Bruce Lee-Shanok

The defendant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing bodily harm, failing to stop and provide assistance after an accident, and breach of a recognizance of bail.

On September 25, 2016, the defendant drove while impaired with a blood alcohol level between 145-200 mg/100ml, causing his vehicle to roll and injure two passengers.

One victim suffered catastrophic spinal cord injuries resulting in paraplegia.

The defendant fled the scene and hid from police.

The court imposed a sentence of 3 years custody with a 6-year driving prohibition, balancing significant aggravating factors including catastrophic injuries to victims, prior impaired driving conviction, and breach of bail conditions, against mitigating factors including guilty plea, genuine remorse, and successful rehabilitation from alcohol addiction.

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault on a 2½-year-old child in her care on March 25, 2015.

The Crown sought 90 days in custody followed by 18 months probation.

The defence sought a conditional discharge with probation.

The court found the defendant was a victim of domestic abuse and control by her husband at the time of the assault, acted out of character, expressed genuine remorse, and had no criminal record.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, rejecting the Crown's custodial sentence as disproportionate for a first offender.

The defendant was charged with nine offences arising from a tumultuous marital relationship: uttering threats to cause death, three counts of assault, wilful damage to property, criminal harassment, and three counts of voyeurism.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the credibility of the complainant and her children.

The defendant denied all allegations and asserted the complainant fabricated evidence to destroy him.

The court found the complainant generally credible despite her delayed reporting and attempts at reconciliation.

The defendant was found guilty of assault on three dates, two counts of voyeurism, but acquitted on the threat charge, property damage charge, and criminal harassment charge.

The voyeurism convictions were upheld despite the defendant's public good defence, as the court found no objective evidence that the surreptitious recordings served any public purpose.

The accused, charged with domestic violence offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the time of the charges to the anticipated end of the trial was over 41 months.

The Crown argued that the accused had waived his section 11(b) rights during a judicial pre-trial and that significant portions of the delay were attributable to the defence.

The court found that the self-represented accused's waiver was not clear, unequivocal, or informed.

After deducting three months of defence delay, the net delay was over 38 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The application was allowed and the charges were stayed.

Grace Gaurino was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and theft over $5,000, with the theft count stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The fraud involved $16,629.96 from her 98-year-old vulnerable employer, Eileen Rennie, through altered cheques.

The Crown sought 18-21 months custody, while the defence requested 90 days or less intermittent.

A key consideration was the collateral immigration consequence under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, where a custodial sentence of six months or more would remove the right to appeal a deportation order on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

The court balanced denunciation, general deterrence (paramount in breach of trust fraud), and rehabilitation, alongside mitigating factors (first offence, admissions, personal difficulties, late remorse) and aggravating factors (breach of trust, vulnerable victim, some planning).

Finding the appropriate sentence range to be between 90 days and 12 months, the court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence to preserve Gaurino's right to appeal deportation, considering her three Canadian citizen children and strong rehabilitation prospects.

A restitution order of $16,629.96 and a 2-year prohibition from positions of financial authority were also imposed.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

The central issue was the reliability and credibility of the complainant's identification evidence, which was potentially tainted by alcohol consumption, examination of Facebook photos of the accused, and subsequent encounters.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be inconsistent and unreliable, noting his admitted lies to police and perjury at the preliminary inquiry.

Due to these inconsistencies and lack of corroborating evidence, the court could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's identity as the stabber.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused, a caregiver for a 98-year-old woman, was charged with fraud and theft over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that the accused altered cheques written for her salary to receive an additional $16,629.96 over a three-month period.

The accused claimed the extra funds were gifts or for petty cash.

The court rejected the accused's explanation, finding that she altered the cheques after they were signed and took advantage of the victim's forgetfulness.

The accused was found guilty of both offences.

The accused, Grace Go Gaurino, sought a directed verdict of acquittal on charges of fraud over $5,000 and theft over $5,000 after the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown presented evidence that Ms. Gaurino received 19 cheques, which she wrote and deposited, totaling $16,629.96 beyond her salary, while caring for a 98-year-old, pain-medicated, and forgetful employer.

Applying the test from *R. v. Arcuri*, the court found sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a guilty verdict, noting that the judge's role is not to weigh competing inferences.

The motion for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than the legal limit of alcohol in his body and breaching a release condition prohibiting alcohol consumption.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter right to counsel under section 10(b) was breached.

The officer detained the accused following a traffic stop for excessive speeding and, upon discovering the smell of alcohol on his breath, requested an Alcohol Screening Device.

The officer did not inform the accused of his right to counsel during the approximately 8-9 minute wait for the device to arrive, despite the accused having a cell phone with his lawyer's contact information.

The court found that a realistic opportunity existed for the accused to consult counsel before providing a breath sample, and that the officer failed to comply with his implementational obligation under section 10(b).

Consequently, the breath sample results were excluded as evidence obtained in violation of the Charter, and the accused was acquitted on both counts.

The applicant brought a motion for an order declaring a mistrial due to ineffective assistance of counsel following her conviction on charges of impaired operation of a motor vehicle, operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The court examined whether counsel's conduct fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance and whether such conduct resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The court found that while certain trial strategy decisions were reasonable, critical failures in file preparation and transfer, inadequate disclosure of key evidence to trial counsel, and insufficient preparation for cross-examination of expert witnesses fell below the standard of care.

The court determined that the reliability of the verdict was called into question and declared a mistrial.

The accused was charged with refusing to comply with a demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application claiming a violation of section 9 rights, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that he had consumed alcohol.

The matter proceeded as a blended Charter voir dire and trial.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the odour of alcohol from the vehicle, an unsealed bottle of brandy, and the odour of alcohol on the accused's breath when isolated from the vehicle.

The accused was given multiple opportunities to comply with the demand and refused several times despite clear explanations of the consequences.

The accused's subsequent request to provide a sample after arrest was found to be too late.

The court found the accused guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The accused was tried on two counts of criminal harassment and one count of breach of probation arising from post-separation contact with his estranged spouse.

The court reviewed a lengthy course of communications and encounters in the context of an on-again, off-again relationship, ongoing property disputes, and mixed messages from the complainant.

Although the court found one August incident amounted to deliberate harassment, it was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant feared for her personal safety or psychological well-being as required by s. 264.

The evidence of repeated following also did not rise above suspicion.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

At the outset of a criminal trial, the applicant sought permission to cross-examine the complainant about other adulterous affairs and broader sexual conduct.

The court held that mere motive was insufficient to ground a third-party suspect theory without an evidentiary link connecting another person to the offence.

It further held that alleged promiscuity and disregard for monogamy had little relevance to testimonial credibility and would invite prejudicial, collateral inquiry.

The proposed questioning was barred because its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

The court ruled on a pre-trial motion regarding the qualification of an expert witness, Ms. Donna Lee, who testified regarding intellectual disabilities and communication issues.

The Crown sought to have the witness qualified as an expert, while the defence challenged her qualifications.

The court applied the four-part test from R. v. Mohan to determine admissibility of expert evidence: relevance, necessity, absence of exclusionary rules, and proper qualification of the expert.

The court found that the witness met all four criteria and allowed her to be qualified as an expert.

The accused was charged with robbery arising from a bank robbery in Ottawa where the perpetrator threatened a teller and fled with cash before discarding clothing and sunglasses containing DNA evidence.

DNA recovered from the sunglasses strongly matched the accused’s profile and weaker DNA evidence linked him to the jacket found nearby.

Eyewitnesses provided only general physical descriptions and could not identify the perpetrator.

The court held that while the DNA evidence and circumstantial factors made it very probable that the accused committed the robbery, the forensic evidence could not establish when the DNA was deposited and required supporting evidence connecting the accused to the crime at the relevant time.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography under s. 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

Police seized multiple hard drives containing over 7,600 unique images of child pornography and 5,608 images of child nudity, along with 26 movies depicting child pornography and 26 depicting child nudity.

The accused purchased two movies online and accumulated the remainder through unknown sources.

A sexual behaviour assessment revealed the accused responded to pedophilic stimuli despite claiming lack of sexual arousal.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months incarceration (14 months and 20 days after pre-disposition custody credit), 18 months probation with strict conditions including prohibition on computer possession, DNA order, forfeiture of hard drives, SOIRA order for 10 years, and s. 161 order for 5 years.

The accused pleaded guilty to disguise with intent and aggravated assault arising from a convenience store robbery on May 6, 2012.

The accused, aged 25 with no prior record, entered the store with his face concealed, brandished a knife, and stabbed the clerk in the abdomen during a struggle.

The Crown sought two years less a day plus probation, emphasizing general deterrence and public protection.

The defence sought 12 months, arguing for credit for pre-sentence custody and extensive rehabilitative efforts.

The court imposed 15 months custody (7 months additional after pre-sentence custody credit) plus two years probation, balancing denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation and restraint principles applicable to youthful first offenders.