Superior Court of Justice

The applicant, charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant in the context of a Garofoli review.

The applicant sought to question the affiant on the underlying warrantless vehicle search, a witness statement synopsis, and confidential informant information.

The court granted leave to cross-examine solely on the affiant's knowledge regarding the connection between the drugs found in the vehicle and the applicant or his residence.

Leave was denied regarding the constitutionality of the vehicle search, the witness statement, and the confidential informant, as cross-examination on those issues was not reasonably likely to assist the court in determining whether there was a basis for the warrant.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchaser for failing to close a real estate transaction.

The defendant anticipatorily breached the agreement of purchase and sale after the property's value declined due to rising interest rates.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, rejecting the defendant's vague allegations of misrepresentation.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the shortfall in the resale price, with slight reductions to the claimed real estate commission and legal fees.

The parties resolved their family law litigation via a consent order, which included a provision that the applicant would transfer her shares in two private corporations to the respondent, with the respondent bearing any associated costs.

The share transfer was delayed for years due to the need for third-party shareholder approval and disputes over the transfer documentation.

The applicant sought over $22,000 in costs for the transfer, alleging bad faith and unreasonable delay by the respondent.

The respondent sought costs of $5,000, alleging the applicant misrepresented her ability to transfer the shares.

The court found no bad faith but noted unreasonable litigation conduct by both parties.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $12,000 in costs to the applicant.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application for a writ of possession, the self-represented respondent sought costs of $15,000 for 150 hours of his time, plus disbursements, and $50,000 in damages.

The applicants argued costs should be deferred to a fresh proceeding they had commenced.

The court awarded the respondent $2,700 in costs, finding he was entitled to a moderate allowance for time spent performing work ordinarily done by a lawyer, but reduced his claimed hours to 25.

The claim for damages was dismissed as it was not properly before the court.

The offender pleaded guilty to six offences, including conspiracy to commit robbery and discharging a firearm with intent, following a drive-by shooting and vehicle pursuit in Stoney Creek.

The Crown and defence proposed a joint submission of eight years.

The court expressed serious concern that the joint submission was at the extreme low end of the range for such egregious gun violence, but ultimately accepted it.

Due to the leniency of the joint submission and the offender's repeated institutional misconduct, the court declined to grant enhanced Duncan credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and reduced the standard Summers credit to a 1.25:1 ratio, resulting in a net sentence of 69 months.

Following a 14-day family law trial, the court determined the outstanding issues of child support arrears, prejudgment interest, and costs.

The court declined to award the husband prejudgment interest on the equalization payment and child support arrears due to his failure to provide timely financial disclosure.

On the issue of costs, the court found the wife was the more successful party overall, though success was divided.

The husband was ordered to pay $50,000 in costs to the wife, reflecting his unreasonable behaviour in failing to make offers to settle and delaying disclosure.

The plaintiff mortgagee moved for summary judgment to enforce a mortgage by way of power of sale and for a writ of possession.

The defendant mortgagor had defaulted on payments and failed to redeem the mortgage.

Although the defendant filed a Statement of Defence, he did not file any responding evidence on the motion.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, granted summary judgment for the outstanding mortgage debt of $564,514.56, and ordered a writ of possession.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to transfer four Small Claims Court actions to the Superior Court of Justice and consolidate them with a newly commenced Superior Court action seeking injunctive relief.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing it was an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to show their initial choice of Small Claims Court was a mistake or that a just result could not be obtained there.

The court stayed the Superior Court action pending the outcome of the Small Claims Court trial, noting that if the plaintiffs are successful and damages are inadequate, they may seek to lift the stay for injunctive relief.

The applicant brought a Charter application under ss. 8 and 24(2) to exclude evidence seized during the execution of search warrants at his residence and vehicles.

The warrants were based on information from confidential informants and police surveillance.

The court found that while there were sufficient grounds to issue the warrants for the vehicles, the information provided fell short of establishing a credibly based probability that drugs would be found in the residence.

The court concluded that the search of the residence violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the evidence seized from the residence, noting the serious impact on the applicant's privacy interests and the affiant's negligence in seeking a residential warrant on deficient grounds.

The self-represented appellant appealed his summary conviction for 'over 80'.

He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting breath test results despite a delayed breath demand that breached his s. 9 Charter rights, failed to consider a s. 10(b) breach, and conducted an unfair trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the Grant framework to admit the evidence, that the s. 10(b) issue lacked an evidentiary foundation as it was not raised at trial, and that the trial judge was exceptionally helpful and demonstrated no bias.

The applicant, Air Passenger Rights, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of subsection 85.09(1) of the Canada Transportation Act, which imposes a blanket confidentiality requirement on the new Complaint Resolution Officer (CRO) process for air passenger disputes.

The applicant argued this violated the open court principle and section 2(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the CRO process is an adjudicative tribunal to which the open court principle applies, and that the confidentiality provision infringes section 2(b).

The government failed to justify the infringement under section 1, as the blanket confidentiality was not minimally impairing or necessary for efficiency.

The court ordered the provision read down so that confidentiality only applies to optional mediation steps, not adjudicative records.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action arising from the sale of a jointly owned property.

The plaintiff and one defendant were former law partners who co-owned the property.

The defendant received offers to purchase the property but concealed them from the plaintiff, instead using an agent to deceive the plaintiff into selling his interest for a lower amount.

The court found that a partnership still existed, fiduciary duties were breached, and the defendants engaged in civil fraud and unlawful means conspiracy.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion and granted a boomerang summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, with damages to be determined.

The applicant swore a private information containing 11 counts against four individuals following a dispute over a school bus drop-off area.

At the pre-enquete hearing, the Justice of the Peace found no evidence to issue process on most counts, but found some evidence for two counts against one individual.

The Crown intervened and withdrew those remaining counts, noting the incident had already been investigated by police and dealt with through other proceedings.

The applicant sought judicial review of the withdrawal.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no error by the Justice of the Peace and no flagrant impropriety or abuse of process to justify interfering with the Crown's core prosecutorial discretion to withdraw the charges.

The applicants sought a declaration that they had a right-of-way over the respondent's property to access their summer cottage, relying on a 1937 agreement, proprietary estoppel, or the Road Access Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the 1937 agreement did not create a valid easement due to a lack of certainty regarding its location.

The court also rejected the proprietary estoppel claim as the respondent made no representations guaranteeing access.

Finally, the court held that the disputed trail was not an 'access road' under the Road Access Act because it was an overgrown bush trail unsuitable for motor vehicles.

The respondent's counterapplication to remove a caution from title was granted.

The accused was stopped while driving a rental vehicle.

The officer detected the odour of fresh cannabis and observed small amounts of cannabis in the vehicle, prompting a search under the Cannabis Control Act.

The accused was arrested for driving while suspended, and an inventory search of the trunk prior to impoundment revealed fentanyl.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found the stop and searches were lawful, but concluded police breached s. 10(b) by delaying the accused's right to counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breaches had minimal impact and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges favoured admission.

The applicant sought temporary exclusive possession of the jointly owned matrimonial home, which also housed a dog boarding business registered as her sole proprietorship.

Following a domestic incident, the applicant was subject to criminal release conditions preventing her attendance at the property, leaving the respondent in possession.

The court granted the motion, finding that the business required centralized management and could not function effectively under divided authority.

The applicant was granted temporary exclusive possession of the home and operational control of the business to preserve the family asset pending trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a national class proceeding alleging that the defendants, major manufacturers of fragrance ingredients, engaged in an unlawful price-fixing conspiracy contrary to the Competition Act.

The proposed class included direct, indirect, and umbrella purchasers of fragrance ingredients and products.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the 'some basis in fact' test.

The evidence relied upon consisted merely of unsubstantiated suspicions and investigations by foreign regulators, without any direct or indirect evidence of a conspiracy or its impact in Canada.

Furthermore, the court found the proposed class definition unmanageable, as it would be nearly impossible for individuals to self-identify as class members.

The plaintiff corporation purchased a 37-acre rural property from the defendant corporation, whose sole director was the individual defendant husband.

The defendant wife alleged that the husband had previously forged her signature to transfer the property into his corporation's name and that the sale to the plaintiff was a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat her claims in their ongoing family law proceedings, contrary to a non-depletion order.

The court found that while the conveyance by the husband was fraudulent, the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under s. 3 of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The plaintiff paid good consideration, based on expert appraisal evidence of the property's current rural zoning, and had no actual or constructive knowledge of the husband's fraudulent intent or the family law non-depletion order.

The court also held that the plaintiff was protected by the doctrine of deferred indefeasibility under s. 78(4.2) of the Land Titles Act and the indoor management rule.

The wife was ordered to remove the non-depletion order from title.

In proposal proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the debtor brought concurrent expungement motions against proofs of claim filed by two former law firms.

The court held that the debtor failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the trustee erred in admitting the unpaid appeal-fee claim of one firm or that the claim was not legitimate, and further held that s. 135(5) did not permit reopening paid accounts or ordering repayment beyond the amount of the proof of claim.

Applying insolvency expungement jurisprudence, solicitor’s account assessment principles, and the single proceeding model, the court found that the negligence allegations against the second firm raised complex unliquidated set-off issues more appropriately determined in the pending civil negligence action.

The expungement motion as to the first law firm was dismissed, while the motion as to the second was adjourned pending the civil action, with the trustee directed to retain the disputed amount.

In supplementary reasons following a trial judgment, the court determined the proper calculation of damages owed to the defendant on a 2019 blanket mortgage.

The plaintiff, who had recently made an assignment into bankruptcy, submitted calculations based on an unsworn email attempting to re-argue facts and introduce new evidence.

The court rejected the plaintiff's submissions as improper and accepted the defendant's calculations, fixing damages at $1,018,848.74.