Catherine Kehoe

A former Designated Public Office Holder was charged with three counts of violating the Lobbying Act: (1) undertaking to communicate with public office holders on behalf of the Energy Policy Institute of Canada regarding policy development; (2) arranging a meeting between public office holders and EPIC members; and (3) undertaking to communicate with public office holders regarding the awarding of a grant to the Canada School of Energy and Environment.

The court found that the prohibition on lobbying activities by former senior government officials applies regardless of whether communications were initiated by government officials, and that an undertaking to lobby need not be express or written.

The court convicted on all three counts, finding that the accused's actions constituted lobbying under the Lobbying Act despite his arguments that the activities were informational only or that he was acting in his personal capacity.

The accused was charged with refusing to comply with a demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application claiming a violation of section 9 rights, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that he had consumed alcohol.

The matter proceeded as a blended Charter voir dire and trial.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the odour of alcohol from the vehicle, an unsealed bottle of brandy, and the odour of alcohol on the accused's breath when isolated from the vehicle.

The accused was given multiple opportunities to comply with the demand and refused several times despite clear explanations of the consequences.

The accused's subsequent request to provide a sample after arrest was found to be too late.

The court found the accused guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual touching, counselling to touch, and incest involving his daughter over a period from 2005 to 2012.

The complainant was between 9 and 15 years old during the alleged offences.

The case involved testimony from the complainant, her mother, and her brother, with significant credibility issues arising from recantations and minimizations during trial testimony compared to original police statements.

The court found the accused guilty on all eight counts, relying primarily on the original videotaped police statements and the corroborating evidence of the witnesses, while rejecting the minimized trial testimony as influenced by family pressure and the complainant's desire to reunite the family unit.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on observations of the accused's driving, physical signs of impairment, and breath test results showing readings of 110 and 100 milligrams.

The defence challenged both the impairment charge and the admissibility of the breath test results on the basis that the Crown failed to prove the samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found reasonable doubt on both counts due to inadequate police notes, vague timing evidence, and unexplained delays between arrest and breath testing.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The defence brought a motion to admit video demonstration evidence showing a private investigator striking a new cribbage board against a cement pillar to demonstrate the force required to break the board.

The Crown opposed admission on grounds of lack of relevance and prejudicial effect.

The court excluded the evidence, finding that the video demonstration bore insufficient similarity to the facts at trial, lacked probative value due to material differences between the demonstration and the alleged incident, and was highly prejudicial because it raised speculative possibilities that could undermine the complainant's credibility without evidentiary foundation regarding the differences in materials and conditions.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon (cribbage board) against a 15-year-old victim with learning disabilities.

During cross-examination, defence counsel produced a cribbage board and placed it in the witness's hand without warning, causing her severe emotional and physical distress.

The witness indicated she could answer questions about the board but could not continue with it present.

The trial judge restricted further presentation of the board to the witness while allowing cross-examination to continue.

Defence counsel subsequently brought an application for mistrial alleging reasonable apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's comments and rulings regarding the cribbage board.

The application was dismissed.

The court ruled on whether a Drug Recognition Officer must qualify through a Mohan voir dire before providing expert opinion evidence regarding drug impairment.

The accused challenged the scientific basis of drug recognition testing, arguing that expert evidence proving the reliability of the science was required before a DRE could testify.

The Crown argued that Parliament had already conducted its own voir dire when amending the Criminal Code and that accreditation under the applicable regulations was sufficient.

The court held that no Mohan voir dire is required if the officer meets the regulatory accreditation criteria, as Parliament has legislated the qualifications and found the science sufficiently reliable.

Any challenge to the science itself should be brought as a constitutional question.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code and unlawful possession of marijuana contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown admitted that Detective MacKillop's warrantless search of the accused's computer and thumb drive breached section 8 Charter rights.

The court found multiple Charter breaches including the warrantless search of electronic devices, the search of two additional devices not authorized by warrant, and a section 10(b) breach when the accused was questioned about computer ownership without being informed of the child pornography investigation or his right to counsel.

The court excluded the child pornography evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the pattern of police carelessness and disregard for Charter rights, notwithstanding the seriousness of the offence.

At a preliminary inquiry, two accused were jointly charged with weapons offences, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of cannabis for trafficking purposes.

The Crown withdrew charges for trafficking and proceeds of crime.

The accused Lacroix conceded sufficient evidence for committal on remaining charges.

The accused Adatia challenged committal on all charges except possession of 26.3 grams of marijuana found in plain view.

The court found that circumstantial evidence regarding a firearm and brass knuckles found in a bedroom drawer and closet was insufficient to establish knowledge and control by Adatia.

The court held that mere proximity of her passport to the firearm did not reasonably support an inference of knowledge or control.

Adatia was committed only on the plain view marijuana possession charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown proceeded on facts arising from a collision with an Enbridge van.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches and excluded all evidence obtained from the unlawful stop through to the Intoxilyzer results.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The central issue was the identification of the driver of the silver Chrysler 300 on August 8, 2010.

The Crown's case relied on witness testimony and circumstantial evidence.

The defence argued that the actual driver was Jesse Dozois, not the accused.

The court found the accused guilty of the section 253(1)(b) charge and stayed the section 253(1)(a) charge pursuant to Kienapple.