basis for disqualification, and that Foley's attempt to call Searles as a witness was unlikely to be permitted at trial.

The motion was dismissed.

The Attorney General moved in writing to amend the style of cause to substitute the Minister of Justice for the Supreme Court of Canada Registrar and to strike the underlying judicial review application.

The applicant sought to compel the Registrar to place his motion for reconsideration before a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada.

Applying binding authority, the Court held that a decision of the Registrar under Rule 73(4) is not reviewable by the Federal Court, as the Supreme Court is not a federal board or tribunal.

The motion was granted, the style of cause amended, and the application struck without leave to amend as bereft of any possibility of success.

The applicant, a former postsecondary student with disabilities, brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) and the Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP).

The applicant argued that the 'time in study' structure of the programs disproportionately burdened students with disabilities, who often take longer to complete their studies and thus accrue more debt.

The court found that while the legislation establishing the CSLP did not violate s. 15(1) of the Charter, the operation and administration of the program infringed the applicant's equality rights by failing to redress the additional debt she accrued due to her disabilities.

The court held that this infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court granted declaratory relief and ordered the return of monies paid by the applicant pursuant to the unconstitutional operation of the CSLP, but denied her request for Charter damages.

The appellants, Dairy Farmers of Ontario and Dairy Farmers of Canada, appealed a Master's order dismissing their motion to intervene as added parties in an application challenging the constitutionality of mandatory milk pasteurization laws.

The Master had dismissed the motion based on the Supreme Court's decision in Northwestern, finding that allowing the appellants to intervene would violate their impartiality as administrative bodies.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Master erred in applying Northwestern, as the underlying application was a constitutional challenge to a statute, not a judicial review of the appellants' own decisions.

The Court found the appellants met the criteria under Rule 13.01 and could make a useful contribution given their specialized expertise.

The appellants (Iran and related entities) appealed orders of the Superior Court of Justice recognizing and enforcing U.S. judgments obtained by victims of terrorism against Iran for its sponsorship of terrorist attacks.

The respondents sought to enforce these judgments in Ontario under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (JVTA) and amendments to the State Immunity Act (SIA).

Iran challenged the recognition and enforcement of the judgments on multiple grounds, including arguments regarding state immunity, the temporal scope of the JVTA, proof requirements, limitation periods, jurisdiction, public policy, diplomatic immunity, and the appropriateness of costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Iran's appeal, save for judgments arising from terrorist attacks that occurred prior to January 1, 1985, which could not be enforced under the JVTA.

The applicant, an almost 90-year-old man suffering from multiple severe, non-terminal medical conditions causing intolerable pain and suffering, sought judicial authorization for a physician-assisted death under the *Carter* constitutional exemption.

The court considered whether a medical condition must be terminal to qualify for such an exemption.

The Attorneys General took no position, while the respondent physicians supported the application.

The court granted the application, clarifying that a terminal illness is not a necessary precondition for a constitutional exemption for physician-assisted death, and that the death would not require coroner notification.

The applicant sought judicial authorization for physician-assisted death during the interim constitutional exemption regime established by Carter.

The court held that the evidentiary record established all five Carter criteria, including adult capacity, a grievous and irremediable medical condition, intolerable suffering, absence of acceptable alleviating treatment, and clear consent.

The court further held that a court-authorized physician-assisted death in these circumstances did not trigger the notification provisions in s. 10(1) of the Coroners Act.

The application and ancillary declaratory relief were granted.

The applicant, an 80-year-old man with advanced-stage aggressive lymphoma, brought a preliminary motion for confidentiality orders in his application for physician-assisted death under the Carter framework.

He sought orders allowing him, his family, and his physicians to proceed anonymously, a publication ban on identifying information, and a sealing order for the application record, proposing to file a redacted version for the public.

The media respondents opposed the anonymity of the physicians and requested a 'counsel's eyes only' review of the unredacted record.

The court granted the motion, finding that the applicant's proposal struck the appropriate balance between the open court principle and the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the applicant, as well as the public interest in not deterring physicians from participating in such applications.

In a CCAA restructuring proceeding, stakeholders sought disclosure of a settlement agreement between U.S. Steel, its Canadian subsidiary, and the Attorney General of Canada regarding undertakings under the Investment Canada Act.

The CCAA judge held that the agreement was entirely privileged under s. 36 of the ICA.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while s. 36(5) protects the Crown from being compelled to disclose the agreement, this protection does not extend to the private corporations.

The appeal was allowed, and the issue of whether common law settlement privilege barred disclosure was remitted to the CCAA judge.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing a motion to strike or stay an amended statement of claim.

The underlying action alleged that government representations induced the plaintiffs to invest in a telecommunications company and that subsequent government conduct destroyed the value of the investment, causing significant losses.

The moving party argued the claim was derivative in nature and that several pleaded causes of action disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the stringent test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(b) was not met because there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s decision.

Although the pleadings raised novel and important legal issues, they were not plainly and obviously doomed to fail and should proceed on a full evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to add the Attorney General of Canada as a party defendant to an action against the University of Windsor regarding employment insurance premium reductions.

The appellant sought to assert claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and negligence against the proposed defendant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant had not pleaded a tenable cause of action.

The appellant sought to examine a non-party expert witness residing in British Columbia prior to an application hearing, but the motion judge dismissed the request for an interprovincial summons.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that an order finally disposing of an issue between a party and a non-party is a final order.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the expert's evidence was not necessary for the due adjudication of the proceeding under the Interprovincial Summonses Act.

The plaintiff, a commercial cattle farmer, brought a proposed class action against a cattle feed manufacturer and the federal government for economic losses resulting from the closure of foreign borders due to a case of mad cow disease (BSE).

The defendants moved to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding it was not plain and obvious that the negligent manufacture claim against the feed manufacturer or the negligent regulation claim against the government would fail.

However, the court agreed it was plain and obvious that the manufacturer owed no duty to warn farmers who did not purchase its feed.

All three appeals were dismissed.