Introduction

1This is a motion by the applicant mother (A/M) for monthly child support in the amount of $10,369.00 (after set-off), monthly spousal support in the amount of $6,393.00 and a proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses based on the respondent father (R/F) paying 83% of the children's special and extraordinary expenses and the A/M paying 17% of the children's special and extraordinary expenses, up to a maximum of $8,616.00 per year.

2The A/M also requests an interim disbursement of $250,000 pursuant to r. 24(25) of the Family Law Rules to allow her to examine the evidence, make appropriate Offers to Settle, and if necessary, carry the case to trial.

3Finally, the A/M seeks an Order pursuant to s. 112 of the Courts of Justice Act requesting the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) to cause an investigation to be made on all matters concerning decision-making responsibility and parenting time with respect to their children, Yoni born September, 2019, Raya born January, 2021, and Gabriella born May, 2022. The R/F has consented to this request. The parties should submit the usual form of parenting Order required by the OCL for my signature (through my judicial assistant, Aditi Kara at Aditi.kara@ontario.ca).

4If both sides agree they would like a second settlement conference, they may contact me jointly in the same manner, provided the request is made within 14 days.

Background

5The parties cohabitated from 2013 to 2025, with small interruptions in 2014 and 2015. Although there is some dispute about the length of those interruptions, for present purposes I can assume this is a 12-year relationship.

6They have four children, three of whom (named above) are under the age of 7. The fourth child, Sienna, is 18 years old. She is the A/M’s child from a prior relationship. Sienna has been raised by the R/F since Sienna was four years old. The R/F would like to improve his relationship with Sienna, although that is not directly an issue on this motion.

7The parties separated in February 2025 after the A/M was charged with various offences related to a serious drinking and driving incident. Her criminal trial is expected to occur later this year.

8Although the children initially resided with the R/F post separation, Sienna now resides exclusively with the A/M and the other three reside equally with both parents.

9Sienna will go to University in September 2026 at which point she will likely reside at home with her mother for only four months each year.

10The R/F occupies the matrimonial home exclusively. The parties have agreed to sell the home but that process is stalled. The R/F says he cannot sell it until he does some minor repairs and that these have been delayed pending his insurance claim.

11It is material that the R/F pays all the carrying costs of the home pursuant to an interim Order. Those expenses are significant, in the order of $15,000 per month, which the R/F says he can’t afford if he is also ordered to pay the amounts sought on this motion.

12The R/F also currently pays 100% of the s.7 expenses. These are also significant in this case and an important part of the analysis on this motion. The R/F paid approximately $60,000 last year in s.7 expenses alone. The A/M does not have to contribute but she says she paid just under $3,600.

13The most significant component of the s.7 expenses is the cost of the private schools for the three youngest children. This is around $40,000 per year in total.

14The R/F is firmly of the view that this private school expense should continue (albeit shared equally by the parties, instead of paid exclusively by him). The A/M believes, however, that this annual cost is excessive in light of their current financial situation. She suggests the children should attend public school.

15The A/M says she is in a very poor financial situation. She is currently allowed to take $5,600 per month from the joint line of credit. She is also paid approximately $3,100 per month net by the R/F’s law firm (she does not work there; this is income splitting for tax purposes). She says her current income is inadequate to live on or to maintain the children in an appropriate standard of living. She has no assets of any consequence.

16For the purposes of this motion the A/M says her annual income is $18,000 based on her 2025 income as a doula/infant sleep trainer, although she cannot work in that field at this time due to the impact of the pending criminal charges.

17The A/M says she has worked hard to achieve and maintain sobriety and build a business and support network. Her focus, she says, at this time needs to be on defending the four criminal charges, being present for her children and improving her mental health.

18The A/M formerly worked as a law clerk in various law firms. She has not worked in that capacity for six years. She took a leave of absence when the last two children were born. She does not believe a law firm would hire her because of the pending charges, but she has not sought such a job. The R/F does not think the charges would impede her from being hired.

19The R/F is a personal injury litigation lawyer. The R/F’s income is $538,218.00 per year based on an expert’s income report he has produced. The A/M accepts this figure only for the purposes of this motion. She says the R/F’s actual income is higher. The R/F agrees this number should be used on this motion.

The R/F’s three companies

20Glowinsky Law (the R/F’s professional corporation) and his two other corporations hold the R/F’s primary assets. The corporate financial statements do not disclose any significant assets or liabilities or income sources other than his income from his litigation practice. It is true that in recent years he was able to withdraw funds from his business for a million-dollar payment on the matrimonial home. It appears that was taken out using a “dividend strip” for tax purposes. This appears to have been a mechanism to save taxes and did not generate new or additional income nor does it suggest any impropriety on his part.

21It appears that the R/F has funded his litigation expenses, including expert fees, through the companies. This is important in the context of the A/M’s request for interim disbursements to fund her own litigation expenses.

The A/M’s position

22The A/M says the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (CSG) and the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) are presumptively applicable and there is no reason to depart from them.

23The A/M says all four children are entitled to child support. She says the amount should be calculated in accordance with the CSG and should not be reduced just because the R/F earns more than the upper threshold of $150,000.

24She argues that based on their incomes, and after taking into account child and spousal support, the A/M’s proportionate share should be in the range of 13.6% to 17.3% depending on how much spousal support is ordered.

25She says the R/F’s argument that s.7 expenses should be paid in equal parts based on a target of equal net disposable income (NDI) is contrary to the CSG.

26She says that entitlement to spousal support is not in issue and the quantum should be set at the higher end of the SSAG range having regard, in particular, to the great disparity in their incomes and the number of children. She also relies on the fact that she has been out of the workforce for some years, and had three children in quick succession. Meanwhile, the R/F established a successful law firm.

27The A/M argues that she needs $250,000 to pay for interim disbursements to level the playing field in this family litigation, given that the R/F has ready access to funds for this purpose and she had no means to pay her lawyers and the experts.

The R/F’s position

28The R/F does not deny that the A/M is entitled to both child and spousal support.

29He says, however, that child support has to be reduced based on Sienna no longer living at home after August, 2026. More significantly, he says that spousal support should be minimal having regard to the very high s.7 expenses and his inability to pay, as evidenced, he says, by an analysis of his budget and his lack of assets; notwithstanding his relatively high income.

30He says the SSAG should not be applied as argued by the A/M. He says they only require an outcome of equal NDI. He does not suggest this is an exceptional situation as listed in the SSAG. He says, however, that the court must have regard to the very high s.7 expenses and adjust spousal support to leave both parties with a relatively equal standard of living. He says that equalizing their NDI should be the target. He complains that the A/M’s approach would result in him retaining only about 31-34% of the family’s NDI with the A/M obtaining 66-69%.

31He also points out that existing court Orders (June 12, 2025 and November 19, 2025) requiring him to pay all the home’s carrying costs; to pay both the A/M and Sienna a notional salary, and to pay all s.7 expenses must be dealt with concurrently (this is not in dispute). In this regard, he wants to stop the current monthly payments from his Professional Corporation to Sienna (the 18-year-old child). He also says that the joint line of credit should no longer be used, other than for the current situation to be maintained by the A/M paying all the interest.

32He maintains that they parties should be equally responsible for the carrying costs of the matrimonial home where only he resides, pending its sale (which has long been delayed).

33He argues that the s. 7 expenses should be shared equally, even though he makes $500,000 more than the A/M by his own admission.

34The R/F says the effect of any Order must promote an equal sharing of family expenses, while also capturing an equal sharing of the parties’ net disposable incomes. This outcome, he says, is in accordance with the SSAG.

35Finally, he says the A/M’s request for $250,000 for interim disbursements should be denied because the amount sought is grossly excessive and, in any event, he cannot pay such a large sum. He says he too needs funding for the litigation.

What is not in issue on the motion (Retroactive Support/Postseparation Adjustments)

36Neither party claims retroactive support on this motion. This will be an issue for trial. Similarly, postseparation adjustments are also in the purview of the trial judge.

Analysis

Child Support (Imputing Income)

Analysis

37The A/M says her income for the purposes of this motion is $18,000 per year. The R/F asks the court to impute income of $72,500 to the A/M based on section 19 of the CSG. Based on his calculations, child support would be $9,082 per month and spousal support $939 per month.

38He says the A/M should earn what she is capable of earning as a law clerk. If she fails to do so (as is the case, he says), she should be found to be intentionally under-employed: Drygala v. Pauli 2002 41868 (ON CA), [2002] 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (Ont. C.A.).

39The onus is on the party seeking to impute income to the other party to establish that the other party is intentionally unemployed or under-employed. The person requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made. Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, 248 O.A.C. 168, at para. 28.

40Once a party seeking the imputation of income presents the evidentiary basis suggesting a prima facie case, the onus shifts to the individual seeking to defend the income position in question: Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200 at paras. 108 and 111.

41In Drygala, at para. 23, (see also Lavie v. Lavie, 2018 ONCA 10, at para. 28) the court set out three questions that should be addressed when considering a request to impute income:

Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?
If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his or her reasonable educational needs, the needs of the child or reasonable health needs?
If not, what income is appropriately imputed?

42The court need not be satisfied that a payor spouse has acted in bad faith before it imposes a support order based on imputed income: Drygala, at paras. 29-30, and 36. Rather, the court must consider whether the parent's decisions around work choices are reasonable: Drygala, at paras. 38-40; see also Duffy v, Duffy, 2009 NLCA 48, 73 R.F.L. (6th) 233, at para. 25; Tillmanns, at paras. 59-60.

43I struck out references to a vocational expert’s opinion that was improperly tendered by the R/F without an affidavit, without the expert’s affirmation of duty and without proof of appropriate expertise, but there was other admissible evidence about the A/M’s track record as a law clerk with well known law firms. The issue is not any lack of evidence. It is likely that at some appropriate time the A/M may have to refresh her law clerk training and seek employment in that field.

44The issue is that I do not accept that it is reasonable for the R/F to expect that the A/M immediately refresh her training and resume practice as a law clerk. This is a case similar to Lindeman v. Desloges, 2020 ONCJ 41 and McCormick v. McCormick 2013 ONSC 709. She is relatively recently separated, relatively recently recovered (or still recovering) from her alcohol related relapse, dealing with medical issues (although the details and prognosis are not yet confirmed by medical evidence) and she is still responsible for raising three children under 7 years of age (recognizing it is a situation of partly shared custody, but noting that she helps the R/F when he is understandably unavailable on his parenting times due to his work commitments). Furthermore, she will soon be helping 18-year-old daughter Sienna prepare to depart for first year University. All that is in addition to the upcoming trial on the driving under the influence/while impaired charges, which should be behind her by the end of the year.

45It may be that by some time next year the A/M may reasonably be expected to make other career decisions, but that will be for the trial judge to decide. Of course, that will bring into play the issue of whether the A/M will then need to incur childcare expenses, as the R/F has done to the tune of about $35,000 to allow him to work fulltime, thereby reducing the net value of the extra income.

46For now, the $18,000 which the A/M’s acknowledges she earns per year is appropriate for the purposes of this motion.

47The R/F earns $538,218.00. This is significantly more than the $150,000 high end threshold in the CSG, above which the court has discretion in setting the quantum of child support, if the Table amount is found to be inappropriate. The Table amount is presumed to be appropriate, Francis v. Baker, 1999 659 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250 para. 42. If the court decides that approach is inappropriate, then for the excess earnings (above $150,000) the court must determine the appropriate amount payable, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the children and the financial ability of each parent to contribute to the children’s support.

48I find that this is a case in which the R/F is a consistently high earner. This is not a situation where he only has occasional years with high income. I do not see any reason why the Table amount for child support should not apply. There is no evidence to show why the CSG approach is inappropriate, as discussed in Hathaway v. Hathaway, 2014 BCCA 310. I will, however, take the R/F’s high income (above threshold) into account in determining the range of spousal support which I will deal with below.

Child Support (Custody Shared or Hybrid)

49There are four children who must be considered for purposes of child support. Sienna must be included. She resides solely with the A/M, at least until September, 2026 when she will attend University. Thus, this is a hybrid case, with three children in shared custody and one in the sole custody of the mother.

50The CSG shall be applied in the manner the A/M has calculated. The R/F is required to pay $10,531 and the A/M is required to pay $162 per month. The setoff amount payable by the R/F therefore is $10,369 monthly. There should be no deduction prior to September, 2026 on the basis that Sienna must somehow be disregarded. Assuming Sienna does go away to University, then after September, 2026 the numbers will be adjusted in a manner commensurate with these reasons to reflect whatever residential reality then prevails (having regard also to whether s.7 expenses continue at the same approximate levels).

51When Sienna leaves for University and assuming she resides at home only for four months, the software calculation shows that if the A/M is still earning $18,000, the result will be child support payable by the R/F of $9,188, and assuming s.7 expenses remain the same, the R/F will pay spousal support (at the low end of the range) of $5,866 per month.

Section 7 Expenses

52Both sides acknowledge that in determining the parents’ incomes in order to apportion s.7 expenses, a court is to deduct spousal support paid to the other spouse from the payor’s income. On the other hand, child support paid and/or received is not considered when determining s.7 expenses: CSG, Schedule III, para. 3(a).

53 Section 4 of the CSG says the court may award Table calculated child support and an amount for special and extraordinary expenses. S. 7 expenses must be considered prior to calculating spousal support because the various formulas for spousal support deduct both the table amount for child support and the s.7 expense contributions of each spouse from income. (See Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2016, “RUG”, section 8(b), which is entitled Section 7 expense contributions)).

54The court must therefore make some estimate of future s.7 expenses before turning to the SSAG calculations. The RUG suggests that if the expenses are not too large, they can perhaps be accommodated by going lower in the SSAG range.

55I accept the s.7 expenses set out in exhibit D to the A/M’s affidavit sworn April 17, 2026. To avoid any doubt, that exhibit is the DivorceMate calculation showing that the R/F will be responsible for $5,434 per month and the A/M for $258 per month at the low end of the SSAG range.

56Section 7(3) of the CSGs states that in determining the amount of an expense, “the court must take into account any subsidies, benefits or income tax deductions or credits relating to the expense, and any eligibility to claim a subsidy, benefit or income tax deduction or credit relating to the expense.”

57In this regard it must also be noted that in 2025 the R/F was able to claim a childcare expense of over $35,000 (on account of special and extraordinary expenses) as a deduction on his income tax return.

58The calculations proposed by the A/M also take into account the fact that the R/F will claim one of the children as a dependent, which is permitted for separated families with children in shared custody.

59Pursuant to section 7(2) of the Federal CSG, the guiding principle for section 7 expenses is “that the expense should be shared by the spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child.” This refers to the parties’ actual or imputed income. It does not refer to net disposable income. Applying net disposable incomes to proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses is contrary to the CSG: Ostapchuk v. Ostapchuk (2003), 2003 57399 (ON CA), 64 O.R.(3d) 496, 226 D.L.R.(4th) 385, 38 R.F.L.(5th) 172 (C.A.). (In this case there is no issue of contributions from any child).

60The R/F says to the contrary, that interim support arrangements should result in the equal sharing of net disposable incomes of the parties, and the Court should also make an Order for the equal sharing of section 7 expenses. He relies on N.L. v. J.C., 2019 ONSC 6207 where Justice Emery found at para. 106 that because the spouses had approximately equal incomes, they had an obligation and responsibility to contribute to their children’s section 7 expenses equally. I do not accept that conclusion is appropriate here. There is a huge disparity in incomes, there is a significant compensatory claim and the R/F insists on the three younger children attending private school, contrary to the views of the A/M.

61The parties’ incomes are $18,000 and $538,218 respectively. I estimate the s. 7 expenses for the forthcoming year to be the same as set out in exhibit D to the April 17, 2026 affidavit of the A/M (case center p. A389). The parties will apply those numbers.

Spousal Support

62 Section 15.2(2) of the Divorce Act enables the court to award interim spousal support. Given the summary nature of a motion for interim spousal support, and its temporary effect (i.e., only pending trial), s. 15.2(2) provides a court with a broad discretion to order what it “…thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse, pending the determination of the application” for spousal support.

63In exercising that discretion, section 15.2(4) requires the Court to consider the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including:

a. the length of time the spouses cohabited;

b. the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

c. any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

64Section 15.2(6) provides that an interim order under subsection (2) should:

(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

65In Knowles v. Lindstrom, 2015 ONSC 1408, 57 R.F.L. (7th) 402, the court stated at para. 8:

“Interim support motions are not intended to involve a detailed examination of the merits of the case. Nor is the court required to determine the extent to which either party suffered economic advantage or disadvantage as a result of the relationship or its breakdown. These tasks are for the trial judge. Orders for interim support are based on a triable or prima facie case. An order for interim support is in the nature of a “holding order” for the purpose of maintaining the accustomed lifestyle pending trial”.

66In Driscoll v. Driscoll, 2009 66373(Ont. S.C.), the Court, at para. 14 referred to Robles v. Kuhn, 2009 BCSC 1163, and concluded that:

On applications for interim support the applicant's needs and the respondent's ability to pay assume greater significance;
An interim support order should be sufficient to allow the applicant to continue living at the same standard of living enjoyed prior to separation if the payor's ability to pay warrants it;
On interim support applications the court does not embark on an in-depth analysis of the parties' circumstances which is better left to trial. The court achieves rough justice at best;
The courts should not unduly emphasize any one of the statutory considerations above others;
On interim applications the need to achieve economic self-sufficiency is often of less significance;
Interim support should be ordered within the range suggested by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines unless exceptional circumstances indicate otherwise;
Interim support should only be ordered where it can be said a prima facie case for entitlement has been made out;
Where there is a need to resolve contested issues of fact, especially those connected with a threshold issue, such as entitlement, it becomes less advisable to order interim support.

67Entitlement to spousal support on the part of the A/M is not an issue here. The R/F recognizes he should pay spousal support.

68The R/F’s concern, however, is that the blind application of the SSAG will severely impact him, and unfairly benefit the A/M. He says that the A/M’s position will leave him with a net disposable income of $7,303 per month and leave her with a net disposable income of $16,624.

69The R/F also argued that if this sum was ordered in addition to the current interim support arrangements, he would also have to cover the carrying costs for the matrimonial home in the amount of $14,464.74. This would leave him with a negative income every month – without factoring in basic expenses for himself and the children. This is not an issue, however, because I am terminating the prior interim support arrangements (the applicable portion of the two relevant Orders cited above) as part of this Order.

70The R/F says that if he has to pay the amount sought by the A/M, even after the matrimonial home is sold, he will be unable to afford his basic monthly expenses on $7,303 per month. The R/F’s updated sworn Financial Statement says his basic monthly expenses are $8,555.25. This does not include any housing or utility costs or the children’s section 7 expenses. The R/F notes that he will have to pay rent or a mortgage when he vacates the matrimonial home.

71I agree that the spousal support numbers should take gross disparities into consideration, but the appropriate approach is not to insist on the equalization of NDI. The spousal support software already takes into account any large disparity in incomes and the tax benefits and credits that will be available to the R/F once formal spousal support is being paid. A more nuanced approach is appropriate.

72In summary, the court in quantifying temporary spousal support must take the following steps:

(a) determine each spouse’s income;

(b) choose the correct SSAG formula;

(d) determine and explain the location in the range, after reviewing the factors listed in the SSAGs.

73I would add that the court must also consider whether exceptional circumstances suggest that interim spousal support should not be ordered within the range suggested by the SSAG. In this case the R/F does not suggest that exceptional circumstances warrant an exception.

74Section 8(f) of the RUG explains how the SSAG apply in “Shared Custody Cases” (this is not such a case, but nonetheless the commentary is instructive). Although the R/F suggested otherwise, this is not a shared custody case, it is a hybrid case because Sienna lives exclusively with the A/M while the custody of the other three children is shared.

“Some lawyers and courts have been surprised by SSAG ranges for amount that start at or near 50 per cent NDI for the recipient and then go up from there, typically cases with two or three children. The argument is that spousal support should never leave the recipient with more than 50 per cent of the family’s net disposable income in shared custody cases. That view is incorrect, as the cases with big income disparities often reflect strong compensatory claims based upon past disadvantage that justify going above 50 per cent. The same is true for some of the cases where the recipient has a low income.” (emphasis added).

75Section 8(h) of the Revised User’s Guide explains how the SSAGs apply in Hybrid or Mixed Custody Cases, which is the situation here.

“These are cases in which at least one child is in shared custody plus the split, sole or primary residence of the others. These are complex cases, but the software by and large solves the problems of calculation of child support and notional child support.

Because at least one of the children is in shared custody, the discretion of s.9 of the Child Support Guidelines is available in assessing child support. For a leading case on the calculation of child support in hybrid cases, see Sadkowski v. Harrison-Sadkowski, 2008 ONCJ 115. In turn, as with shared custody, that child support discretion can complicate the SSAG calculations. Any complications can be resolved by simply using the set-off to determine child support and then using spousal support to adjust, e.g., T.L. v J.L., 2014 ONSC 91.

As with split custody, there is no automatic extension of the range in the formula to include a 50/50 split of NDI, especially as there may be an odd number of children involved. If there is much movement between the homes, not just for the shared custody child, there may be a good argument in favour of equal living standards, e.g. Ryder v. Walker, 2015 ONSC 2332 (1 child primarily with mother, 2 shared, living standards should be “not too dissimilar”)”.

76To avoid any doubt, the R/F understandably did not claim “undue hardship” even though he did rely on his own monthly expenses, his own housing expenses and the argument that his net income after spousal support would be inadequate to allow him to maintain his and the children’s lifestyle.

77I will now determine where spousal support should be set in the SSAG range.

SSAG Ranges

78Applying the “with child support” formula, the SSAG range for spousal support for a 12-year long relationship based on annual income of $538,000 for the R/F and $18,000 for the A/M and four children (hybrid) with (setoff) child support of $10,369 per month is:

SSAG Low Range

SSAG Mid Range

SSAG High Range

Amount

$4,866

$5,730

$6,558

Net Disposable Income (NDI)

F–33.8% M – 66.2%

F–32.3% M– 67.7%

F–30.8% M – 69.2%

After Tax Cost/(Benefit)

F–$(27,135) M – $44,401

F–$(31,952) M – $51,694

F–$(36,571) M – $58,686

Percent of INDI (Individual NDI)

F–60% M–40%

F–57% M –43%

F–54% M –46%

79I have taken into account chapter 9 of the SSAG to determine where temporary spousal support should be ordered along the range. The relevant factors are:

(a) The recipient’s needs tend to push the award to the higher end of the range for amount because she has limited income and earning capacity, and because of her personal circumstances set out above, plus the fact that the A/M’s latest financial statement shows she has minimal assets.

(b) The R/F has a high income. It is above the $150,000 threshold in the SSAG. While “need” and limited ability to pay on the part of a payor spouse might push an award to the lower ends of the ranges, that is not of much relevance here. While his own “need” is elevated by the expense of the home and the private schools this is largely within his own control. If he rented a home for the same cost as the A/M’s rental house ($5,600 per month) and if the three children, all under 7 years old, went to public school his expenses would be significantly reduced.

(c) The carrying cost of the matrimonial home are high but he lives in the home; not the R/M. The home should soon be sold. The R/F will therefore reduce his living costs (the sooner the better). He will presumably replace that very high monthly expense with a lower monthly accommodation cost.

(d) The need to preserve work incentives for the payor has less significance on an interim motion for spousal support. The R/F has every reason to continue his lucrative career. The more important issues for him are selling the house and deciding on whether to continue to incur the private school costs for the younger three children.

(e) Equalization is an issue which will be determined at trial. For now it is not a significant factor for determining the place in the SSAG range.

(f) There is no suggestion that the recipient will hold sizeable exempt or excluded assets after division, and therefore, that is not a factor in favour of the R/F.

80The most important consideration for now is to maintain the standard of living of the children as equitably as possible in both households. The R/F will be paying Table child support without reduction for his earnings being above the $150,000 threshold. He will continue to receive the tax benefit of deducting the cost of the nanny and other child related deductions. He will, of course, be able to deduct his spousal support payments. The A/M will eventually be expected to earn more than she currently does, but that is not a reason to impute income today, as discussed above.

81The end result is that in balancing all the considerations set out above, I award spousal support at the low end of the range.

82The R/F relies on Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, 2015 SCC 63 where Justice Fish (in dissent, although not on this point) stated at para. 85:

“… in cases of shared custody, child support seeks to secure for the child, insofar as possible, a similar standard of living in the two households concerned. Children may prefer one household to the other, but that cannot be made to depend on the respective means and resources of their parents.”

83As the RUG noted when it was published the following year, in shared custody cases “there is a clear default location for amount in the range: the amount of spousal support which would leave the children in each household with roughly similar standards of living.” (para. 8(f)).

84This statement does not suggest that NDI must be divided equally between parents in cases of split custody where one parent has primary care of one or more children (sometimes referred to as hybrid custody where there is both a shared and split custody components) (RUG para. 8(g) and (h)). SSAG contemplates the exercise of judicial discretion to adjust payment and receipts between households. A 50:50 NDI is not automatically included in the SSAG range in these cases.

85The R/H earns gross income of $538,218 ($44,851 per month) and net income of $316,974 ($28,081 per month) after deducting $201,244 for annual taxes and deductions.

86The R/H will be paying monthly child support of S10,369 plus his s.7 expense contribution of $5,043 (as long as the private school is maintained) plus spousal support of $4,866 (tax deductible). The total is $20,278. He earns net $28,081 per month, before accounting for the spousal support tax deduction.

87His financial statement suggests his basic monthly expenses are $8,555.25 although this does not include housing costs or the s.7 expenses. Carrying costs for the matrimonial home are $14,464.74. The A/M is paying rent of $5,600 per month. If each spouse paid $5,600 in housing cost/rent, the R/F would save about $9,000 and the children would have similar accommodation standards.

88None of these calculations are as precise as the numbers here suggest. The amounts awarded are consistent with the objectives of s.15 of the Divorce Act. There is no good reason to depart from the SSAG range based on an outcome measured by NDI.

Interim Disbursements

89The A/M requests interim disbursements in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to r. 24(25). She says she needs funding for an expert to prepare a critique of the Respondent’s income report and business valuation. She says this will cost $63,000 to $86,000. She also asks for funding for her family law legal fees in the approximate amount of $185,000 (including $10,000 for litigation arising from the sale of the matrimonial home).

90The A/M also says she requires $60,000 for her criminal trial in addition to her request for $250,000. On this point I find, however, the A/M’s legal fees for the criminal matter have nothing directly to do with the family case and are her sole responsibility.

91The R/F says that regardless of the fact that they both need to pay for lawyers and experts he does not have the financial ability to fund both their disbursements. The A/M suggested that the funds can be withdrawn from the parties’ joint Line of Credit (LOC); however, the R/F says this would place them at risk of being unable to pay the balance of the LOC when the home eventually sells.

92The LOC has a balance outstanding of $113,094.82. The current credit limit is $331,721 (i.e., $218,626.18 remaining).

93The A/M is incapable of funding the disbursements in any other way, her claim is meritorious (as far as can be determined at this stage) and the amounts sought will ultimately be required to litigate her claims: Parente v. Parente, 2023 ONSC 907; Stuart v. Stuart, 2001 28261.

94I accept that the LOC is a reasonable source of interim funding for the A/M and that a limited degree of funding should be awarded now “to level the playing field”. The R/F has been able to fund his side of the litigation through his companies. The A/M should be able to fund her side using the LOC (for her own account at the end of the litigation).

95I do not agree, however, that the A/M should be allowed immediately to take out $60,000 for experts and $180,000 for her lawyer as she requests. I will order 33% of those sums to be made available within 30 days from the LOC. Any further release of funds for interim disbursements will require further court authorization, or written agreement.

Costs

96If the parties cannot agree on costs the A/M may submit three pages of written costs’ submissions plus a copy of any applicable offer to settle and her bill of costs. This should be served within 10 days. The R/F may respond within a further 10 days with up to three pages of written costs’ submissions plus a copy of any applicable offer to settle and his bill of costs. No right of reply.

Colin P. Stevenson J.

Released: May 27, 2026

CITATION: Glowinsky v. Glowinsky, 2026 ONSC 3003

COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-00047646-0000

DATE: 20260526

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Danielle Glowinsky

Applicant

– and –

Steven Glowinsky

Respondent

REASONS on MOTION

Colin P. Stevenson J.

Released: May 27, 2026