David Paul Finley

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder in the death of Edward Wilson following a two-month trial in Kenora, Ontario.

The appellant appealed his conviction on six grounds, including challenges to the trial judge's treatment of evidence from the Minaki boys (who assaulted the victim), the admission of hearsay evidence from the co-accused turned Crown witness, jury instructions on intoxication and provocation, the failure to provide a W.(D.) instruction, the admission of police opinion evidence regarding the appellant's veracity, and the cumulative effect of the trial judge's interventions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder in the death of Orin Felix and attempted murder of Trevor Hunter following an altercation between two groups outside a bar.

The appellant appeals on grounds relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct evidence and a corrective instruction regarding the appellant's testimony about a witness named Latoya Dejonge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the post-offence conduct evidence or the corrective instruction, and concluding that the trial remained fair despite some unfortunate judicial decisions.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the stabbing death of Kevin Pham.

On appeal, the court considered three grounds: (1) whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule for out-of-court statements; (2) whether the trial judge erred in admitting the victim's ante mortem statements; and (3) whether the trial judge erred by including multiple alternate routes to liability in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instruction on the co-conspirators' exception was not supportable on the record and lacked adequate reasons.

The court ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 12-year-old girl under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to designate the appellant as a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code, instead designating him as a long-term offender under s. 753.1.

The appellant challenged the admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct toward the complainant and alleged the trial judge failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in failing to find a pattern of repetitive behaviour and improperly considered factors outside the statutory dangerous offender test.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 12-year-old girl under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to designate the appellant as a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code, instead designating him as a long-term offender under s. 753.1.

The appellant challenged the admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct toward the complainant and alleged the trial judge failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in failing to find a pattern of repetitive behaviour and improperly considered factors outside the statutory dangerous offender test.

Both appeals were dismissed.

Two co-accused appealed their sentences imposed following guilty pleas to breaking and entering and convictions on firearm and drug offences.

The appellants argued the sentencing judge erred in characterizing the offence as a home invasion and imposed sentences that were too high and violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentences, finding the sentencing judge was entitled to find the appellants were reckless as to whether anyone was home, and that the sentences were fit given the aggravating factors including the use of a firearm, criminal records, breach of court orders, premeditation, and proximity to schools.

The court allowed Mr. Fourtounes' appeal only to award additional pre-trial custody credit of 227 days.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

The complainant, a child, testified at trial but became unresponsive during cross-examination and refused to answer defence counsel's questions.

The trial judge declined to declare a mistrial or grant a stay of proceedings, instead admitting the complainant's testimony from the preliminary inquiry and providing a cautionary jury instruction regarding the absence of cross-examination.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial, and (2) that the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence regarding false subjective memory in children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to balance the accused's right to make a full answer and defence with the special needs of a young witness in a sexual abuse case.

The appellants, Elizabeth Gayle and Fedrick Gayle, appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the death of Tiffany Gayle, a 15-year-old who was beaten to death in their home.

The appellants challenged various evidentiary rulings and jury instructions made at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of evidence regarding prior discreditable conduct, the baseball bat, or the jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct and the modes of participation in the homicide.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual interference with an 11-year-old child.

The respondent, then 25 years old, had befriended the victim, engaged in grooming behaviour via text and telephone, and subsequently raped her.

The trial judge sentenced him to 30 months' imprisonment with 15 months credit for presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give proper effect to the principles of deterrence and denunciation, by failing to recognize that the respondent had sought out a young girl, and by failing to consider the significant impact of the offence on the victim as a separate aggravating circumstance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and increased the sentence to 33 months' imprisonment (resulting in an effective sentence of 4 years after credit for presentence custody).

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 months plus two years' probation for sexual assault.

He argued that the sentencing judge applied the wrong sentencing range, contending that the appropriate range for intercourse with an unconscious complainant was 12 to 14 months to three years, rather than the 21 months to four years range for forced intercourse with a spouse.

The appellant submitted that a sentence of six to ten months was fit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly applied the sentencing range and that the sentence imposed was fit in the circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and first degree murder following a street altercation in Barrie, Ontario in which two members of an opposing group were stabbed.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: (1) erroneous jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct; (2) one-sided jury charge on planning and deliberation; (3) insufficient instructions on intent for murder; and (4) failure to redact references to the appellant being bipolar.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all counts but substituted a conviction for second degree murder for the first degree murder conviction, finding the trial judge's charge on planning and deliberation was heavily weighted toward inculpatory evidence and omitted significant exculpatory evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated sexual assault and forcible confinement.

During and after the trial, the jury foreperson participated in a radio broadcast where he made derogatory and homophobic comments about the trial participants and discussed the case.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the juror's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias, necessitating a new trial.

The concurring judge found no reasonable apprehension of bias but agreed a new trial was required because the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury against using evidence from one count to support findings on other counts.

The appellant appealed his jury conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm on three grounds: erroneous jury instructions on the fault element, improper Crown conduct during re-examination and closing address, and an erroneous Corbett ruling regarding his criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions for the appellant were separate from the flawed instructions for his co-accused, the Crown's re-examination under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act was permissible, and the trial judge's Corbett ruling was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and conspiracy to commit unlawful confinement, as well as his ten-year sentence.

He argued there was insufficient evidence he knew about a firearm in the driver's side door pocket of the car he was driving.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's possession of other weapons and the proximity of the firearm, proved his knowledge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the trial judge properly considered the appellant's prior record for similar violent offences and his poor prospects for rehabilitation.

The appellant challenged a sexual assault conviction, sought to adduce fresh evidence, and appealed sentence.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, that the W.(D.) framework was misapplied, that the evidence was misapprehended, and that the complainant's frailties were inadequately assessed.

The court held that any possible similar fact reasoning error was curable under s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code, refused to admit the proposed fresh evidence under the Palmer test, and found no error in principle or demonstrable unfitness in the eight-month custodial sentence.

The conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed, although leave to appeal sentence was granted.

The appellant, an inmate, fatally stabbed a fellow inmate and was convicted of first-degree murder.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence and testified to three prior incidents that were never put to the Crown's witnesses during cross-examination.

The trial judge ruled that defence counsel breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn and remedied the breach with a jury instruction rather than recalling the witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to find a breach of the rule and that the jury instruction was a reasonable and proper remedy in the circumstances.

The appellants appealed their convictions for first and second degree murder arising from a firebombing that killed two children.

The Crown's theory was that the primary appellant orchestrated the arson to silence the children's mother, who had accused him of sexual assault, and hired the other appellants to execute the plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's admission of bad character evidence, Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness, instructions on unlawful object murder, or instructions on post-offence conduct.

The court also upheld the 23-year parole ineligibility period for the appellant convicted of second degree murder.

The respondent, convicted of first-degree murder, sought a declaration that he could apply for a ministerial review of his conviction under s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code without first seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application judge granted the declaration, finding that the Minister of Justice is not precluded from determining that an applicant has exhausted their rights of appeal despite not applying for leave to the SCC.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed, and the respondent cross-appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, agreeing with the application judge's analysis.

The accused was charged with care or control over 80 and released on a promise to appear.

A justice of the peace failed to properly confirm the promise to appear under s. 508 of the Criminal Code, issuing a summons for a new date without endorsing the cancellation of the original promise.

The trial judge quashed the information for want of jurisdiction, and the summary conviction appeal judge affirmed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that non-compliance with s. 508 results in a loss of jurisdiction over the person, not the offence, and does not affect the validity of a properly laid information.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and unsuccessful on appeal to the Court of Appeal, sought a declaration that he was not required to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada before applying for ministerial review of his conviction under s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Attorney General of Ontario argued that all appeal avenues, including a leave application to the Supreme Court, must be exhausted before ministerial review could proceed.

The court held that although the phrase “rights of judicial review or appeal” includes the right to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, the concept of exhaustion must be interpreted flexibly.

Determining whether appeal rights have been exhausted is a discretionary screening decision for the Minister of Justice, not the provincial Attorney General.

The court declared that the Minister may determine that appeal rights are exhausted even where no leave application to the Supreme Court has been made.