Iona M. Jaffe

The accused, Huynh Nguyen, was charged with dangerous operation of a vehicle causing bodily harm after her minivan rolled forward in a school parking lot, pinning a four-year-old boy.

The court first addressed the admissibility of Ms. Nguyen's police statement, ruling it voluntary and admissible despite defence arguments regarding her right to remain silent and lack of a Vietnamese interpreter during questioning.

The court then considered the charge of dangerous operation, focusing on the mens rea requirement.

Ultimately, the court found that while the incident was a tragic accident, the Crown failed to prove the mens rea of the offence, concluding that Ms. Nguyen's actions amounted to a momentary lapse in attention or carelessness, not criminal conduct.

Ms. Nguyen was found not guilty.

The accused was stopped at a static RIDE checkpoint and given a lawful demand to provide a breath sample into a roadside screening device.

Over approximately seven minutes, the accused repeatedly refused the demand despite multiple warnings about criminal consequences, a demonstration of the device, and a final chance warning.

Following arrest, the accused made three requests to provide a sample.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of refusing to comply with the breath demand, holding that the accused's post-arrest requests did not raise a reasonable doubt about the finality of the refusals, as the offence was complete when the accused knocked the device from the officer's hand.

The accused was convicted of arson causing damage to property and mischief endangering life following a trial.

The Crown sought a sentence of 2 to 2½ years imprisonment, while the defence sought 90 days on an intermittent basis.

The court imposed 18 months concurrent imprisonment on each charge, followed by three years probation, with conditions including no contact with the victims, a 100-meter exclusion zone, weapons prohibition, DNA order, and mandatory counselling for anger management.

The court emphasized that arson convictions warrant significant sentences regardless of mitigating circumstances, and that conditional sentences are generally inappropriate in arson cases.

The accused was convicted of attempted murder after stabbing his co-worker multiple times in the head and neck on January 6, 2016, leaving the victim permanently and severely disabled.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused suffered from a mental disorder rendering him incapable of knowing his actions were wrong.

The court found the accused probably suffered from mental illness and depression but retained the ability to know right from wrong.

The accused was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment, with credit for pre-trial custody reducing the remaining sentence to 12 years and 9 months.

The court balanced the brutal nature of the offence and devastating injuries to the victim against the accused's mental illness as a mitigating factor.

A boxing coach was charged with assault causing bodily harm after sparring with his 13-year-old student, who sustained a concussion.

The court examined whether the coach's conduct exceeded the student's implied consent to contact within the sport of boxing.

Despite evidence that the coach struck the student multiple times and the student suffered a concussion, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct constituted criminal assault.

The court noted the lack of expert evidence regarding boxing rules, inconsistencies in witness testimony, and the possibility that the student's injury resulted from contact with another sparring partner.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device on May 15, 2015.

The information was sworn on May 20, 2015.

By June 27, 2018, when the section 11(b) Charter motion was heard, the matter had been scheduled for trial five times over approximately three and one-half years.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and found that while the net delay of 16.5 months fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases, the case had taken markedly longer than a straightforward roadside refuse case ought to take.

The court found that the accused had demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the delay had caused prejudice.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The accused was charged with one count of mischief relating to tire slashing on December 26, 2016, one count of arson relating to a car fire on February 7, 2017, and two counts of mischief relating to an attempted car ignition on March 7, 2017.

The Crown relied on video evidence from a gas station and home security camera, along with similar fact evidence to establish the accused's guilt.

The court found the accused guilty of the March 7 mischief charges and the February 7 arson charge using similar fact evidence, but acquitted on the tire slashing charge due to insufficient similarities.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and over the legal limit, resisting arrest, and assault with intent to resist arrest, following her arrest at a banquet hall parking lot.

The Crown alleged the accused was found behind the wheel of her vehicle after leaving a Christmas party.

The accused applied for Charter relief alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter applications but acquitted the accused on the impaired and over 80 charges, finding she had rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control and that no realistic risk of danger existed.

The accused was convicted of resisting arrest but acquitted of assault with intent to resist arrest.

The accused was charged with being in care and control of a vehicle while her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence sought to exclude breath test evidence based on alleged Charter violations: improper wording of the caution under s. 10(b), delay in providing rights to counsel, failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice, and unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8.

The court found one Charter breach regarding the caution but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court also found the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, allowing reliance on the statutory presumption.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol in his system and impaired operation of a motor vehicle following a motor vehicle collision at 2 a.m. on July 4, 2016.

The accused sought Charter relief on two grounds: first, that police lacked sufficient grounds for detention in violation of s. 9 Charter rights, and second, that police breached s. 10(a) and (b) Charter rights by delaying the provision of rights to counsel.

The court found that the initial arrest was lawful based on objective grounds including the smell of alcohol, red eyes, and the context of a severe collision.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) rights due to a five-minute delay in providing rights to counsel after a second officer arrived on scene, but found the breath demand was lawful and the evidence admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

Two defendants were jointly charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a street race on May 11, 2015, that resulted in a collision with an innocent third party.

The Crown alleged the defendants engaged in street racing along Mavis Road in Mississauga, which caused one defendant's vehicle to lose control and collide with the victim's Honda Civic, causing serious injuries.

The trial focused on whether both defendants were driving dangerously and whether the second defendant's manner of driving significantly contributed to the victim's bodily harm despite not being physically involved in the collision.

The court found the first defendant guilty as charged and the second defendant guilty of dangerous driving simpliciter, finding insufficient evidence that the second defendant's driving significantly contributed to the victim's injuries.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

At trial, the accused sought to exclude breath test results on the basis of alleged violations of Charter rights under sections 9 and 10(b).

The accused argued that placement in the rear of the police cruiser for the approved screening device test violated the right to be free from arbitrary detention, and that the delay in providing rights to counsel violated the right to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 9 rights, as the detention was reasonably justified by officer and public safety concerns.

The court also found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as the four-minute delay between arrest and provision of rights to counsel was justified by necessary safety precautions and operational requirements.

The breath test results were admitted and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with attempted murder for stabbing his co-worker repeatedly in the back and neck at their workplace.

The Crown alleged the accused knew his actions were wrong.

The accused raised a defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder under section 16 of the Criminal Code, arguing he was suffering from a mental illness that rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were wrong.

The court found the accused probably suffered from a delusional disorder involving beliefs of persistent harassment and depression, but was not convinced the mental disorder rendered him incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong or making rational choices about it.

The accused was found guilty as charged.