Ysolt Brar

The offender was sentenced for sexual assault, assault, and multiple breaches of court orders against his intimate partner.

The court emphasized denunciation and specific deterrence given the offender's relentless pursuit of the victim and flagrant disregard for court orders, including calling the victim 43 times from jail during the trial.

The court imposed a global sentence of 3.5 years, reduced by 6 months due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions including extensive triple-bunking and lockdowns, resulting in a net sentence of 3 years minus enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

Following a lengthy criminal trial arising from a tumultuous intimate relationship, the court was left to decide one assault count and one sexual assault count, along with conceded breaches of release conditions.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard and the W.(D.) framework, the court accepted the complainant's core narrative despite confusion on peripheral details and repeated attempts to end the prosecution.

The court found those recantation efforts reflected minimization, self-blame, and the dynamics of the relationship rather than fabrication.

The accused's denials were rejected as neither credible nor reliable.

Findings of guilt were entered on the assault, sexual assault, and three fail to comply counts.

Following a jury trial, the accused was found guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm and aggravated assault, but acquitted of firearm possession charges.

The sentencing judge was required to make factual findings under s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code for sentencing and an impending constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence.

Applying the Ferguson principles, the court found the accused credible and accepted that he snatched the gun from the victim in self-defence, was pursued by the victim, and fired at the ground out of a legitimate fear for his life.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a firearm while prohibited, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arising from the discovery of a loaded handgun, large quantities of cocaine and other drugs, ammunition, cash, and trafficking paraphernalia in a vehicle.

The court treated the offender as a mid-level trafficker and held that the drug, firearm, and prohibition-breach sentences should be consecutive, subject to the totality principle.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, while giving some weight to remorse, rehabilitation, family support, and difficult pre-sentence custody conditions.

Enhanced credit was granted for presentence custody, including lockdowns and triple bunking, resulting in a total sentence of approximately seven years and just under ten months, together with lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA, forfeiture, and counselling recommendation.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving his minor daughter.

The Crown sought a 5-year sentence, while the defence sought 3-4 years.

The court considered aggravating factors such as abuse of trust, the victim's young age, the duration and frequency of the assaults, and the degree of physical interference.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea and the collateral consequences of serving time during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court also noted the accused's own history of abuse, which explained his actions but did not serve as a mitigating factor for sentencing.

A sentence of 4 years and 6 months in penitentiary was imposed, along with a 15-year Section 161 prohibition order, a DNA order, and lifetime SOIRA registration.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and other offences, brought an application for directions on whether he must apply under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code to adduce text messages and letters from the complainant at trial.

The court analyzed whether the communications constituted 'records' under s. 278.1 in which the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court ruled that threatening messages and an email recanting the allegations did not require a hearing, while messages of a sexual nature and love letters did constitute records requiring a s. 278.93 hearing.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual touching, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 28 months and 23 days.

The court deducted 58 days of defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 26 months and 21 days, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the applicant failed to establish that the delay was markedly longer than reasonably required, particularly given the scheduling challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and failing to provide a breath sample following a rear-end collision.

The court acquitted the accused of impaired driving, finding the civilian witness unreliable and the indicia of impairment too frail to support a conviction.

However, the court convicted the accused of failing to provide a breath sample, concluding that despite the accused's limited English proficiency, he understood the breath demand and intentionally evaded providing a suitable sample by blocking the mouthpiece with his tongue.

The accused was tried on a 12-count indictment alleging historical sexual offences against a child complainant over several years.

The court reviewed the complainant’s evidence, multiple inconsistencies, the defence evidence concerning lack of opportunity, and the theory of fabrication arising from an alleged relationship between the accused and the complainant’s mother.

Applying the criminal burden of proof and the W(D.) framework, the court found the complainant’s evidence compelling in some respects but not sufficiently reliable to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Canadian Tire allegation was expressly rejected, and broader concerns about opportunity and reliability left the court with a reasonable doubt on all counts.

The accused was acquitted on every count.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a complainant at a youth residence.

The trial focused on the issue of consent.

The complainant testified that she had consumed alcohol, lost consciousness, and woke to find the accused performing sexual acts on her.

The accused testified that the complainant had consented to the sexual activity through her words and actions.

The court found that the complainant's lack of memory was more consistent with a blackout state than complete unconsciousness, and that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant was unconscious and unable to consent at the time of the alleged sexual activity.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown sought a review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the respondent on bail following serious charges including failing to comply with a recognizance, discharge of a firearm, uttering a threat to damage property, and break and enter of a residence.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law and principle by failing to adequately analyze the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, and by allowing the COVID-19 pandemic to disproportionately influence the decision without a robust supervision plan.

The court concluded that the proposed supervision plan was inadequate given the seriousness of the allegations and the respondent's criminal record.

The respondent's bail was vacated, and she was ordered detained.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle after police observed him driving erratically on December 29, 2017.

At trial, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the drug recognition evaluation (DRE) and seizure of his urine sample, arguing that a 25-minute delay caused by a second call to duty counsel violated his section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found no breach of section 8, holding that the "as soon as practicable" requirement in section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code is not a statutory pre-condition for lawfulness, and alternatively, that the evaluation was conducted as soon as practicable.

The court also found that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was found guilty of operating a vehicle while impaired by a drug.