Alexei Zaitsev

The appellant appealed his summary conviction and custodial sentence for domestic assault, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and claiming he was guaranteed a non-custodial result.

The court rejected the appellant's evidence, finding that his trial counsel acted competently, obtained written instructions, and dealt patiently with a difficult client.

The court noted the appellant's lack of insight and accountability, and dismissed the appeal, confirming the sentence.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after the trial judge found multiple Charter breaches, including a pat down search by a male officer that involved touching under the respondent’s breast area.

The Superior Court found that the search was brief, professional, and not unreasonable in the circumstances, and that there was no breach of sections 7, 8, or 12 of the Charter.

The stay was set aside and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The accused, Nadim Khan, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

Khan conceded impairment and BAC over 80, but argued involuntary intoxication, claiming he was drugged and possibly sexually assaulted.

The court rejected Khan's testimony as unbelievable and found no air of reality to the involuntary intoxication defence.

The court also briefly addressed and dismissed the defence of automatism due to lack of evidence.

Khan was found guilty on both counts.

Yaqub Jama was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol.

He argued that the Crown failed to prove he was the driver and that his Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)) were violated, seeking exclusion of evidence.

The court found the Crown proved identity and impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, and that no Charter rights were infringed.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found Mr. Jama guilty of both charges, staying the impaired driving charge under the Kienapple principle.

This is a summary conviction appeal from convictions for over-80 impaired driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's finding of identity, arguing his post-arrest utterances were ambiguous and that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The appellant also challenged the dismissal of his s. 8 Charter application, asserting a lack of reasonable and probable grounds for detention and arrest.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's common-sense interpretation of the utterances as an admission of driving and upholding the finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on the totality of evidence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing or refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge due to a reasonable doubt about whether the delay between the initial breath demand and the arrival of the ASD was reasonably necessary, rendering the demand unlawful.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge erred by focusing on the initial demand rather than a second demand made when the ASD arrived, and by applying the immediacy requirement too rigidly.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the initial demand occasioned the detention and was the correct focus of the analysis, and that the trial judge made no error in concluding the Crown failed to prove the delay was reasonably necessary.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

She was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of her running vehicle after an argument with her boyfriend.

The trial judge found she failed to rebut the presumption of operation and that there was a realistic risk she would set the vehicle in motion.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge engaged in speculative reasoning and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were reasonable, grounded in the evidence, and that the reasons for judgment were adequate.

The accused, Manish Kumar, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on civilian and police observations of erratic driving, physical indicia of impairment, and consciousness of guilt.

However, the court excluded the breath test results for the "80 and over" charge under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the accused, whose first language was Punjabi, understood and could meaningfully exercise his right to counsel, constituting a serious Charter violation.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty of the "80 and over" charge.

The defendant was tried for impaired driving and driving with a blood-alcohol concentration at or above the legal limit ("80-plus").

The defence argued post-driving alcohol consumption, claiming the defendant drank a significant amount of whisky after a collision and before police arrived, which would explain his impairment and breath readings.

The court found the defendant's testimony regarding post-collision drinking and the presence of alcohol in the vehicle to be incredible and unreliable.

The court also determined that the defendant would have had a reasonable expectation of providing a breath sample after the collision.

Based on the evidence, including police observations and the collision itself, the court found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both impaired driving and the "80-plus" offence.

Mr. Osbourne was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance.

He was found asleep in the driver's seat of his car with the engine running, while intoxicated.

The court first determined if the presumption of operation under s. 320.35 of the Criminal Code was rebutted, finding that Mr. Osbourne did not intend to set the vehicle in motion.

However, the court then assessed whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Osbourne was in "care or control" of the vehicle, applying the three-part test from R. v. Boudreault.

Despite Mr. Osbourne's good intentions, the court found that his conduct (being highly intoxicated, in a running vehicle, on a busy street, without a reliable plan or phone) created a realistic risk of danger to the public, either by inadvertently setting the car in motion or changing his mind to drive while impaired.

He was found guilty.

The accused was charged with obstruct justice, intimidation of a witness, criminal harassment, and mischief based on allegations made by his mother.

The investigating officer grossly overstated and falsified the mother's allegations in the bail synopsis, leading to the accused being held in custody for three nights before being released on bail.

The accused brought an application to stay the proceedings for abuse of process.

The court found that the police conduct in falsifying the allegations and overholding the accused constituted an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter and an abuse of process in the residual category.

The court also found that the interviewing officer violated the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel by disparaging his lawyer.

The proceedings were stayed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood, arising from a traffic stop on July 13, 2018 in downtown Toronto.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the police failed to obtain breath samples "as soon as practicable" as required by section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, resulting in a 35-minute unexplained delay at the police station.

The court also found a breach of the accused's right to counsel without delay.

However, the court exercised its discretion under section 24(2) of the Charter and admitted the breath test evidence, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court rejected the defence argument that the Crown was required to prove all prerequisites under section 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code and found the breath test results admissible and reliable based on common law principles.

The court convicted the accused on both counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle after police observed him driving erratically on December 29, 2017.

At trial, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the drug recognition evaluation (DRE) and seizure of his urine sample, arguing that a 25-minute delay caused by a second call to duty counsel violated his section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found no breach of section 8, holding that the "as soon as practicable" requirement in section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code is not a statutory pre-condition for lawfulness, and alternatively, that the evaluation was conducted as soon as practicable.

The court also found that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was found guilty of operating a vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and dangerous driving following a traffic stop.

Officer Slessor observed the defendant's vehicle weaving between lanes at high speed on Keele Street and subsequently detected signs of impairment during the roadside interaction.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

However, the court found that while the defendant's driving conduct was careless, it did not rise to the level of moral blameworthiness required for a dangerous driving conviction.

The defendant was acquitted of dangerous driving but convicted of impaired driving.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration (over 80 mg/100 ml) under the former s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issues were whether the presumption of identity under the repealed s. 258(1)(c) survived the legislative amendments that came into force on December 18, 2018, and whether the revised presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1) of the new legislation was satisfied.

The court found that the presumption of identity remains intact for transitional cases charged under the old statutory regime but tried after the new legislation came into effect.

The court also rejected arguments that the qualified technician's reliance on the analyst's certificate regarding the alcohol standard was improper.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration under the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant challenged the legality of the roadside screening procedure, the pat-down search conducted prior to the screening, the delay in administering the screening, and the delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court conducted a blended voir-dire and ruled on the Charter application.

The court found no violations of the defendant's Charter rights and dismissed the application for exclusion of the evidential breath testing results.

The applicant appealed an order under the Dog Owner's Liability Act requiring that his dog be destroyed.

A stay of the destruction order was granted pending the appeal.

The applicant then applied for the dog to be returned to his custody pending the hearing of the appeal, subject to conditions ensuring the dog remained on his property.

The court dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant such an order.

While the court recognized it had ancillary jurisdiction to stay the destruction order itself (to prevent frustration of the appeal), it held that returning the dog to the applicant's custody was not necessary to prevent frustration of the appeal and therefore fell outside the court's jurisdiction.

The defendant was charged with "Over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood) following a police investigation.

The matter proceeded as a blended Charter application and trial.

The defendant sought exclusion of evidence based on alleged breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant raised multiple Charter arguments concerning the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, the timing of the demand, the location of the test, and the provision of rights to counsel.

The court dismissed all Charter arguments and found the defendant guilty of the charge.

The accused was charged with common assault on July 1, 2014, following an altercation with a co-worker.

The trial proceeded over multiple dates spanning from January 2016 to June 2016, with the decision rendered in September 2016.

The Crown established that the accused assaulted her former co-worker outside their place of employment on June 30, 2014.

However, the accused brought an application alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from charge to decision was 25 months and 8 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness based on exceptional circumstances.

Although the case was transitional under Jordan, the court determined that the degree of complacency in the prosecution could not be justified, even allowing for inherent time requirements and limited institutional delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.