Brent McPherson

The plaintiffs sought up to $50 million for alleged negligent misrepresentations made by Ministry officials during the regulatory review of a proposed wind energy project requiring a Renewable Energy Approval.

The court held that the Ministry representatives owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs given their sustained, proponent-facing interactions and knowledge of the economic consequences tied to the feed-in-tariff deadline.

However, the court found that none of the four alleged misrepresentations was actionable: some statements were attributable only to government press releases or regulatory materials, while others were factually and legally correct, including statements about the six-month service standard, merits-based review, and the absence of any Indigenous veto.

The court also rejected preliminary defences based on pleading sufficiency, issue estoppel, abuse of process, and a prior release.

The action was dismissed.

The defendant, His Majesty The King in Right of the Province of Ontario, brought a motion to dismiss a proposed class action for delay.

The plaintiff, Kiwayne Jones, had initiated the action over six years prior, seeking damages and declarations related to the citizenship status of former Crown wards.

Despite agreed timetables and multiple case conferences, the plaintiff failed to advance the certification motion or convert the action to an individual claim, and ultimately confirmed he was no longer interested in pursuing the matter.

The court, applying section 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, dismissed the action for delay, noting that the dismissal would not prejudice putative class members as the limitation period remained suspended under section 28 of the Act, and only the plaintiff's personal claim was dismissed.

No costs were sought or awarded.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Pierce J. dated May 26, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered that there be no order as to costs.

Following the release of its decision allowing the Crown's appeal and setting aside a class action certification order, the Divisional Court entertained post-decision submissions from the respondent based on two new Court of Appeal decisions regarding state liability in negligence.

The court concluded that the new decisions applied settled law and did not alter its previous reasoning.

The court amended its previous disposition to clarify that while the appeal is allowed and the certification order is set aside, the underlying action is not dismissed, leaving that issue for the parties to address below.

The applicant, a retail appliance store, sought a declaration that it was permitted to remain open for in-person shopping during the COVID-19 grey lockdown stage in Toronto and Peel.

The applicant argued it qualified as an essential business under O. Reg 82/20, either as a 'hardware store' or as part of the construction supply chain.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the legislature intended the term 'hardware store' to be given its conventional, everyday meaning, which does not include a store exclusively selling home appliances.

The court rejected the applicant's attempt to stretch the plain language of the regulation.

The applicant, a home appliance retailer, sought an interim injunction to allow its showrooms to remain open despite being ordered to close under Covid-19 public health regulations.

The applicant argued it qualified as an essential 'hardware store' and would suffer irreparable financial harm if closed during the busy December retail season.

The court dismissed the request for interim relief, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and potential irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.

The court held that the public interest in enforcing public health measures to prevent the spread of Covid-19 outweighed the applicant's private economic interests at this preliminary stage.

At a case conference, the court scheduled the plaintiff's motion to convert a proposed class action into an individual action for May 10, 2021.

The court also explicitly endorsed the plaintiff's right to attend any motion or case conference, whether virtually or in person, at the request of plaintiff's counsel.

The appellants, Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation and Ontario, appealed an arbitration decision that found they breached the Gaming Revenue Sharing and Financial Agreement (GRSFA) by ceasing to share certain non-gaming and complimentary revenues with the respondent, Ontario First Nations (2008) Limited Partnership.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for commercial arbitrations remains reasonableness post-Vavilov.

The court found the arbitration panel's contractual interpretation was reasonable, firmly rooted in the agreement's text and surrounding circumstances, and that the honour of the Crown doctrine was correctly applied to the government-to-government agreement.

The moving parties, a group of affiliated companies, sought leave to appeal a judgment setting aside an ex parte CCAA Initial Order.

The respondents, creditors of a Singapore subsidiary, successfully argued before the application judge that the CCAA court lacked jurisdiction over the subsidiary.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal held he had jurisdiction to hear the leave motion but refused leave, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the real debtors were Singapore companies with little connection to Canada and that the evidence did not support the initial ex parte findings of insolvency and intertwined finances.

The applicants sought initial protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act after becoming insolvent with liabilities exceeding $5 million and being unable to meet obligations as they fell due.

The court considered jurisdiction, the necessity of a stay of proceedings, oversight during the stay, pre-filing payments, the appointment of a monitor, and the granting of priority charges including a DIP charge, administrative charge, and directors’ and officers’ charge.

The applicants intended to pursue a sale and investment solicitation process to refinance or sell the business and maximize value for stakeholders.

The court found the applicants met the statutory requirements for CCAA protection and that the proposed restructuring steps, financing, and charges were reasonable and necessary.

An initial stay of proceedings and related relief were granted.

The applicant sought a temporary cease trade order against an insider bid made by the respondent, alleging the respondent failed to obtain a formal valuation as required by MI 61-101.

The applicant argued the respondent possessed undisclosed material information, specifically confidential power purchase agreement pricing and wind speed data.

The Commission found the applicant failed to provide prima facie evidence that the information was material, noting the applicant's own Directors' Circular stated there was no undisclosed material information.

The Commission dismissed the request for a temporary cease trade order and granted the respondent's cross-motion to dismiss the application.

The appellants, Italian manufacturers of custom equipment, appealed a decision dismissing their motion to set aside service and stay the respondents' Ontario action.

The appellants argued that the contract was formed in September 2004 and included an exclusive jurisdiction clause for Italy, and that parallel proceedings were already underway in Italy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the contract was formed in March 2004 without a jurisdiction clause, that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter based on a real and substantial connection, and that Italy was not clearly a more appropriate forum.

The appeal was dismissed.

The complainant alleged that the union breached its duty of fair representation under section 69 of the Labour Relations Act by failing to notify him of a meeting where his discharge grievance was dropped, and by failing to present medical evidence of his mental illness.

The union admitted the breach.

The Board ordered the grievance to proceed to arbitration.

The Board declined the complainant's request for sole carriage of the grievance, finding that the union's potential liability for damages did not warrant removing its normal role, but ordered that the complainant have a say in selecting the arbitrator and that joint counsel be retained.