Joseph King Lam Cheng

The appellant challenged the vires of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, enacted by the Governor in Council under the Divorce Act, arguing that the GIC exceeded its authority because the Guidelines require the payer parent to bear a greater share of child-related costs than the recipient parent.

The Supreme Court held that the reasonableness standard under the Vavilov framework presumptively applies when reviewing the vires of subordinate legislation, and that the 'irrelevant, extraneous or completely unrelated' threshold from Katz Group is no longer good law.

Applying reasonableness review, the Court concluded that the Child Support Guidelines fall within the GIC's extremely broad statutory authority under s. 26.1 of the Divorce Act and are therefore intra vires.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, Roger Foley, failed to comply with a prior court order requiring payment of over $100,000 in costs to the defendants by August 30, 2024.

Despite being given an opportunity to respond, the plaintiff did not dispute non-payment and failed to provide sufficient evidence of impecuniosity.

The court dismissed the action against all remaining defendants, refusing a further extension of time or to convert unpaid costs to costs in the cause, emphasizing the importance of compliance with court orders.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following the striking out of the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff sought to have his former lawyer personally pay costs or for no costs to be awarded.

The court dismissed the request for personal costs against the lawyer, finding his conduct did not cause unnecessary costs and did not meet the high threshold for such an order.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants and imposed terms requiring the plaintiff to pay all outstanding costs orders (including prior ones) before being permitted to amend his claim, failing which the action would be dismissed.

Roger Foley, the plaintiff, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to disqualify Neil Searles as counsel for the Centre for Independent Living in Toronto (CILT).

Foley alleged conflict of interest, divided loyalty, and that Searles would be a necessary witness due to a 1996 article he authored on physician-assisted suicide.

The court, on its own initiative, considered dismissing the motion as frivolous or vexatious.

The court found the motion frivolous, noting that CILT opposed the removal of its counsel, that accepting a binding Supreme Court decision (Carter) is not a basis for disqualification, and that Foley's attempt to call Searles as a witness was unlikely to be permitted at trial.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellants (Iran and related entities) appealed orders of the Superior Court of Justice recognizing and enforcing U.S. judgments obtained by victims of terrorism against Iran for its sponsorship of terrorist attacks.

The respondents sought to enforce these judgments in Ontario under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (JVTA) and amendments to the State Immunity Act (SIA).

Iran challenged the recognition and enforcement of the judgments on multiple grounds, including arguments regarding state immunity, the temporal scope of the JVTA, proof requirements, limitation periods, jurisdiction, public policy, diplomatic immunity, and the appropriateness of costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Iran's appeal, save for judgments arising from terrorist attacks that occurred prior to January 1, 1985, which could not be enforced under the JVTA.

The applicant, an almost 90-year-old man suffering from multiple severe, non-terminal medical conditions causing intolerable pain and suffering, sought judicial authorization for a physician-assisted death under the *Carter* constitutional exemption.

The court considered whether a medical condition must be terminal to qualify for such an exemption.

The Attorneys General took no position, while the respondent physicians supported the application.

The court granted the application, clarifying that a terminal illness is not a necessary precondition for a constitutional exemption for physician-assisted death, and that the death would not require coroner notification.