5 total
Retail appliance store does not qualify as an essential 'hardware store' under COVID-19 lockdown regulations.
The applicant, a retail appliance store, sought a declaration that it was permitted to remain open for in-person shopping during the COVID-19 grey lockdown stage in Toronto and Peel.
The applicant argued it qualified as an essential business under O. Reg 82/20, either as a 'hardware store' or as part of the construction supply chain.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the legislature intended the term 'hardware store' to be given its conventional, everyday meaning, which does not include a store exclusively selling home appliances.
The court rejected the applicant's attempt to stretch the plain language of the regulation.
Interim injunction to allow appliance retailer to open during Covid-19 shutdown denied due to public interest.
The applicant, a home appliance retailer, sought an interim injunction to allow its showrooms to remain open despite being ordered to close under Covid-19 public health regulations.
The applicant argued it qualified as an essential 'hardware store' and would suffer irreparable financial harm if closed during the busy December retail season.
The court dismissed the request for interim relief, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and potential irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.
The court held that the public interest in enforcing public health measures to prevent the spread of Covid-19 outweighed the applicant's private economic interests at this preliminary stage.
Guilty plea set aside after second Justice of the Peace exceeded jurisdiction by accepting it mid-trial.
The applicant municipality brought an unopposed application for certiorari and mandamus to set aside a guilty plea accepted by a Justice of the Peace.
The respondent had originally pleaded not guilty to a careless driving charge, and a trial commenced before a different Justice of the Peace.
The court held that the second Justice of the Peace exceeded her jurisdiction by accepting a guilty plea during a trial over which she was not presiding, contrary to sections 30 and 46 of the Provincial Offences Act.
The application was granted, the guilty plea was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the original Justice of the Peace to continue the trial.
The court lacks ancillary jurisdiction to return a seized dog pending an appeal of a destruction order.
The applicant appealed an order under the Dog Owner's Liability Act requiring that his dog be destroyed.
A stay of the destruction order was granted pending the appeal.
The applicant then applied for the dog to be returned to his custody pending the hearing of the appeal, subject to conditions ensuring the dog remained on his property.
The court dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant such an order.
While the court recognized it had ancillary jurisdiction to stay the destruction order itself (to prevent frustration of the appeal), it held that returning the dog to the applicant's custody was not necessary to prevent frustration of the appeal and therefore fell outside the court's jurisdiction.
Judicial review of housing assistance denial dismissed; applicant's rooming house was not a self-contained unit.
The applicant sought judicial review of a decision upholding his ineligibility for an enhanced allowance under Peel's Investment and Affordable Housing program.
The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the eligibility requirement of living in a self-contained unit was ambiguous.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness as the applicant was given reasons and opportunities to respond.
The court also held that the determination that the applicant's rooming house accommodation was not a self-contained unit was reasonable.
