Peter Southey

The applicant, a civil liberties organization, brought a public interest challenge against the administrative segregation provisions (sections 31-37) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, arguing they violated sections 7, 11(h), and 12 of the Charter.

The court found that the applicant had standing to seek a declaration of invalidity under section 52(1) but not a personal remedy under section 24(1).

The court held that the legislative scheme violated section 7 of the Charter because it failed to provide an independent review of the institutional head's decision to maintain an inmate in administrative segregation, which breached the principles of fundamental justice (procedural fairness) and was not saved by section 1.

The court dismissed the claims under section 11(h) and section 12, finding that segregation is not a punishment and that the scheme, if properly applied with consideration for inmates' mental health, does not constitute cruel and unusual treatment.

The court declared the provisions unconstitutional to the extent they authorize segregation beyond five working days without independent review, but suspended the declaration for 12 months.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the National Energy Board authorization for offshore seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.

It held that the Board’s approval process triggered the Crown’s duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process to fulfill consultation obligations where that process is adequate.

On these facts, consultation was inadequate given the significance of Inuit treaty harvesting rights, the potential impacts of testing, limited participation opportunities, and insufficient accommodation.

This appeal considered whether the Crown’s duty to consult Indigenous peoples can be fulfilled through the National Energy Board process for a pipeline modification.

The Court held that the Board’s approval decision was Crown conduct that engaged the duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process where statutory powers and process are sufficient.

On the facts, the Court found meaningful participation, assessment of potential impacts, and accommodation conditions imposed on the proponent.

The consultation obligation was met and the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown sought an adjournment of a constitutional challenge brought by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) against administrative segregation provisions in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The Crown argued for deference to Parliament due to pending legislative amendments (Bill C-56) and a new administrative policy.

The CCLA opposed the adjournment.

The court refused the adjournment, finding that the CCLA's constitutional challenge addressed aspects of the existing Act that would remain unaltered by the proposed amendments, thus rendering the adjournment unnecessary and not a matter of disrespect to the legislative process.

The Court dismissed the appeal and held that Ontario’s permit-suspension enforcement mechanism is constitutionally inoperative to the extent it enforces a bankruptcy-provable toll debt discharged under s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, because it creates an operational conflict and frustrates Parliament’s financial rehabilitation purpose.

RCMP members challenged federal wage restraint measures, arguing that rollback of agreed wage increases without prior consultation violated freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The majority held the Expenditure Restraint Act did not substantially interfere with the existing consultation process and dismissed the appeal, while a dissent found unconstitutional unilateral interference.

The Court allowed the appeal and held that the provincial statutory bar in s. 44 of Newfoundland and Labrador’s workers’ compensation statute applied to bar the dependants’ maritime negligence action.

The Court concluded the provincial provision was constitutionally applicable and operative, rejecting both interjurisdictional immunity and federal paramountcy.

The Court held the provincial no-fault compensation regime and the federal maritime cause of action could operate together without conflict.

This appeal considered whether actuarial surpluses recorded in federal public-sector superannuation accounts were assets in which plan members held legal or equitable interests.

The Court held the accounts were statutory accounting records tracking Consolidated Revenue Fund transactions, not segregated asset pools.

It rejected claims based on proprietary entitlement, fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and alleged expropriation.

The Court further held the statutory amendments authorized debiting surplus amounts and did not require compensation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicants, Fercan Developments Inc. and GRVN Group Inc., challenged the constitutional validity of sections 16 and 19 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, which permit courts to order forfeiture of offence-related property.

The applicants raised three constitutional questions: whether the forfeiture provisions were ultra vires Parliament as relating to property and civil rights; whether they violated section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 by conferring jurisdiction on provincial courts; and whether they violated the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The court upheld the constitutional validity of all challenged provisions, finding that forfeiture is a valid exercise of Parliament's criminal law power, that the Ontario Court of Justice may constitutionally exercise forfeiture jurisdiction, and that procedural safeguards meet Bill of Rights requirements.

A mining company sought indemnification from the federal government for environmental remediation costs associated with uranium tailings produced under Cold War-era fixed-price uranium supply contracts with a Crown corporation.

The plaintiff argued that the contracts contained an implied term guaranteeing profitability or requiring indemnification if later government regulation increased production costs, and alternatively alleged breach of a duty of good faith and unjust enrichment.

The government moved for summary judgment dismissing the action, while the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

The court held that the proposed implied term was inconsistent with the express fixed‑price structure of the contracts and failed the necessity test for implying contractual terms.

It further held that the doctrine of good faith could not be used to create new obligations inconsistent with the contract, and that the government's enactment of environmental legislation did not constitute contractual bad faith.