Sarah Fountain

The accused, K.G.A. and A.S.A., were charged with human trafficking, receiving a material benefit from human trafficking, advertising sexual services, and K.G.A. was also charged with criminal harassment.

The charges stemmed from allegations by P.J., who claimed she was exploited in the sex trade in Ottawa.

The court conducted a thorough assessment of P.J.'s credibility and reliability, finding significant inconsistencies, memory issues due to intoxication and drug use, and evasiveness in her testimony.

The court concluded that it would be dangerous to convict the accused based on P.J.'s evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the conduct or purpose elements for human trafficking, the material benefit, or the advertising charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

For criminal harassment, the alleged words were not found to be threatening or intimidating to a reasonable person in the circumstances.

All charges against K.G.A. and A.S.A. were dismissed, and acquittals were entered.

The defendant was charged with assault with a weapon (a Chrysler PT Cruiser), uttering a threat to cause death, dangerous driving, and failing to stop and give his name and address after an accident.

The Crown's case relied on eyewitness identification and circumstantial evidence.

The main issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle that struck the victim.

The court found the direct identification evidence (courtroom identification by the victim and police officer identification from video) to be inherently unreliable and subject to significant frailties.

While circumstantial evidence established that the vehicle involved was registered to an address where the defendant lived and was found shortly after the incident with a warm engine, this did not eliminate reasonable doubt as to the defendant's identity as the driver.

The court noted that proper investigative procedures (photo lineup, seizure of the toque, obtaining the mall video) were not conducted, which could have resolved the identification issues.

All charges were dismissed due to reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm after sideswiping a cyclist on a country road on October 9, 2012.

The victim suffered devastating injuries including a traumatic brain injury.

The court found the accused was so substantially intoxicated that he may not have even realized he struck the victim.

The court emphasized that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount sentencing objectives for this serious impaired driving offense.

The accused had no prior criminal record and demonstrated genuine remorse, but the severity of the victim's injuries and the degree of impairment were significant aggravating factors.

The accused was charged with three offences arising from a motor vehicle accident on October 9, 2012: failing to stop after being involved in an accident knowing bodily harm was caused, impaired driving causing bodily harm, and operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood while causing an accident resulting in bodily harm.

The court found that the accused's vehicle struck a cyclist, causing serious injury.

The Crown's case was significantly weakened by Charter breaches committed by police during the accused's detention, resulting in the exclusion of breath samples and statements.

The court convicted the accused of impaired driving causing bodily harm but acquitted on the other two counts, finding reasonable doubt regarding whether the accused knew or was wilfully blind to having struck a person.

The accused brought a voir dire challenging the voluntariness of statements made during a video-recorded police interview in a prosecution for sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

The accused argued that the interviewing officer improperly induced cooperation by suggesting possible release, undermined legal advice to remain silent, and reversed the onus by presenting a narrative and inviting correction.

Applying the contextual voluntariness analysis from the confessions rule, the court held that the accused was aware of his rights, had consulted counsel, and maintained his right to silence when confronted with incriminating allegations.

The court concluded that the questioning was not oppressive and did not overbear the accused’s will.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary and therefore admissible.

The offender, a former teacher, was convicted of historical sexual offences (indecent assault, gross indecency, buggery) against two of his former students.

At sentencing, the Crown sought to admit extrinsic evidence of similar discreditable conduct involving other students, which the court admitted for the limited purpose of assessing the offender's character.

The court found that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the serious breach of trust and the aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, along with ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition and a SOIRA order.

The court ruled on whether a Drug Recognition Officer must qualify through a Mohan voir dire before providing expert opinion evidence regarding drug impairment.

The accused challenged the scientific basis of drug recognition testing, arguing that expert evidence proving the reliability of the science was required before a DRE could testify.

The Crown argued that Parliament had already conducted its own voir dire when amending the Criminal Code and that accreditation under the applicable regulations was sufficient.

The court held that no Mohan voir dire is required if the officer meets the regulatory accreditation criteria, as Parliament has legislated the qualifications and found the science sufficiently reliable.

Any challenge to the science itself should be brought as a constitutional question.

During a jury trial for historical sexual assault involving two complainants, the Crown sought to admit the evidence of each complainant as similar fact evidence on the counts relating to the other.

Applying the framework from R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of the proposed evidence outweighed its potential prejudicial effect.

Although certain similarities existed, including allegations of sexual acts occurring after the accused provided alcohol and took students to private residences, the court found significant dissimilarities in the nature of the interactions and the presence or absence of grooming behaviour.

The court also noted the fifteen‑year gap between the allegations.

These differences undermined any meaningful unity between the incidents.

The court concluded that the probative value did not outweigh the potential prejudice and refused to admit the evidence as similar fact evidence.

On a voir dire in a sexual assault prosecution, the Crown sought admission of two videotaped police interviews with the accused.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to inducements, oppression, police persistence despite repeated assertions of the right to silence, and attempts to undermine counsel’s advice.

Applying the confessions rule from R. v. Oickle and related jurisprudence, the court assessed threats or inducements, oppression, and the accused’s ability to exercise a meaningful choice to speak.

Although certain police tactics raised concerns, including repeated questioning after assertions of silence and comments undermining counsel, the court found no nexus between those tactics and the accused’s decision to speak.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that both statements were voluntary and admissible.

During a jury trial for historical sexual assault involving a teacher and two former students, the court made four evidentiary rulings.

The court ordered the disclosure of unedited psychologist notes to the defence since the witness would use them to refresh his memory.

The court allowed the Crown to adduce some, but not all, evidence of uncharged discreditable conduct to complete the narrative of the relationship.

The court permitted a retired psychologist to testify based on past recollection recorded to explain the complainant's actions.

Finally, the court allowed the Crown to call the complainant's wife to rebut an implicit allegation of recent fabrication arising from the defence's cross-examination regarding the complainant's deteriorating memory.

The accused was charged with impaired care and control of a motor vehicle and care and control with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a single-vehicle collision in Ottawa.

The Crown conducted a blended voir dire to address both substantive charges and alleged Charter breaches.

The court found that the evidential breath samples were obtained in violation of the "as soon as practicable" requirement under the Criminal Code, rendering them inadmissible and precluding reliance on the presumption of identity.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted of the over-80 charge.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired care and control based on admissions regarding alcohol consumption, physical signs of impairment, and the manner of driving that caused the accident.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The central issue was the identification of the driver of the silver Chrysler 300 on August 8, 2010.

The Crown's case relied on witness testimony and circumstantial evidence.

The defence argued that the actual driver was Jesse Dozois, not the accused.

The court found the accused guilty of the section 253(1)(b) charge and stayed the section 253(1)(a) charge pursuant to Kienapple.