Ananthan Sinnadurai

The appellant, self-represented, appealed an order of a justice of the Ontario Court of Justice to the Divisional Court.

The court issued a Rule 2.1 notice and invited submissions as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant requested a transfer to the Superior Court rather than addressing jurisdiction.

The respondent agreed the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction but opposed the transfer, arguing the appellant should recommence proceedings in the proper forum.

The court dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, finding the Divisional Court was clearly without jurisdiction, and declined to transfer the proceedings.

A reference to the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning whether legal online gaming and sports betting would remain lawful under the Criminal Code if users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada.

The majority (Tulloch C.J.O., Gillese, Hourigan and Dawe JJ.A.) answered affirmatively, finding that section 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code permits Ontario to conduct and manage a lottery scheme with international pooled liquidity, provided Ontario continues to conduct and manage the Ontario-based aspects of the scheme in accordance with provincial law.

The majority rejected the application of the real and substantial connection test and distinguished the Earth Future decisions.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, arguing that the Proposed Model would contravene the Criminal Code because it would require Ontario to conduct and manage aspects of the lottery scheme outside Ontario's territorial boundaries, contrary to the plain meaning of "in that province" in section 207(1)(a).

The appellant sought a stay pending appeal of an application judge's decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the modified version of its GotSkill? game was not a game of mixed chance and skill under the Criminal Code.

The appellant also sought injunctive orders preventing enforcement of a bulletin issued by the respondent requiring liquor licensees to cease operating the game.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and the appellant would suffer irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the public interest in enforcing gambling and alcohol regulations designed to protect minors and vulnerable individuals.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario's determination that the modified version of GotSkill, an electronic terminal game, remains a game of mixed chance and skill under section 197(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant had modified the game following the 2019 Court of Appeal decision in Play for Fun Studios Inc. v. Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario), which found the original version to be a game of mixed chance and skill.

The court upheld the Registrar's decision, finding that despite modifications allowing players to view the next five potential wins, the game continues to involve a systematic resort to chance by inducing players to wager money in hopes of uncovering valuable prizes in future rounds.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard motions for leave to adduce evidence and for a confidentiality order in the context of a reference regarding the legality of an online provincial lottery scheme permitting international play.

The court granted leave to the Attorney General of British Columbia and the Canadian Lottery Coalition Members to file their proposed evidence, finding it potentially helpful for the reference panel.

The court dismissed the Canadian Gaming Association's motion for a confidentiality order, ruling that alleged reputational harm was a private interest insufficient to override court openness, especially as the information was largely public.

The Mohawk Council of Kahnawà:ke sought a declaration that Ontario's iGaming scheme, enabled by specific provincial legislative provisions, was inoperative.

The Council argued that these provisions impermissibly allowed private operators to "conduct and manage" lottery schemes, which, under the Criminal Code, is reserved for provincial governments, thus violating the division of powers and triggering the doctrine of paramountcy.

The respondents, iGaming Ontario and the Attorney General of Ontario, challenged the Council's standing and argued that Ontario, through iGO, properly conducts and manages the scheme.

The court granted the Council public interest standing but ultimately dismissed the application, finding that Ontario, through iGO, maintains sufficient control to be considered the "operating mind" of the iGaming scheme, thereby complying with the Criminal Code and avoiding paramountcy.

The plaintiff, a resident of Australia involved in family law and other actions against judges, brought a motion seeking recusal of Justice Corthorn and any judge acting under the direction of the defendants or represented by the Attorney General of Ontario.

Alternatively, he sought a stay of his own action or a separate action to determine the lawfulness of the Attorney General representing judges.

The motion was dismissed without a hearing as moot, given Justice Corthorn had already dismissed the underlying action against the Chief Justice and Associate Chief Justice under Rule 2.1.

The recusal motion itself was also found to be frivolous and vexatious, as prior rulings against a litigant do not constitute bias, and the premise that judges acting under the Chief Justice's direction are biased is impossible.

Adan McIntosh, a self-represented plaintiff, sued three judges (Justice Shore, Associate Chief Justice McWatt, and Chief Justice Morawetz) for defamation and other claims, alleging their conduct denied him access to justice in his family litigation.

The defendants' counsel sought dismissal of the action under Rule 2.1.01, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the claims against Associate Chief Justice McWatt and Chief Justice Morawetz, finding them to lack legal basis.

It also dismissed specific relief sought against Justice Shore (finding of want of jurisdiction and forced leave of absence).

However, the court refused to dismiss the defamation claim against Justice Shore, despite pleading deficiencies, stating the claim was not patently frivolous, vexatious, or abusive.

The plaintiff, Adan McIntosh, commenced an action against Justice Sutherland, alleging bad faith and lack of jurisdiction in a previous family law matter where McIntosh was not a party.

The defendant, Justice Sutherland, sought dismissal of the action under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that McIntosh's claims were based on dissatisfaction with a prior decision in which he lacked standing, and that his reliance on s. 142 of the Courts of Justice Act was misguided as it does not apply to judicial conduct.

The court dismissed the action, finding it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and waived the requirement for further submissions.

The Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed the "Student Choice Initiative" framework, which mandated an opt-out system for non-essential student ancillary fees at Ontario colleges and universities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the framework was unlawful.

For colleges, the framework conflicted with section 7 of the Ontario Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Act, 2002, which protects student governing bodies' normal activities.

For universities, the framework interfered with their statutory self-governance and institutional autonomy, a fundamental principle implicit in their establishing Acts.

The court clarified that the Minister's action was an exercise of executive authority, not prerogative power, and must yield to conflicting legislation.

The Crown applied for a restraining order under s. 9 of the Reopening Ontario Act to prevent the respondents from contravening COVID-19 public health restrictions at three churches.

The court found that the Crown established clear and repeated breaches of capacity limits, masking, and physical distancing requirements.

The respondents failed to establish any exceptional circumstances, such as a pre-existing Charter right or evidence that the unlawful conduct would cease.

The application was allowed and the restraining order was issued.

The defendant Province moved to assign three related actions to case management under Rule 77, arguing that the self-represented plaintiff's conduct had delayed the proceedings and thwarted efforts to schedule summary judgment and strike motions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues were not complex and the tension between the defendant seeking summary resolution and the plaintiff seeking discovery was standard fare for Civil Practice Court.

The court noted that case management resources should be conserved for cases that truly require it.

Three police officers sued the Attorney General of Ontario for misfeasance in public office, alleging Crown prosecutors mishandled stay applications brought by two accused persons who claimed the officers assaulted them during an arrest.

The majority held that prosecutorial immunity bars misfeasance claims by police officers against Crown prosecutors, as allowing such claims would fundamentally undermine prosecutorial independence and objectivity and imperil the accused's right to a fair trial.

The majority found that the mutually independent relationship between police and prosecutors is incompatible with a regime of legal accountability running from prosecutor to police.

In dissent, one justice would have dismissed the appeal, finding four policy reasons why prosecutorial immunity should not apply to deliberate and unlawful prosecutorial conduct causing serious harm to police officers facing findings of brutality, and that the high liability threshold for misfeasance adequately guards prosecutorial independence.

The Crown applied for a restraining order under s. 9 of the Reopening Ontario Act to prevent the respondents from operating their restaurant in defiance of COVID-19 lockdown regulations.

The respondents had openly defied the Stage 1 Regulation by offering indoor and patio dining despite being in a lockdown zone.

The court found a clear breach of the regulation and no exceptional circumstances to refuse the statutory injunction.

The restraining order was granted, and costs were fixed at $15,000.

The applicant sought an urgent hearing for a restraining order under s. 9 of the Reopening Ontario Act to prevent the respondents from operating a restaurant in contravention of COVID-19 regulations.

The respondents requested more time to retain counsel and opposed the urgency.

The court scheduled an ex parte hearing for later in the week, allowing the respondents the option to attend or to challenge any resulting order at a later date.

The applicant sought a case conference to schedule an urgent application for relief under the Reopening Ontario (A Flexible Response to Covid-19) Act.

The court, acting as a delegate of the Regional Senior Justice, convened a case conference before Justice Jessica Kimmel and issued procedural directions for the urgent hearing, including electronic filing and virtual attendance.

At a case conference, the court scheduled the plaintiff's motion to convert a proposed class action into an individual action for May 10, 2021.

The court also explicitly endorsed the plaintiff's right to attend any motion or case conference, whether virtually or in person, at the request of plaintiff's counsel.

The plaintiffs appealed an order of a Master upholding numerous refusals made during Rule 39.03 examinations of non-party witnesses.

The examinations related to interlocutory motions concerning the late disclosure of a tolling agreement between the defendants.

The plaintiffs alleged 14 errors of fact and law, primarily challenging the Master's findings on litigation privilege, common interest privilege, and the scope of permissible questions for Rule 39.03 witnesses.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or errors of law, and affirming that the documents and communications surrounding the tolling agreement were protected by privilege.

The Registrar of Alcohol, Gaming and Racing appealed from a Superior Court declaration that the GotSkill gaming system is not a game as defined under s. 197(1) of the Criminal Code.

The application judge had concluded that GotSkill was not a game of mixed chance and skill because a sufficiently skilled player could ultimately beat the machine.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that GotSkill is a game of mixed chance and skill.

The court clarified that under the Criminal Code, any game containing both elements of chance and skill—regardless of which predominates—falls within the definition of a game.

The presence of a systematic resort to chance when the game is played multiple times, combined with the skill element required in the game task, was sufficient to classify GotSkill as a game of mixed chance and skill.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 16, 2018.

However, no counsel appeared for the appellant at the hearing, and counsel for the respondent advised that a Notice of Abandonment was to be filed.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned.