Louise Tansey

The 83-year-old accused was charged in 2022 with a historical murder from 1975.

A fitness hearing was held to determine if his cognitive decline rendered him unfit to stand trial.

While early assessments suggested potential malingering, subsequent psychiatric evaluations confirmed a diagnosis of Moderate Neurocognitive Disorder (dementia).

The court accepted the joint submission of the Crown and defence, finding that the accused's dementia severely compromised his ability to sustain attention, follow proceedings, and instruct counsel.

The accused was found unfit to stand trial and ordered transferred to a psychiatric hospital.

Following a five-week trial, the offenders were convicted of fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document arising from a fraudulent mandatory entry-level training scheme for commercial truck drivers.

Between January 2019 and May 2021, the offenders operated unregistered truck driver schools, charged students $4,000-$5,000 for substandard training that did not meet MELT standards, and paid accomplices to fraudulently upload false MELT completion records to the MTO database.

Approximately 45-47 students per offender were defrauded.

The Crown sought five years imprisonment; the offenders sought a conditional sentence of 12-18 months.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with strict conditions including house arrest for the full duration, 200 hours of community service, and a forfeiture order against one offender for three commercial trucks valued at approximately $100,000.

The court dismissed an application by Alain Bellefeuille for a temporary publication ban regarding information related to a Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

Bellefeuille, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, argued that publication of the SIU report could prejudice his right to a fair trial.

The court found the risk to trial fairness was speculative and could be mitigated by jury selection and instructions.

The open court principle and freedom of expression outweighed any potential benefit of a publication ban.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, B.S.L., on charges including sexual assault and uttering threats.

The appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred by failing to act as a gatekeeper against inadmissible evidence of other sexual activity under s. 276 of the Criminal Code; and second, that the trial judge relied on speculation and conjecture to make adverse credibility findings about the complainant, particularly regarding an audio recording.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility findings, and that the defence's questioning about the recording's date did not constitute s. 276 evidence.

The Crown brought an application under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to sentence the young person as an adult for the offence of manslaughter.

The young person, who was one month shy of 18 at the time of the offence, participated in a fatal attack on a friend.

The court considered the young person's significant Gladue factors, history of trauma, and rehabilitative progress while in custody.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and that a youth sentence was sufficient to hold the young person accountable.

The application was dismissed, and the young person was ordered to be sentenced as a youth, with sentencing delayed to allow for the development of a release plan.

The accused, Rodney Nichols, charged with murder, sought a further extension of his fitness assessment beyond the statutory 60-day limit under the Criminal Code.

The defence argued for a liberal interpretation of the provisions to ensure a full answer and defence, citing the complexity of the psychiatric issues and the need for specialized testing.

The Crown did not oppose the request.

The court, adopting the reasoning from R. v. Reimer, held that it had jurisdiction to grant a new assessment order even after the 60-day period, interpreting the statutory time limits as directory rather than mandatory to prevent injustice and achieve the objectives of the mental disorder scheme.

The court granted a new 30-day fitness assessment order.

The Crown applied to have Danyiel Walker declared a dangerous offender under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code, seeking an indeterminate sentence or, alternatively, a determinate sentence of 20 years with a 10-year long-term supervision order.

Walker had pleaded guilty to numerous sexual offences against children and child pornography charges, and had a history of similar youth offences and a prior Children's Aid Society intervention.

The court considered expert psychiatric evidence, victim impact statements, and uncharged conduct.

The court found Walker to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour, persistent aggressive behaviour, and a failure to control sexual impulses, and concluded his conduct was intractable.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding no reasonable expectation that lesser measures would adequately protect the public, citing concerns about the effectiveness of treatment and the limitations of community supervision, particularly regarding internet access.

The Crown brought a motion for certiorari and mandamus in a dangerous offender application, challenging the sentencing judge's decision to rule Victim Impact Statements (VIS) inadmissible without reviewing them.

The VIS related to uncharged conduct that had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Superior Court granted certiorari, finding that the sentencing judge erred in failing to consider the VIS before ruling on their admissibility.

The court directed the sentencing judge to hear the VIS in a voir dire, emphasizing the broad range of information required in dangerous offender hearings and the procedural fairness owed to all parties, including victims.

Danyiel Walker pleaded guilty to numerous sexual offences, and the Crown sought to have him declared a dangerous offender.

This decision concerns a Gardiner hearing to determine the admissibility and proof beyond a reasonable doubt of certain uncharged conduct as facts in aggravation for sentencing.

The Crown sought to adduce five statements from a 14-year-old victim, MP: three video-taped police statements and two written statements from counselling sessions.

The court found that the three police statements were admissible under s. 723(5) of the Criminal Code, satisfying the necessity and threshold reliability tests due to video recording, cross-examination of facilitators, and lack of motive to lie.

However, the two counselling statements were deemed inadmissible due to lack of video recording and being transcribed from memory.

Regarding the ultimate reliability of the uncharged conduct, the court found that allegations concerning a second child, CL, were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt due to ambiguity in MP's testimony.

However, several specific allegations concerning MP himself were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including exposure of genitals, showing child pornography, inserting penis into MP's mouth, and threats.

These proven facts will be admitted for the analysis of the offender's future risk in the dangerous offender application.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied for a second court-ordered psychiatric assessment under s. 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code to support a defence of not criminally responsible.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a second assessment was not necessary because a comprehensive assessment had already been conducted by a forensic psychiatrist, and there was no evidence of new information that would shed further light on the accused's mental state at the time of the offence.

The three offenders were convicted of kidnapping, unlawful confinement, break and enter, and sexual assault after breaking into the victim's apartment, confining her, and sexually assaulting her with hair removal cream.

The principal offender, who orchestrated the attack out of revenge and distributed intimate images of the victim online, was sentenced to 7 years in prison.

The two co-offenders, who acted as aiders and did not participate in distributing the images, were each sentenced to 4 years in prison.

All offenders received credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The accused applied under section 278.93 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant and to use records of communications between them.

The application concerned two counts of sexual assault.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence of prior sexual activity constituted impermissible twin-myth reasoning and was not capable of being admissible.

The court held that the evidence did not address how consent was communicated and therefore could not support a defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

Additionally, regarding the allegation involving digital penetration while the complainant was asleep, the court found the evidence irrelevant to consent as an unconscious person cannot provide the required affirmative consent.

The defendant was found guilty of sexual assault by a jury.

Prior to sentencing, the Court of Appeal released R. v. Chouhan, which held that the elimination of peremptory challenges applied only prospectively.

Because the defendant's right to a jury trial vested before the legislative change, he applied for a mistrial, arguing the jury was improperly constituted and lacked jurisdiction.

The Crown argued the trial judge was functus officio.

The trial judge held that he had the jurisdiction to declare a mistrial post-verdict under the common law powers recognized in R. v. Burke.

However, the judge declined to order a mistrial, noting the availability of bail pending appeal, the ordeal of a retrial for the complainant, and the public interest in avoiding multiple trials, leaving the issue for appellate review.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a teenage complainant who was the daughter of a woman he had briefly dated.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence but held that the Crown still failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable because of significant internal inconsistencies, external contradictions with other Crown witnesses, and uncertainty about key factual details, including the number and sequence of the alleged incidents.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement following an incident in a supply room at the complainant's workplace.

Both the complainant and the accused testified, presenting conflicting versions of events.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework to assess credibility.

The court found both witnesses to be unreliable and noted significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony regarding the sequence of events and her subsequent behaviour.

Given the frailties in the evidence, the court concluded the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, brought a fresh application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter after the Court of Appeal previously overturned a stay and ordered a new trial.

The court conducted a preliminary assessment under Rule 34.02 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

Finding that the delay since the appellate decision was entirely attributable to the applicant's own requests for time to prepare and seek leave to appeal, the court concluded the application had no reasonable prospect of success and summarily dismissed it.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and over 80 contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire to address a Charter application alleging denial of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) due to failure to facilitate interpretation.

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights, determining that special circumstances did not exist on an objective basis despite the accused's limited English proficiency.

The court convicted on both counts, finding the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on driving conduct, odour of alcohol, and unsteadiness, and proved the over 80 offence based on breath sample analysis.

The accused was tried on a charge of possession of child pornography found on a work computer assigned to him.

The only live issue was possession, as the nature of the images and other foundational facts were admitted.

Relying on forensic evidence about exclusive user access, creation of the folder structure, transfer and organization of the files, and the accused's targeted deletion of the relevant folder immediately after learning of a workplace sexualized-incident investigation, the court inferred knowledge and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court held that actual viewing of the images was not necessary to prove knowledge where circumstantial evidence established knowing possession.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 48 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the case was not particularly complex and that the Crown's reliance on the previous state of the law was unreasonable, particularly given the accused's continuous pre-trial custody and the Crown's failure to mitigate delay caused by its own unavailability.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused challenged the mandatory victim surcharge under Criminal Code section 737 as violating equality rights under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the surcharge had a disproportionate impact on persons with mental disabilities.

The Crown sought to justify the violation under section 1 of the Charter by arguing the surcharge served pressing and substantial objectives of raising funds for victim services and holding offenders accountable.

The court rejected the Crown's section 1 justification, finding the legislation was not minimally impairing and that the deleterious effects on disabled persons outweighed the salutary effects.