Laura J. Metcalfe

The applicant, charged with child pornography and sexual assault offences, brought Charter applications to exclude evidence obtained from a production order and subsequent search warrants.

The court found breaches of the applicant's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights, which the Crown conceded, resulting in the excision of his statements from the search warrants.

The court also found s. 8 breaches for videotaping the applicant using the toilet in a holding cell without adequate privacy measures, and for police relying on an IP address obtained from a Cyber Tipline report without prior judicial authorization, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Bykovets.

A further s. 8 claim regarding information obtained from Ontario Works was dismissed.

Conducting a s. 24(2) analysis, the court concluded that despite the breaches, the evidence was highly reliable and critical to the Crown's case, and the police had acted in good faith based on the law as it existed prior to Bykovets.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The 83-year-old accused was charged in 2022 with a historical murder from 1975.

A fitness hearing was held to determine if his cognitive decline rendered him unfit to stand trial.

While early assessments suggested potential malingering, subsequent psychiatric evaluations confirmed a diagnosis of Moderate Neurocognitive Disorder (dementia).

The court accepted the joint submission of the Crown and defence, finding that the accused's dementia severely compromised his ability to sustain attention, follow proceedings, and instruct counsel.

The accused was found unfit to stand trial and ordered transferred to a psychiatric hospital.

The Crown appealed acquittals on written child pornography and child luring charges arising from an online undercover operation in which the respondent exchanged sexualized messages with a person repeatedly presenting as a 14-year-old girl.

The court held that the trial judge erred in law by isolating sexually explicit messages from their full context, by treating the absence of explicit age references within particular messages as dispositive, and by allowing the respondent’s claimed role-play motive to distort the objective inquiry under s. 163.1(1)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Code.

The court further held that the trial judge misapplied the mens rea for child luring, wrongly focused on whether the respondent intended to commit the secondary offences at the meeting, and failed to consider wilful blindness in the age analysis under s. 172.1 and Morrison.

The acquittals were set aside, findings of guilt were entered on all counts, and a new trial was ordered on all counts limited to entrapment and sentencing.

Two accused were jointly charged on a fourteen-count indictment involving sexual assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, making and possessing child pornography.

The offences were alleged to have occurred over more than two decades involving multiple complainants who were children of a family member of one accused.

The court considered a similar fact application by the Crown, ultimately dismissing the application with respect to two complainants whose evidence was found to be tainted by collusion and whose allegations of involvement by one accused were only disclosed after police informed one complainant of an unrelated assault on her child.

One accused pleaded guilty mid-trial to multiple counts involving child pornography and sexual assaults on two complainants.

On the remaining counts, the court found the first accused guilty of sexual assault on one complainant and guilty of two counts of possession of child pornography, while acquitting both accused of the remaining contested charges.

The court found insufficient credible and reliable evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt sexual assaults by the first accused on the other complainants, whose evidence was intertwined with collusion-tainted allegations.

The accused was convicted of possession of and trafficking in a firearm.

The Court of Appeal had previously found that the police violated the accused's Charter rights during a dynamic entry and directed the sentencing judge to consider a sentence reduction.

Given the accused's exceptional rehabilitation over five years, the Crown's concession that a two-year sentence was appropriate, and the need to provide a remedy for the Charter breach, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The appellant, D.S., appealed convictions for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference involving his niece, T.S. The appeal raised four grounds: the trial judge's reliance on similar fact evidence, misapprehension of the complainant's credibility, illogical reasoning in rejecting the appellant's evidence, and the unreasonableness of the convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's proper application of similar fact evidence principles from R. v. Handy and upholding the credibility findings, noting the high bar for appellate intervention on such matters as per R. v. Kruk.

This appeal concerns a partial stay of proceedings granted by a trial judge due to Charter violations arising from an unauthorized "no-knock" police entry into the accused's residence to effect an arrest.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in granting a partial stay based on a factual misapprehension and in rejecting alternative remedies.

The Court concluded that while the police misconduct was serious, a stay was not warranted given the lack of evidence of a systemic problem and the availability of alternative remedies like a strong judicial reprimand and potential sentence reduction.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, vacating the stay, and the accused's cross-appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Rodney Nichols, charged with murder, sought a further extension of his fitness assessment beyond the statutory 60-day limit under the Criminal Code.

The defence argued for a liberal interpretation of the provisions to ensure a full answer and defence, citing the complexity of the psychiatric issues and the need for specialized testing.

The Crown did not oppose the request.

The court, adopting the reasoning from R. v. Reimer, held that it had jurisdiction to grant a new assessment order even after the 60-day period, interpreting the statutory time limits as directory rather than mandatory to prevent injustice and achieve the objectives of the mental disorder scheme.

The court granted a new 30-day fitness assessment order.

The applicant, facing drug and firearm charges, brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) during his arrests.

The Crown conceded violations of sections 8 and 9 regarding the "no-knock" entry during the second arrest but argued the delay in access to counsel was reasonable.

The court found that the police's unannounced entry into the applicant's home to execute a Feeney warrant, without judicial authorization for such entry and without exigent circumstances, violated his section 7 and 8 Charter rights.

The court found the delay in access to counsel was not unreasonable in the circumstances of both arrests.

As a remedy for the Charter violations related to the Feeney warrant execution, the court granted a partial stay of proceedings, specifically staying the firearm-related charges, but allowed the drug trafficking charges to proceed.

The applicant, Daveion Brown, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay, arguing the total delay of 797 days (26 months and 6 days) exceeded the Jordan ceiling.

The Crown contended that defence delay and exceptional circumstances (discrete events, case complexity) justified the delay.

The court found 92 days of defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 705 days (23.2 months), which still exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

While acknowledging the case's complexity, the court rejected the Crown's arguments for discrete events and found the Crown's prosecution plan, despite a significant conflict-of-interest issue, was not unreasonable in minimizing delay for this complex case.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

D.D. appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the adult complainant.

The trial judge improperly evaluated the complainant's testimony, given when she was 18, as if she were a child, inferring truthfulness from "childlike details" rather than applying adult credibility criteria while considering the childhood context of the events.

The appellant, Hubert Nathanial Shilling, appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his four-and-a-half-year sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, the rejection of a motive to fabricate, and the use of corroborating evidence.

The appellant also brought a fresh evidence motion, citing his contraction of COVID-19 and a PTSD diagnosis during incarceration, seeking a reduced sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, the conviction appeal, and the sentence appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning or the fitness of the sentence.

The accused, Rene Hamouth, faced charges of possessing firearms without a license.

Police executed a search warrant at his residence, finding multiple firearms and ammunition.

The defence argued for the exclusion of evidence under Charter s. 24(2) due to alleged s. 10(b) infringements, including delayed access to counsel and breaches of the "hold-off" duty.

The court found multiple s. 10(b) breaches by the police, citing lack of diligence in facilitating counsel access and improper questioning.

However, applying the Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the violations and their impact on the accused's Charter rights did not outweigh society's interest in a trial on the merits, especially given the lawful seizure of reliable evidence prior to the breaches.

Consequently, the firearms and ammunition were admitted.

The court then found the accused guilty on all counts, concluding that the prosecution proved constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant, a commercial truck driver, was referred to a secondary examination at a border crossing due to a CBSA 'drug lookout'.

During the examination, border officers discovered methamphetamine and cash in his truck.

The applicant brought a motion alleging violations of his Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), arguing that the lookout made him a specific target of a criminal investigation, thereby triggering his Charter rights upon arrival.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the questioning and search were routine border procedures authorized by the Customs Act, and the applicant was not detained for Charter purposes until the drugs were actually discovered.

Four appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that their Charter s. 11(b) rights to be tried within a reasonable time were violated due to unreasonable delay.

The application judges had dismissed their s. 11(b) applications, finding that despite delays exceeding the Jordan ceiling (18 months), the Crown had demonstrated the cases were complex and had a concrete plan to minimize delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judges' decisions, finding no reversible error in their assessment of the Crown's plan and the complexity of the cases.

The appellant, a disbarred lawyer and unlicensed immigration consultant, was convicted of providing unauthorized immigration advice for consideration and counselling misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

She appealed her convictions, arguing that the charging provisions were ultra vires the federal government, violated section 7 of the Charter, and that the trial judge made numerous evidentiary and instructional errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the provisions were validly enacted under the federal criminal law power, were neither vague nor overbroad, and that the trial judge made no errors in her rulings or jury instructions.

The applicant applied for bail pending appeal pursuant to s. 679 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant had previously been convicted and his appeal was dismissed, but he subsequently applied to re-open his appeal against conviction to adduce fresh evidence.

Because the formal order dismissing the appeal had not been entered, the court was not functus officio and permitted the application to re-open to proceed.

The motion judge held that the original notice of appeal remained operative, granting jurisdiction under s. 679(1)(a) to consider and grant the applicant's request for bail.

The applicant, having been acquitted of aggravated assault but convicted of the lesser included offence of simple assault, applied to re-open the trial before sentencing.

The applicant argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to find him guilty of simple assault, asserting that aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Criminal Code does not contain a lesser included offence of assault.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to re-open the trial, emphasizing the principle of finality and noting the argument should have been raised during closing submissions.

The court also rejected the substantive argument, affirming that simple assault is a lesser included offence of aggravated assault.

The applicants, convicted of various firearms offences, sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the applications based on the public interest criterion.

The motion judge found no public safety concerns, noting neither applicant had a criminal record and both had complied with previous bail conditions.

The judge also determined that the grounds of appeal were arguable and that the applicants might serve their sentences before the appeals could be heard.

The applications for bail pending appeal were granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for an "over 80" offence, alleging a s. 9 Charter violation (arbitrary detention/overholding) and a s. 11(b) Charter violation (unreasonable delay).

The court found a s. 9 breach due to police "benign neglect" in assessing continued detention but determined that breath samples should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the breach was too remote from the evidence gathering.

However, the court found a s. 11(b) breach, concluding that judicial deliberation time for interlocutory motions counts towards the Jordan ceiling, and the net delay of 20.5 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling without exceptional circumstances.

A stay of proceedings was granted.