Meara Conway

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 12-year-old girl under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to designate the appellant as a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code, instead designating him as a long-term offender under s. 753.1.

The appellant challenged the admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct toward the complainant and alleged the trial judge failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in failing to find a pattern of repetitive behaviour and improperly considered factors outside the statutory dangerous offender test.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The accused, a high school automotive technology teacher, was charged with sexual assault and related offences involving a student under 16 years of age.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the credibility of the complainant, as there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged events.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be fraught with inconsistencies regarding key dates, the frequency and duration of alleged sexual contact, and the circumstances under which the relationship allegedly began.

The complainant provided multiple conflicting versions of events to police, school officials, and friends.

Forensic evidence from the complainant's cell phone revealed no corroborating communications establishing a sexual relationship.

The accused's evidence was consistent, and corroborating testimony from his wife, former students, and the complainant's own friends contradicted the allegations.

The court found the accused had raised a reasonable doubt and acquitted him on all charges.

The accused, charged with domestic violence offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the time of the charges to the anticipated end of the trial was over 41 months.

The Crown argued that the accused had waived his section 11(b) rights during a judicial pre-trial and that significant portions of the delay were attributable to the defence.

The court found that the self-represented accused's waiver was not clear, unequivocal, or informed.

After deducting three months of defence delay, the net delay was over 38 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The application was allowed and the charges were stayed.

The accused, Osama Filli, was charged with second-degree murder for the stabbing death of Nahom Berhane.

The trial proceeded without a jury.

The central issues were self-defence and the intent for murder.

The court found that while Filli subjectively believed he was in danger and acted for self-defence, his belief was not objectively reasonable, and his response (stabbing an unarmed man with a knife when retreat was possible) was grossly disproportionate.

Therefore, self-defence was disproven.

Regarding intent, the court found that Filli intended to cause bodily harm but was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause bodily harm of such a grave and serious nature that he knew it was likely to result in death.

Consequently, Filli was found not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of manslaughter.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break and enter and breach of probation, receiving an eight-month sentence based on a joint submission.

Four months later, an amendment to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act came into force retrospectively, rendering him inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality with no right of appeal due to the sentence length.

The appellant sought to reduce his sentence to five and a half months to preserve his right of appeal against deportation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the reduced sentence remained proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender's circumstances.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her detention in a hospital.

The appellant argued the Board's finding that she posed a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and that her risk could be managed in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant's history of violence, mental illness, substance abuse, and noncompliance with medication and court orders.

The Court relied on expert evidence that the appellant continued to suffer from a significant mental illness and lacked community support, justifying the detention order.

The appellants appealed their sentences for drug trafficking to avoid deportation resulting from the retrospective application of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the first appellant's appeal on Crown consent, reducing his sentence to six months less a day as it remained fit.

The Court dismissed the second appellant's appeal, finding that the requested reduction would render his sentence unfit given his criminal record and the aggravating factors, and would circumvent parliamentary intent.

The accused, a 40-year-old teacher with 12 years of unblemished service, pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offences involving a 12-13 year old student.

The relationship began as supportive mentoring but escalated into romantic and highly sexualized communications, including exchange of explicit images and videos, and physical sexual contact including oral sex and digital penetration.

The accused was arrested after being discovered with the victim in a school gymnasium closet.

The court imposed a sentence of 33 months incarceration with enhanced pre-trial custody credit, resulting in 20 months to serve, followed by 3 years probation.

The court rejected the Crown's submission for 4-5 years, finding the case unique and warranting a sentence outside the normal range due to mitigating factors including genuine remorse, guilty plea, strong family support, and excellent rehabilitation prospects.

Following an earlier ruling declaring two mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in s. 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the court considered whether those provisions were severable from the remainder of the section.

The applicant argued the entire subsection constituted a unitary sentencing scheme that must fall together.

The Crown argued the offending subsections could be removed without affecting the validity of the remaining provisions imposing mandatory minimums for larger-scale cannabis production.

Applying the severance principles from Schachter v. Canada and related authorities, the court concluded the unconstitutional provisions were not inextricably bound to the remaining subsections.

The court held that only ss. 7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) were of no force or effect and that ss. 7(2)(b)(iii–vi) remained valid.

The appellant was convicted of importing narcotics after a 26-month delay between his arrest and trial.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The appellant contended that the 15.5-month delay caused by his efforts to retain counsel of choice, exacerbated by Legal Aid Ontario's refusal to transfer his certificate, should be characterized as institutional or Crown delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was part of the inherent time requirements of the case and that a s. 11(b) application is not the proper forum to review the reasonableness of Legal Aid Ontario's decisions.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, arson, and rendering an indignity to a body after he and two accomplices tortured the victim and burned down the house to conceal the crime.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for the production of a Crown witness's third-party psychological records, and in his jury instructions regarding accomplice evidence (Vetrovec warning) and fabricated statements.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred at the first stage of the third-party records analysis, production would not have been ordered at the second stage.

The court also found the jury instructions were adequate and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant pled guilty to the production of marijuana and theft of electricity after police discovered a large-scale grow operation with a hydro bypass in a residential home.

The Crown sought a mandatory minimum sentence of three years under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing the mandatory minimums violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court found that the mandatory minimum sentences could foreseeably capture conduct with minimal moral blameworthiness, such as a licensed producer making an honest mistake about the number of plants, or a gardener unaware of a public safety hazard.

The court declared the mandatory minimum sentences under ss. 7(2)(b)(i)(ii) and 7(3)(c) of no force or effect.

The appellant appealed a one-year sentence for possession of 97 grams of marijuana.

The Crown conceded the sentence was unfit as it was imposed due to a misapprehension of law that a mandatory minimum applied.

The Court of Appeal accepted a joint submission, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to 12 days imprisonment, equating to time served.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges.

The applicant argued that the three-year delay between his indictment and the extradition request, during which his parole in Canada was revoked, rendered the surrender an abuse of process and unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Minister erred in stating that bad faith or improper motive were prerequisites for abuse of process, the surrender decision was ultimately reasonable.

The delay did not amount to an abuse of process, and the Minister did not err in assessing prejudice or the application of s. 64(1) of the Extradition Act.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to importing 1.37 kg of heroin and was sentenced to 10.5 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient reasons for rejecting his claim of duress, erred in finding he was a principal rather than a courier, and imposed an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's credibility findings were supported by evidence, his characterization of the appellant's role was appropriate, and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the quantity of heroin and the appellant's role.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellant for child luring based on internet communications traced to an IP address.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for extradition after inferring that the appellant was the user of the IP address at the relevant time because he was the subscriber.

The Court of Appeal held that this inference was unreasonable without further evidence linking the subscriber to the actual use of the device at the time of the offence, and quashed the committal order.

The Court also dismissed a constitutional challenge to the ex parte gathering and sending provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, finding they contained adequate safeguards to satisfy procedural fairness under the Charter.

The appellants were convicted of attempted mischief for blocking cattle trucks during a peaceful protest and received a conditional discharge.

Their summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

They sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing their protest was protected expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, holding that the appellants failed to serve a mandatory notice of constitutional question under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act, depriving the court of jurisdiction to grant a Charter remedy.

Three originating applications challenged the constitutional validity of the gathering-order and sending-order regime under ss. 18 and 20 of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act on the basis that the proceedings are presumptively ex parte.

The court held that s. 8 does not generally require inter partes proceedings at the investigative stage, and that the trans-border context does not alter the usual principles favouring confidentiality and expedition in criminal investigations.

Applying the contextual approach from Rodgers, the court found that the statutory scheme contains a broad array of judicial, ministerial, and remedial safeguards.

The absence of presumptive notice before a s. 20 sending order, and the inapplicability of Tse’s after-the-fact notice requirement, did not render the regime unconstitutional.

The applications were dismissed.