Paolo Giancaterino

The court ruled on the admissibility of expert psychiatric evidence and hospital records in a first-degree murder trial involving two sisters charged with killing their mother.

The accused sought to introduce seven hospital records as business records and expert opinion evidence from a forensic psychiatrist regarding the accused's mental health condition, the effects of chronic abuse, and related psychiatric concepts.

The Crown opposed both applications on grounds of hearsay, prejudicial effect, and necessity.

The court admitted the hospital records as business records and qualified the expert to provide opinion evidence on psychiatric assessment, diagnosis, causes, and impacts of mental disorders, while restricting the expert from opining on the specific conduct of the accused.

The appellant appealed his convictions for eleven charges arising from an armed robbery of a cryptocurrency exchange business.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing circumstantial evidence and failed to consider reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Villaroman principles and reasonably concluded that the appellant's participation in the robbery was the only plausible inference based on the totality of the evidence, including DNA on clothing used in the robbery.

The Crown applied to admit evidence of prior sexual activity in a sexual assault trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence's marginal probative value for narrative or explaining the complainant's state of mind did not outweigh its significant prejudicial effect, which included risks of moral prejudice and diverting the trial's focus.

The court emphasized that the proposed evidence was not required for narrative purposes and that the complainant's reaction (remaining silent and motionless) did not require explanation, as such reactions are not unusual in sexual assault cases.

The appellant, C.L., appealed his sentence of six years and six months' imprisonment for violent sexual assault and other related offences.

The appeal raised two grounds: that the trial judge erred in tempering the mitigating factor of his guilty plea with a lack of insight, and that the trial judge erred in her analysis of enhanced credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's approach to either the guilty plea's mitigation or the pre-trial custody credit.

This criminal trial involved charges against Zekeim Ogilvie (13 offences) and Akol Akol (15 offences, including enabling escape) stemming from a shooting incident.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, cell phone data, and GPS data from a rented vehicle.

The court meticulously analyzed the identification evidence for Ogilvie and the elements of aiding and abetting for Akol.

The judge found that the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for either accused on any count, emphasizing the need to avoid speculation and conjecture when drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence.

Both defendants were acquitted.

The Crown applied for testimonial aids for a key witness in a second-degree murder trial.

The witness, who suffers from schizophrenia and other mental health conditions, witnessed the stabbing.

The Crown sought to admit the witness's videotaped police interview under s. 715.2 of the Criminal Code and to allow him to testify via CCTV under s. 486.2.

The court dismissed the s. 715.2 application, finding the witness capable of communicating his evidence cogently.

However, the court granted the s. 486.2 application, allowing the witness to testify via CCTV, as his mental disability and anxiety could make it difficult for him to give a full and candid account in the accused's presence.

The accused was charged with the first-degree murder of his former domestic partner.

He admitted to intentionally killing her and sought a conviction for second-degree murder, arguing the killing was impulsive.

The Crown argued the murder was planned and deliberate, and committed during a forcible confinement.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the accused forcibly confined the victim by throwing her into the trunk of his car before strangling and shooting her.

The court also found that the accused's actions, including bringing a sawed-off shotgun, removing his license plate, and driving to a remote location, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate.

The accused was found guilty of first-degree murder.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to admit various ante mortem statements made by the deceased victim to friends and family, as well as text messages, under the principled and state of mind exceptions to the hearsay rule.

The statements included allegations of prior discreditable conduct by the accused.

The court admitted several statements and texts that demonstrated the victim's state of mind, fear, and the accused's animus, finding they met the threshold reliability test and were highly probative of motive and planning.

Some statements were excluded as being repetitive, lacking specificity, or more prejudicial than probative.

The accused pled guilty to perjury for lying under oath during the preliminary inquiry of her boyfriend, who was charged with murder.

The Crown and defence agreed on a sentence range of 18 to 24 months but disagreed on whether it should be served in custody or the community.

The court considered the serious nature of perjury in homicide cases, the accused's youth, lack of prior record, guilty plea, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on custodial sentences.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, finding it would adequately address denunciation and deterrence while facilitating rehabilitation.

This appeal was brought by George Peters.

Due to the appellant's death, the appeal was dismissed as abated on consent of the parties.

The three offenders were convicted of kidnapping, unlawful confinement, break and enter, and sexual assault after breaking into the victim's apartment, confining her, and sexually assaulting her with hair removal cream.

The principal offender, who orchestrated the attack out of revenge and distributed intimate images of the victim online, was sentenced to 7 years in prison.

The two co-offenders, who acted as aiders and did not participate in distributing the images, were each sentenced to 4 years in prison.

All offenders received credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault and assault causing bodily harm against the complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, improperly used corroborative evidence, and applied uneven scrutiny to the defence and Crown evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, noting that different types of testimony require different critical evaluations.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for breaching an undertaking not to communicate with his former partner.

The breach occurred when the appellant engaged in FaceTime calls with the complainant while exercising access to their children.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant had the requisite subjective mens rea, as he intentionally called the complainant knowing he was bound by a no-contact condition.

The court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to apply the defence of de minimis non curat lex, noting the public interest in enforcing release conditions in domestic violence cases.

The appeal against the suspended sentence and probation was also dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit two statements made by the accused, who was charged with second-degree murder.

The first statement, made spontaneously to a first-responding officer despite cautions, was found to be voluntary.

The second statement, made to a detective during a formal interview, was excluded.

The court found that the detective's comments—suggesting the accused might not get to tell his story in court and that his integrity was highest during the interview—effectively weaponized the right to silence and constituted an inducement, rendering the statement involuntary.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, blood alcohol over legal limit causing accident resulting in death, and blood alcohol over legal limit causing accident resulting in bodily harm.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to consider relevant evidence.

The primary defence theory was that the Crown failed to prove the appellant was driving the van, suggesting the appellant and a passenger could have switched positions.

The appellate court found no misapprehension of evidence and no failure to consider relevant evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

Four co-accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on all charges, alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charges included numerous break and enter offences and drug offences.

The court found that the total delay from October 18, 2017 (date charges laid) to the anticipated completion of trial in April 2020 was 30 months.

After deducting defence-caused delay (7 months and 25 days), waiver (1 day), discrete events (5 days), and case complexity (3 months), the net delay was 19 months, exceeding the Jordan ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

The court granted the stay of proceedings, finding that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay through exceptional circumstances.

Key issues included late and disorganized disclosure from police and Crown, inadequate trial time allocation, and the departure of the case manager from the police investigation without replacement.

The accused, K.G.A. and A.S.A., were charged with human trafficking, receiving a material benefit from human trafficking, advertising sexual services, and K.G.A. was also charged with criminal harassment.

The charges stemmed from allegations by P.J., who claimed she was exploited in the sex trade in Ottawa.

The court conducted a thorough assessment of P.J.'s credibility and reliability, finding significant inconsistencies, memory issues due to intoxication and drug use, and evasiveness in her testimony.

The court concluded that it would be dangerous to convict the accused based on P.J.'s evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the conduct or purpose elements for human trafficking, the material benefit, or the advertising charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

For criminal harassment, the alleged words were not found to be threatening or intimidating to a reasonable person in the circumstances.

All charges against K.G.A. and A.S.A. were dismissed, and acquittals were entered.

The applicant, Rodney Helmer, sought to quash a search warrant and exclude evidence seized from his residence under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The search warrant was based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied on information from four confidential informants (CIs) and police surveillance, alleging cocaine trafficking.

The court conducted a Garofoli review, assessing the compelling nature, credibility, and corroboration of the CI information using the Debot criteria.

Despite some deficiencies in the ITO, including misleading characterizations and omissions, the court found the totality of the information, as modified on review, sufficiently reliable to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

The application was dismissed, as no Charter breach was found.

The accused, C.R., was sentenced after being convicted of 10 counts of abuse against four of his children, including aggravated assault (tattooing), assault with a weapon (knife), assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and simple assault.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, C.R.'s personal circumstances, and aggravating and mitigating factors, with primary consideration given to denunciation and deterrence as mandated for offences against children.

The Crown sought 6-7 years incarceration, while the defence sought 2-2.5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of four years incarceration, crediting 35 days for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 3 years and 330 days in a penitentiary.

The sentence was broken down into concurrent and consecutive terms for the various counts.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total time from the charges to the anticipated end of the second trial was 53 months.

The court deducted 10 months of defence delay and 11 months of delay caused by a mistrial, which was deemed an exceptional circumstance.

The net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.