Jonathan Erik Laxer

The appellant, a bilingual Francophone, was convicted of sexual assault following a trial conducted in English.

The justice of the peace before whom he first appeared failed to advise him of his right under s. 530(3) of the Criminal Code to be tried in the official language of his choice.

The appellant raised this breach for the first time on appeal.

The majority held that a breach of s. 530(3) constitutes an error of law under s. 686(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, giving rise to a presumption that the accused's fundamental right to be tried in the official language of his choice was violated.

The Crown bore the burden of rebutting this presumption under the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv), and failed to do so on the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial in French ordered.

Karakatsanis and Martin JJ. dissented, concluding the breach was a miscarriage of justice under s. 686(1)(a)(iii) requiring the appellant to demonstrate actual deprivation of knowledge of his language rights, a burden he did not meet.

The Court considered whether Ontario could assume jurisdiction over third party professional-negligence claims brought against Quebec law firms in a national class action context.

The majority held that a real and substantial connection existed under Van Breda’s fourth presumptive connecting factor because the Wind-Down Agreements were made in Ontario and were sufficiently connected to the negligence claims.

The Court further held that Quebec was not clearly a more appropriate forum and declined to apply forum non conveniens.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, with dissenting reasons concluding Ontario lacked jurisdiction over the Quebec firms and would have allowed the appeal.

The Court dismissed the appeal and held that Ontario’s permit-suspension enforcement mechanism is constitutionally inoperative to the extent it enforces a bankruptcy-provable toll debt discharged under s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, because it creates an operational conflict and frustrates Parliament’s financial rehabilitation purpose.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to deliver a jury notice after the close of pleadings and after the action was set down for trial, and to compel the defendants to comply with undertakings given at discovery.

The underlying action involves claims of unpaid wages, false imprisonment, and unsafe working conditions.

The court granted leave to deliver the jury notice, finding that the delay was due to inadvertence and there was no prejudice to the defendants.

The court also ordered the defendants to comply with the outstanding undertakings, finding they had not made 'best efforts' to do so.

No costs were awarded due to the plaintiff's delay in bringing the motion.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the auditors’ appeal and confirmed that an expert witness must be able and willing to provide fair, objective, and non-partisan assistance to the court as a threshold admissibility requirement, with remaining concerns about independence generally addressed at the gatekeeping weighing stage.

The moving party sought an order declaring that its construction lien was validly sheltering under other perfected liens pursuant to s. 36(4) of the Construction Lien Act, and also sought enforcement of an alleged settlement.

The responding landowner argued that insufficient evidence established that the work performed by the sheltering lien claimants related to the “same improvement.” The court held that the moving party’s evidence, including an affidavit stating that it supervised contractors working on the same renovation and construction project, established the required nexus between the work.

The lien was therefore found to be validly sheltered.

However, the court declined to enforce the alleged settlement due to insufficient documentary evidence of agreed settlement terms.

Following a prior decision striking the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim in its entirety without leave to amend, several successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the governing principles for costs awards, including the requirement that costs be fair and reasonable and the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although the defendants sought higher partial indemnity amounts, the court exercised discretion to reduce the awards.

The court ordered the self-represented plaintiff to pay fixed costs to multiple defendants reflecting their success on the motions while ensuring the amounts were reasonable in the circumstances.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiff’s Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim alleging fraud, negligence, defamation, breach of contract, and numerous other causes of action arising from a physician assessment and subsequent complaints to the professional regulator and review board.

The court held that the pleading failed to set out material facts supporting the alleged causes of action and instead consisted largely of bald allegations and inflammatory assertions.

Claims relying on materials from professional discipline proceedings were barred by s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, and the regulatory bodies and their officials were protected by statutory immunity absent properly pleaded bad faith.

The court also found the claim constituted an improper collateral attack on the outcomes of the regulatory complaint and review process.

The entire claim was struck without leave to amend.

The plaintiffs moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike portions of a counterclaim alleging defamation arising from a draft statement of claim and covering letter sent by their former solicitor to the defendant’s employer before litigation commenced, arguing the communications were protected by absolute privilege.

The court held that the pleadings did not support a finding that the communications were made to achieve the objects of the litigation and therefore absolute privilege did not apply at the pleadings stage.

However, the court accepted that defending the counterclaim would likely require disclosure of solicitor‑client communications and could prejudice the plaintiffs in the main action.

The court therefore refused to strike the counterclaim but ordered it severed from the main action and directed that it proceed, if pursued, as a separate claim.

After dismissing a municipal defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a procurement dispute, the court addressed the successful plaintiff’s claim for costs.

The plaintiff sought approximately $50,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendant argued that $20,000–$25,000 would be reasonable.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court of Appeal’s guidance that costs must be fair and reasonable to the unsuccessful party, the court reduced several components of the claim.

Reductions were made for the junior counsel’s billing rate, duplication between counsel, and unnecessary expert evidence.

The court fixed costs at $30,000 all-inclusive payable by the defendant.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a procurement dispute arising from a waste haulage contract tender.

The plaintiff carrier alleged its bid was wrongly rejected as non‑compliant despite literal compliance with the tender terms and sought damages for lost profits.

The court held the motion record was inadequate and contained unresolved evidentiary conflicts regarding the interpretation of tender documents, the purpose of amendments to the request for quotation, and the municipality’s handling of clarification opportunities.

The court found that the summary judgment process would not provide a fair and just determination of the dispute.

A full trial was required in the interests of justice.