66 total
Judicial review dismissed; Premier's personal cellphone logs relating to government business are under institutional control.
The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of two Information and Privacy Commissioner decisions ordering the Cabinet Office to obtain and review entries from the Premier's personal cellphone call logs that related to government business.
The IPC had found that these specific call logs were under the control of the Cabinet Office pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's application of the National Defence control test was reasonable and that the decisions appropriately balanced the public's right of access to government information with the protection of personal privacy.
Application for judicial review of Coroner's decision on inquest scope dismissed as reasonable.
The Ministry of the Solicitor General sought judicial review of a Presiding Coroner's interlocutory decision regarding the scope of an upcoming inquest into seven deaths at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre.
The Coroner had included issues of correctional programming and staff absenteeism in the scope, and admitted expert evidence on programming.
The Divisional Court held that the challenge to the evidentiary ruling was premature.
On the scope issues, the Court found the Coroner's decision reasonable, as there was sufficient evidence to warrant considering whether programming and staffing were contributing factors to the deaths.
The application for judicial review was dismissed.
Recusal motion dismissed; judge's former firm's representation of insurer's employee six years prior did not create bias.
The self-represented applicant brought a motion requesting that the triage judge recuse herself from his application for judicial review due to potential bias.
The applicant argued that the judge was formerly a partner at a law firm that had represented an employee of the respondent insurer in a divorce proceeding over six years prior.
The court dismissed the motion, finding that a reasonable person would not apprehend bias given the passage of time, the judge's lack of personal involvement with the individual, and the individual's peripheral role in the current proceedings.
Sealing order granted on consent to protect confidential coroner's inquest brief and victim impact statements.
The moving party, the presiding coroner at an inquest into several deaths in custody, brought a motion on consent for a sealing order over the coroner's inquest brief and confidential correspondence containing draft victim impact statements.
The motion was brought in the context of a judicial review application by the Ministry of the Solicitor General.
The Divisional Court granted the sealing order, applying the test from Sherman Estate.
The court found that the benefits of protecting the confidentiality of the investigative materials and the families' expectations outweighed the deleterious effects of sealing, preserving the integrity of the coroner's process.
Judicial review of horse racing penalties dismissed; TCO2 testing rule upheld as intra vires.
The applicants, a horse owner and trainer, sought judicial review of a Horse Racing Appeal Panel (HRAP) decision upholding penalties for their horse testing above the permitted threshold for total carbon dioxide (TCO2).
They argued they were denied procedural fairness regarding disclosure of testing laboratory records, that the HRAP decision was unreasonable, and that the rule establishing the TCO2 threshold was ultra vires.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness given the HRAP's efforts to mitigate late disclosure, concluding the HRAP's reliance on the testing evidence was reasonable, and holding that the rule was within the Registrar's statutory mandate to uphold the integrity of horse racing.
The Supreme Court held that the Premier's mandate letters to ministers are protected Cabinet records under FIPPA.
The appellant sought to withhold 23 mandate letters delivered by the Premier of Ontario to each minister upon forming government in 2018, claiming exemption under s. 12(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as Cabinet records that would reveal the substance of Cabinet deliberations.
The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure, finding the letters were non-exempt outcomes of the Premier's deliberative process rather than records revealing the substance of Cabinet deliberations.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the IPC failed to give meaningful weight to the constitutional conventions of Cabinet confidentiality, the fluid and dynamic nature of the Cabinet decision-making process, and the central role of the Premier within that process.
The Court found the mandate letters were revealing of the substance of Cabinet deliberations, both on their face and when compared against subsequent government action, and that the IPC's narrow interpretation of s. 12(1) was unreasonable.
Extension of time for judicial review granted despite 43-month delay due to reasonable explanations and minimal prejudice.
The applicant sought an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of a decision denying it a certificate of eligibility for a digital media tax credit.
The delay was 43 months.
The court found that the applicant had a reasonable explanation for most of the delay, having initially pursued an appeal through the tax system in good faith and later experiencing confusion due to changing court procedures during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Finding minimal prejudice to the respondents, the court granted the extension of time.
Appeal dismissed; IPC's order to disclose Premier's mandate letters to Cabinet ministers upheld as reasonable.
The CBC made a freedom of information request for mandate letters sent by the Premier of Ontario to Cabinet ministers.
The Cabinet Office refused disclosure, claiming the letters were exempt under the Cabinet records exemption in s. 12(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure, finding the letters did not reveal the substance of Cabinet deliberations.
The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Attorney General's appeal, holding that the Commissioner's interpretation of s. 12(1) and its application to the mandate letters were reasonable.
Judicial review dismissed; Agricorp reasonably interpreted program rules to exclude out-of-province cattle weight gain.
The applicant cattle producer sought judicial review of a decision by Agricorp, which accepted a recommendation from the Business Risk Management Review Committee that weight gain for cattle occurring outside Ontario was ineligible for benefits under the Risk Management Program.
The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that Agricorp's interpretation of the governing Order in Council and Guidelines was reasonable, as the provisions consistently emphasized 'production in Ontario'.
The court also found no procedural unfairness, noting the applicant had a full opportunity to make submissions and the Committee's reliance on the definition of 'Farmer' did not constitute a new issue.
The Court of Appeal affirmed that a limitation period may be suspended under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act while related proceedings that could impact the viability of the civil claim are ongoing.
The appellants, the Attorney General of Canada and the Ontario Provincial Police, appealed a motion judge's decision that the respondents' claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, and civil conspiracy were not statute-barred.
The core issue was the application of the "appropriate means" element of the discoverability test under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that it was premature for the respondents to commence their actions until related civil forfeiture proceedings and an appeal of a costs order (which addressed Crown misconduct) were concluded.
The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the limitation period had not expired.
Refusals motion dismissed; questions probing decision-makers' deliberative processes irrelevant to pleaded natural justice claim.
The applicant brought a refusals motion in the context of an application for judicial review of decisions denying it financial support under an agricultural risk management program.
The applicant sought to compel the decision-makers to answer questions about who authored the decisions and who was involved in the deliberative process, arguing this was necessary to advance its claim of a denial of natural justice.
The court dismissed the motion, finding the questions were irrelevant to the pleaded natural justice ground and amounted to an unwarranted fishing expedition into deliberative privilege.
Application for abstract declaration on limitation period suspension dismissed for lack of a live dispute.
The Attorney General for Ontario brought an application seeking a declaration that the six-month temporary suspension of limitation periods due to the COVID-19 pandemic should not be counted in limitation period calculations going forward.
The application was brought against 'Persons Unknown' with no live dispute or adversarial parties.
The court dismissed the application, holding that it is constitutionally inappropriate for the court to render an abstract legal opinion to endorse the executive branch's view of its regulatory efforts without a real dispute between interested parties.
Judicial review dismissed; IPC reasonably ordered disclosure of Premier's mandate letters as they did not reveal Cabinet deliberations.
The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision ordering the disclosure of the Premier's mandate letters to Cabinet ministers.
The Cabinet Office opposed disclosure, claiming the letters were exempt under the Cabinet records exemption in s. 12(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the IPC's decision.
The court found it was reasonable for the IPC to conclude that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence that disclosing the mandate letters would reveal the substance of Cabinet deliberations.
Minister's revocation of wind farm approval quashed for unreasonableness and procedural unfairness.
Nation Rise sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to revoke its Renewable Energy Approval for a wind farm project.
The Minister had revoked the approval based on concerns about harm to bat maternity colonies, an issue not raised by the parties before the Environmental Review Tribunal or on appeal.
The Divisional Court quashed the Minister's decision, finding it unreasonable because the Minister lacked statutory authority to raise new issues on appeal, applied the wrong legal test by using a precautionary approach, and misapprehended the evidence.
The Court also found the Minister breached procedural fairness by failing to give notice of the new issue and denying the parties an opportunity to make submissions on remedy.
The ERT's approval of the project was reinstated.
CanWEA granted leave to intervene; Landowners denied leave; motion to strike fresh evidence adjourned.
The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister of the Environment revoking their authority for a wind farm project.
Three procedural motions were brought: CanWEA sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court, the Landowners sought leave to intervene as parties, and the respondent moved to strike fresh evidence filed by the applicants.
The court granted CanWEA leave to intervene, denied the Landowners leave to intervene without prejudice to their right to bring a separate application, and adjourned the motion to strike evidence to the panel hearing the underlying application.
Costs awarded to administrative decision-maker that successfully defended its decision in an adversarial role.
The respondent Registrar successfully resisted an application for judicial review regarding the cannabis retail lottery and sought costs.
The applicants argued that costs should not be awarded to a decision-maker that successfully resists judicial review, relying on an alleged overriding principle.
The Divisional Court rejected this argument, noting that in Ontario, costs are awarded to administrative tribunals acting in an adversarial role to defend their decisions.
The court awarded the Registrar costs of the stay motion and the application, fixing the quantum at $40,000.
Application for judicial review dismissed; revocation of highway sign permits upheld as reasonable.
The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) and the City of Toronto revoking permits for a sign on its property adjacent to Highway 401.
The MTO revoked its permit after determining the sign was a third-party billboard, which is prohibited within 400 metres of a controlled-access highway, rather than a permitted first-party location sign.
Toronto subsequently revoked its municipal permit because a valid MTO permit is a prerequisite.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the MTO's characterization of the sign as a third-party advertisement was reasonable, as the advertised law firm did not genuinely conduct business at the premises.
The court also found the applicant was not denied procedural fairness.
Summary judgment denied; limitation period tolled while related forfeiture and costs proceedings were ongoing.
The defendants brought motions for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiffs' claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, and civil conspiracy were statute-barred.
The plaintiffs had successfully defended against both criminal and civil forfeiture applications brought by the state.
The court dismissed the summary judgment motions, finding that while the plaintiffs knew they had suffered damage when the criminal forfeiture application was dismissed, it was not legally appropriate for them to commence an action until the related civil forfeiture application and the appeal of the costs decision were finally resolved.
Therefore, the claims were brought within the two-year limitation period.
Police have no common law power to arrest a law-abiding person to prevent others from breaching the peace.
The appellant was arrested by Ontario Provincial Police officers while walking to a counter-protest flag rally, having committed no offence and presenting no threat of violence.
The police relied on a purported common law power to arrest someone acting lawfully in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace by others.
Applying the ancillary powers doctrine, the Court held that no such common law power exists: the power is not reasonably necessary because statutory arrest powers already address situations where individuals resist or obstruct officers taking less intrusive measures, and effectiveness of a police action alone cannot justify an arrest if less intrusive means were available.
The Court restored the trial judge's award of damages for battery, wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, and found no new trial was warranted on the issue of excessive force because the arrest itself was unlawful.
Judicial review of cannabis lottery disqualifications dismissed; Registrar's enforcement of letter of credit deadline was reasonable.
The applicants sought judicial review of the Registrar's decision to disqualify them from the cannabis retail store lottery process for failing to provide original copies of a standby letter of credit by the specified deadline.
The applicants argued the disqualification was unreasonable, the lottery rules were ultra vires, and they were denied procedural fairness.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Registrar's decision was reasonable given the applicants' failure to provide functional contact information and their failure to meet the clear deadline.
The Court also held the rules requiring a letter of credit and permitting its drawdown were intra vires, and there was no denial of procedural fairness.