Freya Kristjanson

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Vaughan Council to suspend his pay for 90 days based on a report by the Integrity Commissioner.

The Commissioner found the applicant had improperly interfered with municipal tendering processes and attempted to obstruct her investigation.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Commissioner refused to disclose the names and statements of 32 witnesses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, applying the Baker factors to find that the Commissioner properly balanced the applicant's right to know the case against him with the need to protect cooperating staff from reprisals.

The court also rejected arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and the Commissioner's jurisdiction.

The respondents brought a motion to stay the release of the Commission's decision on the merits of their case, pending the final determination of a civil action commenced by investors against the Commission.

The respondents argued that the civil action created a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Commission might attempt to deflect blame onto the respondents to protect its own interests.

The Commission dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents failed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias given the strong presumption of impartiality and the institutional safeguards in place.

The Commission further held that the interests of justice and the public interest in the timely and efficient enforcement of securities laws favoured the release of the merits decision.

The plaintiff, who was previously investigated for stock fraud and entered into a settlement agreement with the Ontario Securities Commission, sued 67 defendants for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts.

Ten motions were brought by 64 defendants to strike the pleadings and dismiss the actions.

The court dismissed the action against the Attorney General of Ontario because the malicious prosecution claim could not succeed, as the criminal proceedings were stayed pursuant to a settlement and thus not terminated in the plaintiff's favour.

The actions against the remaining moving defendants were dismissed as an abuse of process because they attempted to re-litigate facts already settled or judicially determined in prior proceedings.

Following certification of a pension-related class proceeding, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of over $210,000 for the certification motion.

The defendants conceded entitlement to costs but argued the claimed amount was excessive and opposed joint and several liability.

Applying the principles governing certification motion costs, including those articulated in Pearson v. Inco Ltd., the court determined that the plaintiff’s claimed costs were somewhat excessive and unsupported in part.

The court fixed fair and reasonable partial indemnity costs at $175,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The defendants were not held jointly and severally liable; instead, four groups of defendants were ordered to each pay an equal share.

Following dismissal of a civil action, the successful defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis totaling over $48,000.

The self-represented plaintiff argued that his limited financial means and significant debt should justify declining any costs award.

The court acknowledged that a party’s ability to pay may be considered but emphasized that denying costs to a successful party is reserved for rare circumstances.

Given the repetitive nature of the litigation and the need to discourage continued re-litigation of previously rejected arguments, the court awarded reduced costs.

The court exercised discretion to grant approximately half the requested fees plus full disbursements and applicable HST.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a civil action alleging misfeasance in public office and related claims arising from a temporary cease trade order issued by the Ontario Securities Commission.

The plaintiff alleged the order had expired and that subsequent prosecutions and regulatory proceedings were therefore unlawful.

The court held that the validity of the cease trade order had already been determined in multiple prior regulatory and criminal proceedings, including a guilty plea and unsuccessful appeals.

Applying issue estoppel and the doctrine of abuse of process, the court concluded that the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate issues already conclusively determined.

The action was dismissed with prejudice.

A costs decision following an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act concerning alleged conflicts of interest by a municipal official.

The successful party sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $394,000.

The court considered whether the unsuccessful applicant should be relieved from a costs award on the basis that the litigation was brought in the public interest, applying the factors from St. James’ Preservation Society v. Toronto (City).

The court concluded the litigation was not genuine public interest litigation, noting partisan political motivations and the limited practical significance of the application.

Considering divided success on several substantive issues and the need to balance deterrence of frivolous litigation against discouraging citizens from seeking public office, the court reduced the claimed amount and awarded $170,000 in costs.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence imposed after guilty pleas to two offences under the Securities Act for trading securities while subject to a cease trade order and trading without registration.

He argued that his guilty pleas were not unequivocal, voluntary, or informed and therefore constituted a miscarriage of justice, and alternatively that the custodial sentence imposed was cruel and unusual or unfit.

The court held that the plea inquiry conducted by the trial judge demonstrated that the pleas were unequivocal, voluntary, and informed, and that the appellant’s mistaken personal belief that a conditional discharge might be available did not invalidate the pleas.

The court further held that the 90‑day intermittent custodial sentence and probation order were entitled to deference and were not demonstrably unfit given the need for deterrence and denunciation in securities offences.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action on behalf of members of the Eastern Canada Car Carriers Pension Plan against the plan's trustees, administrative agent, and actuaries.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants negligently or in breach of trust granted early retirement benefits when the plan had ongoing solvency issues, leading to a reduction in benefits for plan members.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed causes of action in negligence and breach of trust, the class was identifiable, there were common issues, a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, and the representative plaintiff was suitable.

The motion for certification was granted.

A municipal conflict of interest application sought removal of a mayor from office under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The respondent mayor brought a motion to convert the proceeding from an application to an action requiring a full trial with viva voce evidence.

The court held that the Act does not require all such proceedings to proceed by trial and that applications may be determined on affidavit evidence, subject to the court’s discretion to order oral evidence or a trial of issues where necessary.

At this preliminary stage, the evidentiary record was incomplete and it was premature to determine whether material facts were in dispute.

The motion to convert the proceeding to an action was therefore dismissed without prejudice.

The applicant, who was unsuccessful in her bid to become Dean of the University of Windsor Law School, brought requests for the production of unredacted search committee documents.

The University opposed production, claiming privilege under the Wigmore test.

Given the proximity to the hearing and the need for evidence to assess the privilege claim, the Tribunal deferred the determination of the privilege issue until after the applicant's case-in-chief.

The Tribunal also granted the individual respondent's request to seal certain documents pending the resolution of the privilege issue.

The respondent University brought a Request for an Order During Proceedings to strike portions of the applicant's revised narrative, clarify a previous phasing order, and establish a revised schedule.

The Tribunal declined to amend its previous order bifurcating the hearing into two phases, finding that evidence regarding the applicant's involvement in equity-seeking initiatives was relevant to the first phase concerning the decanal search.

The Tribunal also dismissed the request to strike contextual allegations as premature, noting that arguments about delay and proportionality would be addressed in phase two.

The respondents were granted leave to file revised Responses and a timeline for document disclosure was established.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application under s. 16 of the Public Officers Act, which alleged that the Human Rights Tribunal was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no foundation in the record to conclude that the Tribunal as a whole was disqualified by interest from acting.

The Court also clarified that previous correspondence and scheduling comments did not direct the appellant to institute the application or halt his human rights complaint.

The Ministry of Correctional Services brought an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal order requiring the production of settlement documentation.

The respondent employee sought the documents to prove the Ministry failed to implement previously ordered remedies for workplace racial discrimination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the adjudicator correctly ordered production because the documents were relevant and necessary to address a compelling interest of justice, falling within an exception to settlement privilege.

The Applicant requested a review of a previous Tribunal decision dismissing her application, and suggested clarifications to the decision.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for review, finding that the Applicant was merely attempting to reargue her case and had not established any material errors of fact or law.

The Tribunal also declined to issue supplementary reasons to clarify the decision, noting that it was functus officio, though it did correct minor clerical errors pursuant to its Rules of Practice and Procedure.

The applicant, a retired member of the OMERS pension plan, challenged an amendment to the plan that changed the method used to calculate inflation indexing.

The applicant argued that the amendment reduced her accrued pension benefits, contrary to section 14(1) of the Pension Benefits Act, because the new method produced a lower increase in the year it was implemented.

The Financial Services Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the new method was actuarially equivalent to the old method and would produce the same level of inflation protection over time.

The Tribunal held that the amendment did not reduce the aggregate amount or the commuted value of the applicant's accrued pension.

At a pre-hearing conference, the Financial Services Tribunal considered applications for party status and a motion by the unrepresented applicant to convert the proceeding from an oral to a written hearing.

The Tribunal granted limited party status to two organizations but dismissed the other applications.

The Tribunal also dismissed the applicant's motion for a written hearing, finding that the presence of contested expert evidence constituted good reason to maintain an oral hearing to allow for cross-examination, despite the applicant's concerns about being unrepresented.

The defendants, eight major financial institutions, successfully defended an appeal of a decision denying certification of a class action regarding mortgage contracts.

The defendants sought their costs of the appeal.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded, asserting the proceeding was a test case and involved a matter of public interest under section 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Divisional Court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding the case was not a test case, did not raise a novel point of law, and was not a matter of public interest, but rather involved individual commercial mortgage contracts.

The court awarded the defendants modified partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,000 per defendant.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motions to certify eight separate class proceedings against various financial institutions.

The claims alleged that the respondents incorrectly interpreted mortgage provisions regarding partial prepayment rights and early discharge penalties.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the pleadings failed to disclose a cause of action as they relied on implied terms not supported by the express language of the mortgages.

The court also agreed that the proposed classes were overly broad, individual issues overwhelmed any common issues, and a class proceeding would be unmanageable and not the preferable procedure.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the revocation of his registration as a real estate salesperson.

The Tribunal found that the appellant failed to disclose his status as a registered salesperson and his interest as a beneficial purchaser in multiple transactions.

Furthermore, he acted for vendors in transactions where he was the undisclosed beneficial purchaser, violating the standards of honesty and integrity required under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's conclusion was reasonable and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $3,000 to the respondent.