Peter Southey

The applicant, a civil liberties organization, brought a public interest challenge against the administrative segregation provisions (sections 31-37) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, arguing they violated sections 7, 11(h), and 12 of the Charter.

The court found that the applicant had standing to seek a declaration of invalidity under section 52(1) but not a personal remedy under section 24(1).

The court held that the legislative scheme violated section 7 of the Charter because it failed to provide an independent review of the institutional head's decision to maintain an inmate in administrative segregation, which breached the principles of fundamental justice (procedural fairness) and was not saved by section 1.

The court dismissed the claims under section 11(h) and section 12, finding that segregation is not a punishment and that the scheme, if properly applied with consideration for inmates' mental health, does not constitute cruel and unusual treatment.

The court declared the provisions unconstitutional to the extent they authorize segregation beyond five working days without independent review, but suspended the declaration for 12 months.

This appeal considered whether the Crown’s duty to consult Indigenous peoples can be fulfilled through the National Energy Board process for a pipeline modification.

The Court held that the Board’s approval decision was Crown conduct that engaged the duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process where statutory powers and process are sufficient.

On the facts, the Court found meaningful participation, assessment of potential impacts, and accommodation conditions imposed on the proponent.

The consultation obligation was met and the appeal was dismissed.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the National Energy Board authorization for offshore seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.

It held that the Board’s approval process triggered the Crown’s duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process to fulfill consultation obligations where that process is adequate.

On these facts, consultation was inadequate given the significance of Inuit treaty harvesting rights, the potential impacts of testing, limited participation opportunities, and insufficient accommodation.

The Crown sought an adjournment of a constitutional challenge brought by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) against administrative segregation provisions in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The Crown argued for deference to Parliament due to pending legislative amendments (Bill C-56) and a new administrative policy.

The CCLA opposed the adjournment.

The court refused the adjournment, finding that the CCLA's constitutional challenge addressed aspects of the existing Act that would remain unaltered by the proposed amendments, thus rendering the adjournment unnecessary and not a matter of disrespect to the legislative process.

The Court dismissed the appeal and held that Ontario’s permit-suspension enforcement mechanism is constitutionally inoperative to the extent it enforces a bankruptcy-provable toll debt discharged under s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, because it creates an operational conflict and frustrates Parliament’s financial rehabilitation purpose.

The respondents, Canadian citizens living in the United States for more than five years, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Canada Elections Act that prohibited them from voting in federal elections.

The application judge found the provisions violated section 3 of the Charter and were not saved under section 1.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the provisions infringed section 3, they were demonstrably justified under section 1.

The majority found the pressing and substantial objective was to preserve the social contract between citizens' obligation to obey the law and their right to elect lawmakers, and that the five-year limit was a minimally impairing and proportionate means of achieving this objective.

RCMP members challenged federal wage restraint measures, arguing that rollback of agreed wage increases without prior consultation violated freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The majority held the Expenditure Restraint Act did not substantially interfere with the existing consultation process and dismissed the appeal, while a dissent found unconstitutional unilateral interference.

The Attorney General of Canada moved for a stay pending appeal of a judgment declaring provisions of the Canada Elections Act that restricted non-resident citizens from voting unconstitutional.

The application judge had found the five-year non-residency limit violated section 3 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the risk of irreparable harm was balanced between the parties, and the balance of convenience favoured refusing the stay to allow newly enfranchised non-resident citizens to vote in upcoming federal by-elections.

The Court allowed the appeal and held that the provincial statutory bar in s. 44 of Newfoundland and Labrador’s workers’ compensation statute applied to bar the dependants’ maritime negligence action.

The Court concluded the provincial provision was constitutionally applicable and operative, rejecting both interjurisdictional immunity and federal paramountcy.

The Court held the provincial no-fault compensation regime and the federal maritime cause of action could operate together without conflict.

This appeal considered whether actuarial surpluses recorded in federal public-sector superannuation accounts were assets in which plan members held legal or equitable interests.

The Court held the accounts were statutory accounting records tracking Consolidated Revenue Fund transactions, not segregated asset pools.

It rejected claims based on proprietary entitlement, fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and alleged expropriation.

The Court further held the statutory amendments authorized debiting surplus amounts and did not require compensation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicants, Fercan Developments Inc. and GRVN Group Inc., challenged the constitutional validity of sections 16 and 19 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, which permit courts to order forfeiture of offence-related property.

The applicants raised three constitutional questions: whether the forfeiture provisions were ultra vires Parliament as relating to property and civil rights; whether they violated section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 by conferring jurisdiction on provincial courts; and whether they violated the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The court upheld the constitutional validity of all challenged provisions, finding that forfeiture is a valid exercise of Parliament's criminal law power, that the Ontario Court of Justice may constitutionally exercise forfeiture jurisdiction, and that procedural safeguards meet Bill of Rights requirements.

The applicant's motion to set aside a judgment quashing his application for judicial review was previously dismissed.

The court determined costs for that motion.

The Attorney General of Canada sought full indemnity costs, while the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $14,000 to the Attorney General and $7,000 to the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport.

A mining company sought indemnification from the federal government for environmental remediation costs associated with uranium tailings produced under Cold War-era fixed-price uranium supply contracts with a Crown corporation.

The plaintiff argued that the contracts contained an implied term guaranteeing profitability or requiring indemnification if later government regulation increased production costs, and alternatively alleged breach of a duty of good faith and unjust enrichment.

The government moved for summary judgment dismissing the action, while the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

The court held that the proposed implied term was inconsistent with the express fixed‑price structure of the contracts and failed the necessity test for implying contractual terms.

It further held that the doctrine of good faith could not be used to create new obligations inconsistent with the contract, and that the government's enactment of environmental legislation did not constitute contractual bad faith.

The applicant sought to set aside a motion judge's decision quashing his application for judicial review of a sports arbitration award.

The applicant argued that the arbitration panel exercised public powers and a statutory power of decision, making it subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the arbitration was a private contractual matter and did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision, meaning declaratory relief under the Judicial Review Procedure Act was unavailable.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging sexual harassment by the Canadian Forces.

The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal substantiated the complaint in part and awarded compensation, including $47,000 for legal costs under the statutory provision allowing compensation for 'any expenses incurred'.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the costs award.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Tribunal's decision should be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, its interpretation of the statute to include legal costs was unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the Tribunal does not have the authority to award legal costs.

The applicant, an elite wheelchair athlete, sought judicial review of an arbitral decision by the Court of Arbitration for Sport regarding an anti-doping violation.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, holding that the arbitrator derived authority from a private contract rather than a statutory power, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The court also found the application to be an abuse of process due to a parallel civil action seeking the same relief.

The appellant, a former resident of an Indian Residential School, brought a civil action alleging he was sexually assaulted by a supervisor decades earlier.

The trial judge found the appellant credible despite inconsistencies in his testimony and concluded the assaults occurred.

The Court of Appeal overturned the decision, holding that the trial judge failed to apply a standard of proof commensurate with the serious nature of the allegations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, definitively ruling that there is only one standard of proof in civil cases: proof on a balance of probabilities.

The Court rejected the notion of a shifting standard based on the gravity of the allegations and clarified that corroboration is not legally required in civil sexual assault claims.

Apotex sought a Notice of Compliance (NOC) to market a generic version of AstraZeneca's drug Losec 20, comparing its product to the 1989 version of the drug.

AstraZeneca had withdrawn Losec 20 from the market in 1996 but subsequently listed two new patents against it.

The Minister of Health issued the NOC to Apotex without requiring it to address the new patents, as Apotex's product did not use the new technology.

AstraZeneca applied for judicial review.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, a generic manufacturer is only required to address patents relevant to the innovator product actually copied.

Since Apotex did not claim bioequivalence to the technology in the after-issued patents, it was not subject to the 24-month statutory freeze for those patents.

The Attorney General of Canada moved for an order to clarify its status in an appeal where the appellants challenged the constitutionality of the State Immunity Act.

The Attorney General had intervened at trial to defend the Act's constitutionality.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 109(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, the Attorney General retains intervener status but acquires certain appellate rights limited to the constitutional issue.

The Court ordered the title of proceedings amended to show the Attorney General as an Intervener (Respondent) and permitted the filing of a supplementary exhibits book.

The appellant municipality sought to enforce Ontario's building code and development charge regime against a massive redevelopment project at a federally owned international airport operated under long-term leases.

The court held that the entire redevelopment, including terminals, runways, utilities, and air navigation facilities, fell within Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics and also formed part of a federal undertaking, such that provincial laws directly regulating building design, permits, and development charges were constitutionally inapplicable under interjurisdictional immunity.

The court further held that provincial land and property development legislation could not apply to the federal Crown's continuing property interest in leased airport lands.

Ancillary claims based on the ground lease, common law compensation, and refusal of fire services were rejected, with the municipality directed to pursue the statutory grant-in-lieu regime instead.