Dale Lucy Yurkevicius Yurka

Following the court’s earlier decision declining to certify a proposed class proceeding, the parties addressed the issue of costs for the certification motion.

The plaintiffs had received funding from the Law Foundation of Ontario, which indemnified them against adverse cost awards.

The parties and the Law Foundation agreed that the costs of the certification motion would be payable to the defendant.

The court issued an endorsement reflecting the parties’ consent that costs be paid to the defendant in the amount of $50,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

This appeal considered whether actuarial surpluses recorded in federal public-sector superannuation accounts were assets in which plan members held legal or equitable interests.

The Court held the accounts were statutory accounting records tracking Consolidated Revenue Fund transactions, not segregated asset pools.

It rejected claims based on proprietary entitlement, fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and alleged expropriation.

The Court further held the statutory amendments authorized debiting surplus amounts and did not require compensation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision finding that provisions of the Expenditure Restraint Act limiting compensation increases for federal employees infringed the freedom of association guaranteed by s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the parties had already engaged in a meaningful process of collective bargaining before the Act was enacted.

The Court concluded that s. 2(d) guarantees a process, not a result, and the Act did not render the pursuit of collective goals effectively impossible.

Following dismissal of a motion seeking declarations and partial summary judgment based on res judicata, issue estoppel, and abuse of process in a civil action alleging misfeasance in public office, the court determined costs.

The moving party had sought numerous orders asserting that findings from a prior Federal Court decision conclusively established elements of liability against federal officials involved in an environmental review of a highway project.

The court held the motion was overly complex, repeatedly amended, and entirely unsuccessful.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and principles from appellate authorities, the court concluded that the defendants’ claimed costs were modest given the scale and duration of the proceedings.

Costs of $309,844.95 were awarded to the defendants.

The appellants, representative plaintiffs in two class actions, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Public Service Superannuation Act and the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act that reduced the supplementary death benefit payable to surviving spouses based on the age of the deceased plan member.

They argued this constituted age discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the reduction provisions did not violate s. 15(1).

The Court clarified that a formalistic 'mirror comparator group' approach is not required for a s. 15(1) analysis.

Instead, a substantive equality approach must be taken, considering the full context of the legislative scheme.

Viewed contextually, the benefit scheme met the actual needs of the claimants and did not perpetuate disadvantage or negative stereotypes.

The parties consented to an order fixing the costs of the appeal at $100,000, all inclusive, payable to the respondent Crown.

The appellants, representing federal public servants, RCMP, and Canadian Forces personnel, appealed the dismissal of their actions seeking the return of over $28 billion to their pension plans.

The Government had amortized and later withdrawn actuarial surpluses from the Superannuation Accounts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Superannuation Accounts were merely legislated ledgers containing no actual assets, as employee contributions were deposited into the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

The Court held that the Government did not owe a fiduciary duty to the plan members regarding the surplus, nor was it unjustly enriched.

Furthermore, the 2000 amendments to the governing statutes clearly authorized the Government to withdraw the actuarial surplus.

Following the release of the main appellate decisions, the successful parties made costs submissions.

Counsel subsequently agreed to the quantum of costs for all four appeals.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs on a partial indemnity scale to TeleZone Inc., G-Civil Inc., Fielding Chemical Technologies Inc., and Michiel McArthur in the agreed-upon amounts.

The moving party, the Attorney General of Canada, sought leave to appeal an order certifying a class action brought on behalf of Canadian cattle farmers for economic losses arising from the discovery of BSE in 2003.

The moving party argued the motions judge erred in finding an identifiable class, certifying negligence as a common issue, and concluding a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions on class-wide proof of loss and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's application of the certification criteria under the Class Proceedings Act.

Four appeals were heard consecutively to determine whether the Ontario Superior Court has jurisdiction over claims for damages against the federal Crown, or whether such claims must be brought in the Federal Court pursuant to section 18 of the Federal Courts Act.

The Crown argued that the claims constituted collateral attacks on federal administrative decisions and required prior judicial review in the Federal Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court retains concurrent jurisdiction over claims for damages in contract and tort against the Crown.

Section 18 of the Federal Courts Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Court only for prerogative remedies and declaratory relief, not for damages.

The plaintiffs' appeals were allowed and the Crown's appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, acting as a representative plaintiff in a class action, appealed a decision regarding the Crown's obligation to pay administered funds to a veteran's estate upon death.

The appellant argued that clear statutory language was required to divest such funds, which was absent in the lapsing provisions of the Pension Act and Veterans Treatment Regulations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lapsing provisions clearly intended to prioritize spouses and dependants over estates.

The Crown's cross-appeal was allowed, with the court finding that section 55 of the Veterans Treatment Regulations remained intra vires after 1986, as subordinate legislation is not required to mirror its enabling statute exactly.

The National Council of Veteran Associations in Canada brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning whether the Crown owed a fiduciary duty to pay interest on surplus statutory benefits to disabled veterans.

The court applied the Peel test for intervention and found that the proposed intervenor did not have a special contribution to make regarding the interpretation of the legislation or the scope of the fiduciary duty.

The court concluded that the public interest would be adequately represented by the Attorney General of Canada and dismissed the motion.

On a motion in a class proceeding appeal, the appellant Crown sought a stay of a partial summary judgment on liability, a stay of damages proceedings, transfer of a related appeal from Divisional Court, an extension of time to perfect, and other procedural relief.

The court held that the Crown's appeal from the dismissal of its own summary judgment motion was sufficiently intertwined with the respondents' summary judgment to warrant transfer under s. 6(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The stay request was refused on balance of convenience grounds because the damages proceeding should continue notwithstanding the pending appeal.

The court granted an extension of time to perfect the appeal, left any overlength factum request to be renewed later, kept the appeal on the expedited list, and reserved costs.