Meara Conway

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 12-year-old girl under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to designate the appellant as a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code, instead designating him as a long-term offender under s. 753.1.

The appellant challenged the admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct toward the complainant and alleged the trial judge failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in failing to find a pattern of repetitive behaviour and improperly considered factors outside the statutory dangerous offender test.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 12-year-old girl under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to designate the appellant as a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code, instead designating him as a long-term offender under s. 753.1.

The appellant challenged the admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct toward the complainant and alleged the trial judge failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in failing to find a pattern of repetitive behaviour and improperly considered factors outside the statutory dangerous offender test.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The accused, a high school automotive technology teacher, was charged with sexual assault and related offences involving a student under 16 years of age.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the credibility of the complainant, as there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged events.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be fraught with inconsistencies regarding key dates, the frequency and duration of alleged sexual contact, and the circumstances under which the relationship allegedly began.

The complainant provided multiple conflicting versions of events to police, school officials, and friends.

Forensic evidence from the complainant's cell phone revealed no corroborating communications establishing a sexual relationship.

The accused's evidence was consistent, and corroborating testimony from his wife, former students, and the complainant's own friends contradicted the allegations.

The court found the accused had raised a reasonable doubt and acquitted him on all charges.

The accused, charged with domestic violence offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the time of the charges to the anticipated end of the trial was over 41 months.

The Crown argued that the accused had waived his section 11(b) rights during a judicial pre-trial and that significant portions of the delay were attributable to the defence.

The court found that the self-represented accused's waiver was not clear, unequivocal, or informed.

After deducting three months of defence delay, the net delay was over 38 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The application was allowed and the charges were stayed.

The accused, Osama Filli, was charged with second-degree murder for the stabbing death of Nahom Berhane.

The trial proceeded without a jury.

The central issues were self-defence and the intent for murder.

The court found that while Filli subjectively believed he was in danger and acted for self-defence, his belief was not objectively reasonable, and his response (stabbing an unarmed man with a knife when retreat was possible) was grossly disproportionate.

Therefore, self-defence was disproven.

Regarding intent, the court found that Filli intended to cause bodily harm but was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause bodily harm of such a grave and serious nature that he knew it was likely to result in death.

Consequently, Filli was found not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of manslaughter.

The accused, a 40-year-old teacher with 12 years of unblemished service, pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offences involving a 12-13 year old student.

The relationship began as supportive mentoring but escalated into romantic and highly sexualized communications, including exchange of explicit images and videos, and physical sexual contact including oral sex and digital penetration.

The accused was arrested after being discovered with the victim in a school gymnasium closet.

The court imposed a sentence of 33 months incarceration with enhanced pre-trial custody credit, resulting in 20 months to serve, followed by 3 years probation.

The court rejected the Crown's submission for 4-5 years, finding the case unique and warranting a sentence outside the normal range due to mitigating factors including genuine remorse, guilty plea, strong family support, and excellent rehabilitation prospects.

Following an earlier ruling declaring two mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in s. 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the court considered whether those provisions were severable from the remainder of the section.

The applicant argued the entire subsection constituted a unitary sentencing scheme that must fall together.

The Crown argued the offending subsections could be removed without affecting the validity of the remaining provisions imposing mandatory minimums for larger-scale cannabis production.

Applying the severance principles from Schachter v. Canada and related authorities, the court concluded the unconstitutional provisions were not inextricably bound to the remaining subsections.

The court held that only ss. 7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) were of no force or effect and that ss. 7(2)(b)(iii–vi) remained valid.

The applicant pled guilty to the production of marijuana and theft of electricity after police discovered a large-scale grow operation with a hydro bypass in a residential home.

The Crown sought a mandatory minimum sentence of three years under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing the mandatory minimums violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court found that the mandatory minimum sentences could foreseeably capture conduct with minimal moral blameworthiness, such as a licensed producer making an honest mistake about the number of plants, or a gardener unaware of a public safety hazard.

The court declared the mandatory minimum sentences under ss. 7(2)(b)(i)(ii) and 7(3)(c) of no force or effect.