Self-represented

The appellants appealed an order requiring them to post $66,670 as security for costs pending the trial of their counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal raised the issue of jurisdiction, noting that orders for security for costs are interlocutory, not final.

The appellants argued the order was final in substance because they could not afford to pay it, which would end the litigation.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the legal nature of the order, not its practical effect, determines whether it is interlocutory or final.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed an order denying her motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the respondent after the appellant defaulted on her mortgage.

The motion judge found that while the appellant moved with reasonable dispatch, she failed to provide a draft statement of defence and her proposed defences lacked an air of reality.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's articulation or application of the test for setting aside a default judgment and dismissed the appeal.

The Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee brought a motion to be appointed as the guardian of property and personal care for an incapable adult, seeking to remove the adult's sister from the role.

The court found that the sister had failed to act in the incapable adult's best interests by removing her from a successful group home placement, failing to secure appropriate alternative residential care, leaving her to languish in a hospital mental health ward, and failing to pass her accounts.

The motion was granted, the sister was removed as guardian, and the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed in her place.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support following the breakdown of a 24-year traditional marriage.

The respondent argued that the applicant's income should be imputed to full-time minimum wage and that support should be reduced due to alleged misconduct.

The court declined to impute income, finding no evidentiary basis to establish intentional unemployment given the applicant's age, lack of work history, and health conditions.

The court also rejected the misconduct argument.

Interim spousal support was ordered at the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, amounting to $4,236 per month.

Claims for retroactive support and health benefits were dismissed without prejudice to be determined at trial.

The appellant appealed a scheduling order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that a scheduling order is an interlocutory order because it does not determine the merits of the dispute.

Therefore, the appeal should have been brought to the Divisional Court, and the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

No costs were awarded.

The father brought a motion to change a 2018 final order for child support, seeking a retroactive and prospective reduction based on his enrollment in a college program and receipt of OSAP funding.

The mother opposed the reduction and brought a cross-motion seeking an increase in support based on the current minimum wage.

The court applied the framework from Colucci v. Colucci and found that neither party established a material change in circumstances.

The court held that the father's transition from social assistance to OSAP funding did not demonstrate a decrease in his earning capacity below the minimum wage imputed in the original order, nor did it establish an increase in capacity to justify the mother's request.

Both the motion and cross-motion were dismissed, and the original child support order remained in effect.

The defendant was charged with two counts under the City of Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 547: operating as a short-term rental operator without registration, and failing to include an operator's registration number in an advertisement.

The Airbnb stay data established that a booking at the defendant's principal residence was made using another person's registration number before the defendant's own permit was issued, generating a deposit to his account.

Although the reservation was cancelled before the guest arrived, the court found that the actus reus of count 1 was made out, interpreting "reservation" and "carrying on business" broadly.

The defendant's due diligence defence failed on both branches — he could not establish a reasonable mistake of fact given his admitted knowledge that his application was still under review, and his remedial efforts (contacting Airbnb and the guest to cancel the booking) were characterized as post-offence conduct relevant only to sentencing.

Count 2 was dismissed because no evidence of an actual advertisement was tendered; the officer never saw one and could only speculate as to its historical existence.

The plaintiff municipality was the victim of a cyber-fraud scheme where an unknown individual impersonated a contractor and diverted a payment of $201,285.86 to a fraudulent bank account.

After obtaining a Norwich order to identify the account holders, the plaintiff sued the defendants and noted them in default.

The court granted default judgment for the diverted funds, ordered the release of frozen funds held by the bank, and awarded $100,000 in punitive damages to deter such highly reprehensible misconduct.

Full indemnity costs were also awarded.

Following a successful application in which the applicant was awarded $200,000 from the estate of his deceased brother and/or from the respondent widow personally on the basis of conversion of trust assets, the court fixed costs of the entire proceeding on a full indemnity basis.

The respondent, who acted as estate trustee and sole beneficiary of her late husband's estate, consistently defied court orders, refused to provide accountings, launched multiple unsuccessful interlocutory proceedings, remained self-represented despite orders requiring her to retain counsel, and failed to pay $21,000 in previously-ordered costs.

The court found her conduct constituted an egregious disregard for the court and the rule of law, warranting full indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $195,543.68 inclusive of all prior costs awards, jointly and severally payable by the respondent in her personal and representative capacities within 60 days.

The court further declared that the real property subject to a Certificate of Pending Litigation was available to satisfy both the $200,000 judgment and the costs award.

The self-represented moving party sought review of a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to extend time to appeal a Superior Court order that had itself declined to extend time for him to appeal a default order in a support enforcement proceeding.

The panel applied the deferential standard requiring an error in law or misapprehension of material evidence before intervening.

Finding no such error, the panel upheld the motion judge's refusal of the extension, which was based on the proposed appeal being manifestly without merit and an abuse of process.

The panel noted that concerns regarding incarceration, support payment history, and arrears calculation had been previously decided and upheld on appeal, and could not be addressed through the proposed appeal in the context of a support enforcement proceeding.

Self-represented plaintiffs commenced an action in 2022 alleging that their investment advisor misappropriated inheritance funds deposited into a brokerage account in 2005.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment asserting no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the action was statute-barred.

The court found that the plaintiffs had documentary evidence of the account and its transactions in 2004 and 2005, and that they necessarily would have discovered the alleged loss of funds by 2014 when they closed all accounts with the defendants.

The court held that the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 had expired well before the action was commenced in 2022.

The court further held that the plaintiffs' claim of misappropriation was unsupported by evidence and rested on conjecture, including a forensic document examiner's report given no weight for failing to comply with affidavit requirements.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant attempted to appeal a single Divisional Court judge's direction made during a judicial review proceeding concerning a freedom of information disclosure dispute.

The court held that no appeal as of right lay to the Court of Appeal from that direction.

Depending on whether the order was made on a motion, the proper route was either a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act or, otherwise, a leave appeal under s. 6(1)(a).

Because the notice of appeal clearly failed to engage the court's jurisdiction, the proceeding was dismissed under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

No costs were ordered.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal an order dismissing his civil action under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge applied the justice of the case framework and held that, although the merits inquiry was the most important factor, the proposed appeal was not clearly devoid of merit.

The court found it arguable that the action sought civil remedies outside the regulator’s jurisdiction and that any prematurity issue might justify a stay rather than dismissal.

The extension of time was granted and the moving party was given until April 9, 2026 to file the notice of appeal.

The applicant brought a motion in a family proceeding seeking the judge's recusal on the basis of reasonable apprehension of bias arising from comments made during an earlier motion and findings in a prior endorsement concerning the sale of the matrimonial home.

The court applied the high-threshold test for apprehension of bias and held that the impugned comments reflected ordinary case management, evidentiary rulings, and findings grounded in the evidentiary record, not a closed mind or predisposition.

The motion was dismissed, costs of $3,000 were awarded to the respondent, and the settlement conference was adjourned on consent with directions for updated financial disclosure and response to a request for information.

The self-represented mortgagors brought a motion, treated from a notice of application, seeking a determination of the amount owing under a mortgage together with broader discharge-related and damages remedies following an earlier summary judgment decision.

The court held that all relief other than fixing the mortgage balance fell outside the case conference direction, improperly attempted to reargue the dismissed counterclaim, or would have to be advanced, if at all, in a new action subject to issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel.

On the merits, the court rejected the alleged waiver of interest and the borrowers' attempt to deduct again payments already reflected in the agreed principal balance.

The mortgagee's calculation was accepted, fixing the amount owing at $791,159.83 as of the hearing date, inclusive of accrued interest, the prepayment charge, and the tax account payoff.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment granting the respondent bank possession of the appellant's residence and monetary relief arising from mortgage default.

The Court of Appeal held there was no merit to the appeal because the evidence was undisputed, the appellant admitted non-payment even after adjustments and an extension, and the mortgage contract authorized possession upon default after required notice.

The court also rejected reliance on the Charte hypothécaire canadienne, holding that it formed part of a federal economic statement and had no force of law.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellant father sought a stay pending appeal of retroactive child support and costs orders, reinstatement of his suspended driver's licence, and a refraining order against further federal enforcement measures.

The court held that the appeal met the low serious-issue threshold in relation to the application of retroactive support principles and the departure from the presumptive three-year period, but the interests of justice did not favour a stay because the balance of convenience, clean hands, and delay all weighed against the moving party.

Relief under the support-enforcement scheme was also denied because the moving party had not satisfied the statutory conditions for driver's licence reinstatement or for preventing a federal licence denial application.

The court nonetheless directed that monies paid to the Director in excess of the prior unstayed costs order and any costs ordered on the motion be held pending disposition of the appeal.

The appellant challenged only the monetary component of a summary judgment finding of copyright infringement, arguing that the profits award failed to account for expenses such as labour, taxes, and rent.

The court held that under s. 35(2) of the Copyright Act, the defendant bore the onus of proving any deductions from revenues earned through infringing sales.

Because no evidentiary foundation was provided for the claimed expenses before the motion judge, and further calculations were advanced for the first time on appeal, there was no basis for appellate intervention.

The appeal was dismissed and appeal costs were fixed at $5,000 inclusive.

The appellant commenced an action seeking damages, alleging the respondent lawyer received mortgage discharge funds on his behalf but took the funds without documenting a loan or repaying them.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's summary judgment motion due to conflicting evidence and credibility issues.

On a boomerang basis, the motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred, finding the appellant knew of his claim by November 2, 2020, when his demand for payment or a signed loan commitment was refused, and the action was not commenced until 32 months later.

The Court of Appeal found no error, rejected the appellant's fraudulent concealment argument, and dismissed the appeal with costs of $8,000 to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of importing heroin contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after approximately 11 kilograms of heroin were found in a suitcase he carried into Canada from South Africa.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, alleged a miscarriage of justice from the Crown's purported withholding of exculpatory evidence on his electronic devices, and sought to introduce evidence regarding COVID-19 entry restrictions as new evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment, held there was no Crown disclosure failure, and determined the COVID-19 restrictions argument had already been considered at trial and was not determinative.